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With the dramatic changes in the extent to which women and men contribute to unpaid domestic 
work and paid employment, work and family life reconciliation (WFLR) has become more 
prominent than ever before within the European Union (EU) agenda. Particularly from the 
2000s, the EU began to require a relatively stronger convergence from member and candidate 
states. However, this does not necessarily result in total policy change. Existing domestic 
political and cultural conditions may facilitate or prohibit the change at national levels. This 
comparative study thus endeavours to examine the Europeanisation patterns of WFLR policies 
of a longstanding candidate country, Turkey and a founding member country, Germany, over 
the last decade, with a particular emphasis on intervening domestic actors and factors. 
 To interrogate the subject, the study draws on a combination of Europeanisation 
literature and New Institutionalism (NI) theory. The term Europeanisation has been applied 
when explaining the domestic impact of the EU on Turkish and German WFLR policies, 
whereas the NI theory has been applied when explaining the domestic responses to the EU 
influence.  
 This study employs a qualitative research design and adopts a comparative approach. 
The comparison is conducted between the Europeanisation process in Germany and the 
Europeanisation process in Turkey around this specific policy area. The data have been collected 
through the combination of document analysis and 80 semi-structured in-depth interviews with 
EU representatives; German and Turkish political elites; representatives of civil society 
organisations (CSO); and academics. The collected data is then analysed through the 
combination of thematic analysis and process tracing.  
 The findings show that, at the time when the EU started to require a stronger 
convergence, the gaps between the German and Turkish WFLR policies and the EU WFLR 
policies were considerable. Therefore, each country received a high level of adaptational 
pressure in this specific policy area. In response to this adaptational pressure, both governments 
introduced a number of laws with respect to WFLR. However, a close examination of these laws 
indicates an incomplete and a contradictory Europeanisation process in each country. This study 
 viii 
further found the simultaneous existence of domestic actors supporting the Europeanisation 
process and of those supporting the status quo; their contributions to the process are key reasons 
for this contradiction and incompleteness, which adds to the view that Europeanisation is a two-
fold process, which comprises both the push from the EU and the pull by the domestic actors.    
 Through its uniquely developed theoretical framework that compares Europeanisation 
patterns of a founding member and a candidate state from an actor-centred lens, this study 
contributes to three different literature strands: Europeanisation, gender studies, and 
comparative social policy studies. Additionally, due to the wide range of data collected 
throughout the fieldwork, this study also provides an empirical contribution by giving more 
insight into Europeanisation and social policy knowledge at national levels.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the interplay of several factors contributed to 
the alteration of the prevalent family model and, concomitantly, existing gender roles. 
These included an increase in the number of women entering higher education, the 
structural transformation of the labour market, and the increased gap between prices and 
income, together with the increased economic necessity for two-earner families (Esping-
Andersen, 2009; Hemerijck, 2013; Lewis, 2009). It has been argued that the traditional 
male breadwinner family model (Esping-Andersen, 2009; Hantrais, 2004; Lewis, 1992) 
has since lost some of its social prevalence over other family models, with the ‘adult 
earner family model,’ or at least the ‘one-and-a-half earner family model,’ gaining more 
prominence. This has resulted in a significant change in the life path of many women. 
Generally speaking, a typical post-war woman was expected to marry in her early 
twenties and have children right after marriage, and then dedicate the rest of her life to 
family altruism, acting as a ‘domestic servant’ (Esping-Andersen, 2009: 27). From the 
early 1980s onwards, women have increasingly chosen not to dedicate their lives to 
family altruism and have come to be associated with both home-making and lifelong 
employment (Esping-Andersen, 2009; McDonald, 2000). 
 These changes have been seen to improve women’s status within society. By 
pursuing a shift from primarily domestic ‘duties’ to lifelong employment, women could 
be freed from the dependency on either their fathers or male breadwinner partners 
(Lewis, 2009). However, it has also been argued that this change gave rise to new social 
inequalities and risks: some important aspects of this being the decrease in fertility rates; 
the double burden of family and job responsibilities on women’s shoulders; and the 
absence of mothers from their children’s lives (Hemerijck, 2013). Esping-Andersen 
(2009) associates this with the social policy structure of societies, stating that existing 
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welfare states are not fully ready to offset this new trajectory. To this end, and in line 
with the main aim of social policy-making, which is to provide human wellbeing and 
increase quality of life (Taylor-Gooby, 1996), these transformations have successfully 
harmonised with the formulation of laws and policies. Therefore, work and family life 
reconciliation (WFLR) has become one of the most pressing policy and political subjects 
across Europe but especially at the European Union (EU) level (Drew et al., 1998). From 
the 1980s onwards, the EU has prepared numerous strategies, formulated a range of 
goals and targets, drafted legislation and introduced various initiatives and roadmaps 
regarding the reconciliation of work and family life. However, with decision making 
around social policy, including WFLR policies, remaining under the domain of national 
competence of member and candidate states; the impact of all this attention at EU level 
on these issues has had varied impact on domestic policy. It was only as a result of the 
introduction of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) in 20001 that a stronger 
convergence from member and candidate states was required in this specific policy area. 
However, there remains considerable variation between countries in transferring and 
implementing EU standards, mostly stemming from the existence of national domestic 
actors with differing views on Europeanising the domestic WFLR model.  
 Since the 1980s, with many European welfare states are experiencing a rapid 
shift towards the ‘one- and-a-half earner’ or ‘adult earner’ family models and with the 
EU has been paying exceptional attention to the issue, it is not surprising that the 
scholarship on WFLR has exploded. To date, the literature on social policy, European 
studies and gender studies includes an array of accounts of the historical and 
contemporary development of WFLR policy at the EU and national levels. However, 
                                               
1 During the 2000s, the coordination method of governance became more common in the EU. Unlike the 
community and intergovernmental methods, it offers a mid-way solution and finds the best practices 
among member states, or at least decreases member states’ reluctance in terms of adopting the EU 
standards into their national legislative frameworks (Borras and Jacobson, 2004; Vural, 2011).   
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several elements of this topic have been less well researched. These include: analysis of 
the transmission process of corresponding EU policies into domestic levels, especially 
when it comes to candidate countries; internalisation of those policies by domestic 
governmental and nongovernmental actors; and their implementation at national levels. 
This study, therefore, seeks to address these gaps. More precisely, it aims to examine 
the Europeanisation processes of a longstanding EU candidate country, Turkey, and an 
EU founding member country, Germany, in this specific policy area. 
1.1. Rationale:  
This thesis is a comparative cross-case study that adopts a qualitative approach to 
examine the Europeanisation patterns of Turkish and German WFLR policies with a 
particular emphasis on intervening domestic actors. In the illustration of such an uneven 
and complex process of Europeanising the national WFLR legislative framework, an 
actor-centred perspective is taken. For this reason, the central emphasis is on 
investigating the roles and attitudes of domestic actors and tracing the causal 
mechanisms that account for the decisions of the domestic actors, while responding to 
the adaptational pressure coming from the EU. 
 In order to achieve this aim, this study has developed its own theoretical 
framework, which combines Europeanisation with New Institutionalism (NI). The term 
‘Europeanisation’ is applied to explain the domestic impacts of the EU and the ways in 
which the EU influences nation states. As elaborated in Chapter 2, this study accepts the 
term as a tremendously intricate two-way process that has been filtered through various 
domestic factors and actors. It argues that firstly, member states strive to upload their 
domestic preferences to the EU level, depending on their political and administrative 
capacities. In this study, this dimension is expected to apply only to Germany: Turkey 
is a candidate country, rather than a member, thus its relationship with the EU is more 
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asymmetric than that of Germany and the EU. Secondly, and after the decision is made 
at the EU level on the basis of negotiations with the member states, the EU begins to 
require a convergence from its member and candidate states. This is where the top-down 
dimension comes into play. This study bears in mind that Europeanisation is not limited 
to legislative changes, but also includes how European values and norms and policy 
paradigms are internalised and how they shape discourses and identities (Héritier, 
2001a; Ketola, 2013; Olsen, 2002), especially in policy areas where the divergence 
between the member states and the EU is high. In this way, this study uniquely explores 
the impact of EU WFLR policies on Turkish and German WFLR policies (the top-down 
dimension) at four levels (Diez et al., 2005): (1) policy Europeanisation, the legislative 
changes that have been made under EU influence; (2) discursive Europeanisation, the 
ways in which the domestic actors perceive the idea of Europeanising the national 
WFLR model; (3) political Europeanisation, the domestic actors’ contributions to the 
process; and lastly (4) societal Europeanisation, to what extent and why the EU way of 
reconciling work and family lives has been practised at the national level.  
 Furthermore, NI theory has been applied to explain domestic responses to the 
influence of the EU. In discursive Europeanisation, NI seeks to explain the mechanisms 
that account for the ways in which domestic actors perceive Europeanising the domestic 
WFLR policies; in political Europeanisation, NI theory is applied in order to understand 
the driving forces behind domestic actors’ actions throughout the process; and finally, 
for societal Europeanisation, this thesis appeals to NI theory to illustrate the reasons 
behind the existing WFLR trends. Ultimately, explaining Europeanisation through NI 
theory allows us to identify and better understand the reasons behind the legislative and 
practical decisions that have been made under the EU influence, as well as to locate the 
Europeanisation of WFLR policies within a broader national political picture. 
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 The gap in the existing literature on domestic actors’ contributions to the process 
of Europeanisation centred the fieldwork to this study. Alongside the analysis of related 
literature and policy documents, 80 semi-structured, in-depth interviews were conducted 
with Turkish and German political elites, including the countries’ former labour and 
family ministers; nongovernmental organisation (NGO) representatives; academics 
sharing the similar research interest and EU representatives. The collected data have 
been analysed through a combination of process tracing and thematic analysis. This 
combination allows the researcher to illustrate the key features of a very complex, 
uneven, and under-researched process with a greater focus on the intervening causal 
mechanisms. Process tracing has contributed to the identification of the mechanisms that 
account for policy changes under the influence of the EU, whereas thematic analysis 
facilitated the understanding of corresponding domestic actors’ perceptions of 
Europeanising the domestic WFLR model, as well as the driving forces behind their 
contributions to the process. The rationale behind the decisions made with respect to the 
research design are further elaborated in Chapter 3. Now that the thesis rationale and 
research perspective have been briefly presented, the next section will discuss the gaps 
in the existing literature, and how this thesis aims to fill them. 
1.2. Research gap and contribution: 
The growing emphasis on WFLR issues specifically at the EU level has been reflected 
in an increasing research focus on the topic. Accordingly, there is now a vast literature 
on WFLR. Yet, there is also a salient research gap, especially within the Europeanisation 
literature. 
 In her PhD dissertation, Ayşe İdil Aybars states that over time, the EU has 
gradually moved away from being a ‘single market’ and a ‘common currency’ towards 
being ‘an external policy’, ‘a security framework’, ‘an immigration agenda’ and most 
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importantly ‘a European Social Model’ (Aybars, 2007b:1), which expects an increased 
level of social policy convergence from its member and candidate states. In line with 
this increased convergence expectation, a process of Europeanising the domestic social 
policy framework has begun in most member and candidate states. Therefore, the 
existing literature on Europeanisation has largely focused on the Europeanisation of 
various social policy spheres. These include the Europeanisation of immigration policies 
(Faist and Ette, 2007; Lavenex, 2001; Schain, 2009); civil society policy (Diez et al., 
2005; Içduygu, 2013; Ketola, 2013; Zihnioğlu, 2013; Warleigh, 2001); social protection 
policy (Kvist and Saari, 2007); public policy (Radaelli, 2003); gender equality policy 
(Kantola, 2010; Liebert, 2003; Lombardo and Forest, 2012); employment policy 
(Aybars, 2007a; Graziano, 2011; Mosher and Trubek, 2003) and environmental policies 
(Jordan, 2002). However, the Europeanisation of WFLR policies has mostly been 
overlooked. Moreover, the main foci of these studies were on the policy changes pursued 
by the national states. The discursive, political and societal levels of the analysis were 
disregarded. Finally, Europeanisation scholars (Abrahamson, 1999; Aybars, 2007b; 
Esping-Andersen, 1996; Jacquot, 2008; Korpi, 2003) have also combined 
Europeanisation with welfare state typology and questioned how the transmission of EU 
standards to national levels has been filtered through the welfare regimes. However, 
although the welfare typology is a conscious preference of a certain socio-political 
ideology, the roles of the domestic actors remain unexamined. 
 A number of notable social policy scholars have paid significant attention to 
WFLR issues. They have focused on the internal and external factors influencing WFLR 
policy-making as well as the existing WFLR policies at the EU and national levels 
(Crompton et al., 2007; Drew, 1998; Esping-Andersen, 2002; 2009; Lewis, 2006, 2009). 
These researchers have questioned the policy paradigm behind WFLR policies and 
developed a number of alternative paradigms, with the aim of solving the work and 
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family life conflict. More recently, a growing emphasis has been placed on the 
implementation of WFLR policies at national levels. A voluminous body of research 
explores how families reconcile their work and family lives and aims to understand the 
shortcomings of the existing WFLR policies (Grebe, 2009; Hantrais, 2000; Knijn and 
Smit, 2009; Lewis, 2006). However, these works remain insufficient as they fail to 
combine their analysis with examination of the EU influence on changes to domestic 
WFLR legislation. 
 As WFLR is embedded in a highly tangled nexus of employment, family and 
gender equality policies (Grebe, 2009), the issue has also been assessed by researchers 
in the area of gender studies and social policy. Using a feminist lens, they question 
whether and to what extent WFLR policies could alleviate gender inequalities 
(Caracciolo di Torella and Masselot, 2010; Hakim, 2000; Lewis, 2009; Saraceno and 
Keck, 2010; Stratigaki, 2004). They pay particular attention to exploring and explaining 
the role of WFLR policies in women’s economic liberation by encouraging their labour 
market participation through providing a balanced work and a family life. However, this 
body of work also excludes the EU influence from their analysis. 
 In sum, this thesis departs from the accumulated knowledge on WFLR, arguing 
that with the new social risks and inequalities stemming from the changing labour 
market and family structures, WFLR has turned into one of the key policy areas at the 
EU level. Especially within the last two decades, the EU has begun to require more 
convergence from its member and candidate states. In line with the EU’s requirements, 
each member and candidate state has taken some important steps towards Europeanising 
the domestic model. However, the outcome of Europeanisation has varied greatly from 
one country to another, and many of the member and candidate states do not demonstrate 
a fully-fledged Europeanisation (Hantrais, 2004). In the quest to understand the factors 
and actors that constrain member and candidate states from a fully-fledged 
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Europeanisation, the existing literature has found that the process of Europeanising the 
domestic model is highly filtered by the welfare model employed at the domestic-level. 
Although each legislative piece is an intentional outcome of a certain ideology, the 
domestic actors’ perceptions of and contributions to the process as well as their 
internalisation of the EU standards have been overlooked. Accordingly, through its 
uniquely developed theoretical framework that approaches Europeanisation from an 
actor-centred perspective, together with the data collected in two countries at very 
different levels of social policy development, and at different levels of relationship with 
the EU, this study aims to contribute to existing knowledge both at theoretical and 
empirical levels. Although the primary focus of this thesis is Europeanisation of WFLR 
policies, it is expected to advance the theoretical boundaries in three different literature 
strands: Europeanisation, comparative social policy studies and gender studies. 
Moreover, due to the first-hand data collected throughout the fieldwork, this study aims 
to provide an empirical contribution by giving more insight into Europeanisation at 
national levels. As one of the very few research studies comparing the Europeanisation 
process of a candidate country with the Europeanisation process of a member state in 
this specific policy area, it displays the significant interconnection between national 
debates and the Europeanisation patterns.    
1.3. Case selection: 
Yin (2009) highlights that multiple case studies are likely to be stronger than a single 
case study design. Gerring (2017) and Hakim (1987) confirm Yin’s argument but further 
argue that the cases to be analysed should be formulated in line with the researcher’s 
aims and research questions, regardless of their number. Relying on Yin, Gerring and 
Hakim, this study explores the Europeanisation patterns of WFLR policies from an 
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actor-centred perspective, selecting as its case studies the Europeanisation process of 
Turkey and the Europeanisation process of Germany. 
 The key rationale behind choosing Turkey and Germany as case studies is that 
both exhibit a high level of misfit with the EU in terms of their domestic WFLR models. 
Concomitantly, they both have been subject to some criticism and received adaptational 
pressure from the EU. It is argued that the German social policy framework and German 
political elites have played a significant role in the construction of the Turkish social 
policy model (Özbek, 2006; Şen, 2002). Accordingly, there are many similarities; the 
most important one for this study is that both of their family models strongly support 
traditional gender roles. In both countries, historically, women are expected to be the 
homemaker whereas men are expected to be the breadwinner, and this fed into the ways 
in which German and Turkish laws and policies were formulated. Accordingly, WFLR 
policies in both countries were highly similar in terms of their nature and paradigm. 
Over the last seventeen years, in light of the pressure coming from the EU, both countries 
have witnessed shifts, away from their male breadwinner-female homemaker model. 
However, the reforms have followed different paths and reached different points. Since 
this thesis expects domestic factors and actors, to mediate the ultimate Europeanisation 
pattern, it stresses those domestic factors and actors that influenced the process by 
comparing two different countries with similar departure but different arrival points (see 
figure 1.1 below). The letters ‘X,Y,Z and W’ in Figure 1.1 visualise the initial 
similarities between German and Turkish family models, whereas the letters ‘a’, ‘b’ and 
‘c’ and ‘q’, ‘w’ and ‘r’, refer to the differences between Germany and Turkey in terms 
of their relations with the EU, and in terms of their socio-political, socio-economic, 
political institutions and political history that are expected to shape the ultimate 
Europeanisation pattern. Moreover, Germany’s status as a founding member and 
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Turkey’s status as a candidate state demonstrate how the operation of Europeanisation 
differs from a member to candidate state. 





In addition to theory- and context- driven reasons, practical considerations also 
influenced the case selection. The researcher’s fluency in the language of each country 
allowed her to overcome any potential language boundaries during the fieldwork. As 
well, Turkey is the researcher’s home country, easing her access to interviewees.  
1.4. Time frame: 
This study examines the period between 2000 and 2017 for two reasons. First of all, as 
detailed in Chapter 4, in the course of the post-industrial era, formerly neglected work 
and family life conflicts have been well-acknowledged by the EU. Instead of being a 
supplementary policy field as it was in the past, work/life balance has come to be a 
highly significant and inseparable part of the EU social policy model (Kantola, 2010; 
Liebert, 2003). Thus, WFLR issues have increasingly begun to appear in EU policy 
documents (Caracciolo di Torella and Masselot, 2010; Drew, 1998; Fahlen, 2012; 
Hantrais, 2004; Lewis, 2006, 2009, Stratigaki, 2004). The introduction of the OMC in 
2000 gave a new dimension to WFLR policies in that the EU began to require its member 
states to converge themselves with the corresponding EU standards (Esping-Andersen, 
2009). From 2000 onwards, EU member states have been expected to transpose both the 
hard and the soft EU WFLR policies into their domestic legislative frameworks. 
Therefore, it is plausible to argue that a process of Europeanising the domestic WFLR 
 
Germany:   XYZW                              a b c                                                S 
 
 
Turkey:     XYZ                                  q w r                                                 T 
Europeanisation 
patterns 
Intervening (f)actors Initial social-
policy framework 
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models has gradually appeared in each member state, including Germany, which is 
interesting to trace.  
 Furthermore, although Turkey had applied for full membership only two years 
after the European Economic Community (EEC) – the predecessor to the EU – was 
established, their long-awaited date only arrived in 1999 at the Helsinki Summit, when 
the EU declared Turkey as an official candidate state (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2013). 
Afterwards, a mutual but hierarchical exchange period began between the EU and 
Turkey. The EU started sending ‘to do lists’ for Turkey, under the name of ‘Accession 
Partnership Documents’, wherein the EU outlines the administrative and legislative 
amendments Turkey had to make to attain official membership (ibid). As a response to 
these official documents, the Turkish government has introduced a number of laws and 
bylaws with respect to leave schemes, childcare provision and working time 
arrangements in a like manner to the EU (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2013; Dedeoğlu, 2012; 
İlkkaracan, 2010). In other words, it can be argued that a Europeanisation process has 
also started in Turkey. This thesis, which aims to explore how the operation of 
Europeanisation differs from a member to a candidate country, takes advantage of this 
and examines the period between 2000 and 2017. 
1.5. Research Questions: 
This research has been conducted to explore the Europeanisation patterns of WFLR 
policies in Turkey and Germany from an actor-centred perspective. The main research 
question, therefore, is ‘how, why and to what extent have Germany and Turkey 
Europeanised their domestic WFLR model?’ By exploring the literature on the concept 
of Europeanisation, the researcher has found that Europeanisation is an interactive and 
context-dependent process. Five puzzling notions stem from such an interpretation of 
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Europeanisation: each of which stands as a research question for this study and each of 
which is addressed in four empirical chapters. 
The first research question accordingly asks ‘How, why and to what extent has 
Germany influenced the EU WFLR policies?’ This question means to unfold traces of 
German WFLR in EU WFLR policies.  
The second research question targets the other side of the coin and asks ‘How 
and to what extent has the EU influenced the domestic WFLR policies in Germany and 
Turkey?’ This question seeks to reveal the administrative and legislative changes that 
have been made in Germany and Turkey as a result of the adaptational pressure coming 
from the EU. 
The third research question next asks ‘How have German and Turkish domestic 
actors responded to Europeanisation of German and Turkish WFLR policies?’ Being 
the core analysis of this study, this question involves multiple dimensions: (a) who are 
the main domestic actors that took part throughout the Europeanisation process? (b) 
How they have responded to the relatively greater EU involvement? (c) What are the 
main motivations behind their perceptions of Europeanising the domestic WFLR 
policies while also engaging in the process of Europeanising the domestic WFLR 
model?  
The fourth question takes its lead from the previous and asks ‘How have domestic 
actors contributed to the process of Europeanising the domestic WFLR policies?’ This 
question aims to explore domestic actors’ input and influence upon the process. 
The final question asks ‘Why and to what extent have the EU WFLR policies 
been implemented in Germany and Turkey?’ It probes the extent of implementation of 
the WFLR policies and the main background reasons that they have been introduced in 
light of EU pressure.      
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These five research questions allow this study to contain two comparative 
dimensions: (1) the comparison of the operation of Europeanisation in a candidate and 
a member state; and (2) the comparison of the impact of the inner dynamics of two 
countries that differ from each other in terms of social policy development, political and 
cultural backgrounds and relationship to the EU on their Europeanisation outcomes. 
1.6. Limitations of the research: 
The key aim of this study is to investigate the Europeanisation puzzle with respect to 
WFLR policies in Turkey and Germany at four different levels. The researcher reached 
the target respondents and collected the data needed; however, there were some 
limitations which have been compensated for through various methods.  
 To begin with, the researcher commenced interviews in Brussels with EU 
officials, with the initial aim of getting more information on the EU’s thoughts towards 
German and Turkish reconciliation models than what is already provided in official EU 
documents. However, the level of information that could be obtained was highly 
disproportionate with regard to the two countries. EU officials, and the representatives 
of social partners and social institutions, were very keen to comment on the German 
model and its limitations. Yet, the same cannot be said for Turkey. As the researcher 
was from Turkey and Turkey-EU relations are in a period of regression (mostly because 
of the July 15, 2016, coup attempt2, current refugee crises and the Turkish President’s 
hostility to the EU), the EU officials were reluctant to speak about Turkey. The gaps 
caused by this reluctance have been addressed here through scrutiny of relevant EU 
documents, relevant data and papers published by the Organisation for Economic Co-
                                               
2On 15 July 2016, Turkey experienced its fourth military coup. A faction within the Turkish Armed Forces 
deemed to be connected with Turkey’s one of the strongest Islamist movements – the Gulen Movement – 
once again attempted to interfere in politics. Yet this time, unlike previous experiences, it was the coup 
attempters who failed. Neither the Turkish Grand National Assembly was closed nor the ruling party AKP. 
From that day on, Turkey has been under a state of emergency, which has fed into the elimination of 
democratic rule, erosion of secularism and trampling of human rights (Kandiyoti and Emanet, 2017).   
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operation and Development (OECD), and reports by the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), as well as through the interviews conducted in Turkey with 
representatives of the Ministry of the EU. 
 At the time the researcher commenced her fieldwork, Turkey was in a state of 
emergency due to the recent coup attempt. In the wake of the attempt, various NGOs 
were closed down with no reason given, and numerous academics, public sector 
employees and civil servants were suspended. Although these maladies have impacted 
on the interview process to a lesser degree than feared, there are still some apparent 
traces. Contrary to expectations, party deputies and NGO representatives were highly 
vocal and generous during the interviews. The civil servants, however, remained 
relatively more reluctant to express their views.  
 Three further limitations of the thesis generated from the formulation of the 
research questions rather than the conditions of the day. The first which is worth noting 
comes from the ways in which the EU approaches the reconciliation of work and family 
lives. There is an intense debate around whether the EU WFLR policies are aimed at 
achieving greater gender equality or at serving economic growth. However, this study 
excludes those discussions and accepts WFLR at the EU level as described by the EU 
because this study is aimed at unfolding Europeanisation patterns of Germany and 
Turkey in this specific area. Such an aim requires researcher to focus on how 
Europeanisation operates and on what are the domestic responses to Europeanisation, 
rather than focusing on the developments at the EU level.  
The second limitation arising from the research formulation is in relation to 
societal Europeanisation. As explained in-depth in Chapter 2, societal Europeanisation 
refers to the implementation of EU standards by member and candidate state residents. 
In that sense, the aim of examining societal Europeanisation is to reveal whether and to 
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what extent Europeanisation could change Turkish and German citizens’ WFLR trends. 
The initial plan was to interview those people who have a family and a work life about 
how they reconcile those responsibilities, the most problematic aspects of the existing 
reconciliation policies and their main needs. However, this was found to be unfeasible 
in terms of time and cost. Therefore, the researcher reduced the study of societal 
Europeanisation to the analysis of existing data and publications collected through 
interviews with key academics and NGO representatives focused on research rather than 
advocacy, and from Turkish and German official statistic institutes (TUIK and 
DEstatis).   
The last limitation of this research stems from the length of the thesis and relates 
to data triangulation. In order not to exceed the word limit set by the Ulster University, 
in most cases, the author supported her arguments with one direct quotation. However, 
as discussed in chapter 3 (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3 at pages 55 and 56), she had interviewed 
a large number of domestic actors who are involved with or knowledgeable about WFLR 
policy-making, which helped with her efforts to triangulate the data. The author ensured 
that each claim that has been made throughout this thesis was expressed by more than 
one interview partner. In other words, the themes, which emerged are not specific to one 
particular respondent.     
1.7. Structure of the thesis:   
This thesis is structured in nine chapters. This introductory chapter proceeds to Chapter 
2, which lays out the theoretical framework developed in this study and locates it to the 
phenomenon under investigation. More precisely, it reviews the literature on 
Europeanisation and NI. In doing so, it discusses how and why Europeanisation 
literature remains insufficient to fully explore the Europeanisation processes of German 
and Turkish WFLR policies. This is an important part of the discussion because it 
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explains why and how this thesis approaches Europeanisation using the additional 
framework of NI, and how the combination is applied to WFLR policy. 
 In continuation of the theoretical framework chapter, Chapter 3 presents the 
research design. It explains the research methods used in this thesis while collecting, 
coding and analysing the data, together with the rationale behind those methodological 
choices. 
 Chapter 4 presents the contextual framework. It visits the literature on WFLR 
policy both at the EU and national levels. This thesis is determined to trace the 
Europeanisation processes of Germany and Turkey in this specific policy area; therefore, 
establishing the nature of domestic WFLR policies before the processes began is of vital 
importance. Moreover, the chapter provides an overview of the factors that urge WFLR 
policy-making in EU, German and Turkish contexts. Finally, as the EU expects its 
member and candidate states to transfer not only the WFLR policies but also the policy 
paradigm, the chapter also discusses the EU logic behind WFLR policy-making.  
 Having explained the theoretical, methodological and contextual frameworks, 
the thesis proceeds to its empirical findings. Accordingly, Chapter 5 explores WFLR 
policy Europeanisation. This thesis accepts Europeanisation as a two-way process that 
consists of both the EU’s requirements from the nation states and the nation states’ 
responses. In line with the ways in which Europeanisation has been interpreted, Chapter 
5 delves into the WFLR policy reforms experienced by Germany and Turkey under the 
EU influence. Therefore, it first discusses the EU’s requirements of these two countries 
together with the countries’ domestic legislative responses. Second, it discusses any 
mismatch between the EU requirements and the two sets of domestic policy responses.   
 The core analysis of this thesis is presented in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. Chapter 6 
focuses on the stances of the domestic actors towards greater EU involvement in this 
specific policy area of WFLR. In other words, it illustrates the perceptions of domestic 
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actors towards Europeanising the domestic legislative framework, perceptions which are 
expected to shape the whole process. In that sense, it questions why some actors have 
decided to act as a catalyst and accelerated the process while others have favoured the 
status quo and decelerated the process. By exploring domestic actors’ perceptions of the 
Europeanisation of WFLR policies through NI, the chapter aims to reveal the importance 
of domestic actors’ rational calculations, as well as socio-political and historical 
backgrounds, to the process of Europeanising the domestic WFLR policies.      
 Drawing on the perception of Europeanisation of WFLR at national levels, 
Chapter 7 analyses domestic actors’ contributions to the process. More specifically, this 
chapter seeks to explain the strategies and tactics that have been employed by both 
catalysts and antagonists while achieving their aims, together with the barriers that they 
have faced throughout the process. By showing the differences in strategy that have been 
employed and the barriers that have been faced by catalysts and antagonists, the chapter 
highlights how socio-political and socio-economic conditions of the day may influence 
the Europeanisation process. In-depth illustration of the strategies and barriers is very 
important for this thesis because it shows how Europeanisation is literally shaped by the 
domestic actors on the ground. 
 Since Europeanisation process involves not only policy adaptation but also the 
implementation of those policies, the last empirical chapter focuses on the societal level. 
Chapter 8 explores the implementation of WFLR policies made in Germany and Turkey 
under the EU influence. It questions why and to what extent the EU WFLR trend has 
been practised at national levels by German and Turkish citizens. By analysing the 
reasons behind societal actors’ daily WFLR practices, the chapter also speaks to the top-
down nature of the EU. It discusses to what extent and why a supranational WFLR 
model is implementable at the domestic levels.   
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 The final chapter reminds the reader about the main findings of this thesis and 
draws several conclusions from the analysis conducted. It aims to bring together the 
findings in order to discuss Turkey’s and Germany’s Europeanisation patterns of WFLR 
policies. Moreover, by linking the findings with the key research questions, the chapter 
aims to provide alternative ideas for WFLR policy-making as well as outline areas for 
future research. 
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CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter introduces the theoretical framework of the study in order to explore the 
Europeanisation processes of Germany and Turkey. In doing so, it draws on two crucial 
aspects: (a) Europeanisation and (b) New Institutionalism. As illustrated later in this 
chapter, Europeanisation is taken here to refer to a bidirectional process, which both 
shapes and is shaped by the domestic policies and politics. To this end, the term 
Europeanisation has been applied when explaining the domestic impact of the EU and 
the ways in which the EU influences the national states, whereas New Institutionalism 
(NI) theory has been applied when explaining the domestic responses to the EU 
influence. To that end, the chapter is organised in seven sections. It begins by defining 
the concept of Europeanisation; secondly, it explains the different domains of 
Europeanisation; thirdly, it illustrates the ways in which Europeanisation operates; 
fourthly, it examines the roles of the domestic actors throughout the process, which is 
where the study appeals to NI. Therefore, the fifth section continues with a detailed 
explanation of NI; sixthly it discusses the potential Europeanisation patterns that are 
identified within the Europeanisation literature; and finally, it puts forward an 
interpretation of Europeanisation in the field of WFLR.  
2.1. Definitions of Europeanisation:  
Notable scholars have already observed that Europeanisation is not a theory itself but a 
puzzling and a vague concept in the broad field of European Studies (Graziano and Vink, 
2008; Ketola, 2013; Ladrech, 2010 and Radaelli, 2004). Therefore, it has accrued 
different meanings in different contexts over time and various commentators have 
defined it differently due to their research interests and objectives. 
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 As Exadaktylos and Radaelli (2009) put forward, early studies on 
Europeanisation had largely focused on the evolution of European institutions as a set 
of new rules and practices. Ladrech, one of the initial advocates of this tendency, defines 
the term as: 
An incremental process, reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the 
degree that EC political and economic dynamics became part of the 
organizational logic of politics and policy-making (Ladrech, 1994:69).  
 
As can be seen from the definition above, contributors have been concerned with the 
ways in which member state governments influence the EU-level administrative and 
legislative structures, exploring how, and to what extent, member states contribute to 
the establishment of EU level norms, values, rules and practices. This process, wherein 
member states try to transfer their own preferences to the European level, has been 
labelled as the ‘bottom-up’ dimension within the Europeanisation literature. This variant 
of Europeanisation has primarily been developed by Tanja A. Börzel (2002). She argues 
in her ground-breaking work ‘Member State Responses to Europeanisation’ that 
member states look for ways to ‘upload’ their national policy preferences to the EU in 
order to reduce the divergence between the EU and domestic legislative frameworks as 
much as possible so that they can subsequently minimise the costs of domestic 
legislation and implementation of EU rules, values and norms (Börzel, 2002; Börzel and 
Risse, 2003). It has further been argued that the process of uploading national 
preferences to the EU differs from one member state to another (Börzel and Risse, 2003). 
Although various scholars have identified a wide range of factors that affect the success 
of uploading, there is a significant consensus that more powerful member states are more 
likely to succeed in transferring their own preferences to the EU. In other words, they 
are more successful in shaping EU standards. The literature on the bottom-up dimension 
of Europeanisation has identified two aspects which define what precisely is meant by 
being more powerful: (1) political capacity, or the political weight which the member 
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states carry in EU decision making bodies (such as the number of votes in the Council 
and financial contribution to the EU budget); and (2) administrative capacity, which can 
be defined as the function of particular resources such as staff-power, money or ability 
to offer expertise and information to the European Commission (EC) in the drafting of 
policy proposals  (Diez et al., 2005; Börzel and Risse, 2003; Cowles and Risse, 2001; 
Radaelli, 2000). 
 More recently, Europeanisation scholars have increasingly become interested in 
what happens after the legislative framework has been developed at the EU level. This 
is the dimension known as ‘top-down’ within the Europeanisation literature. According 
to Börzel and Risse (2000), this dimension was sine quo non for a fully-fledged 
examination of any Europeanisation process. The authors associated with this dimension 
have argued that the EU developments have surely influenced the national legislative 
structures. Yet, each member and candidate state has been influenced in varied ways and 
to different extents (Kvist and Saari, 2007; Ladrech, 2010 and Radaelli, 2003) depending 
on the cost and benefit calculations done at national levels (rational choice 
institutionalism, RCI); past decisions of national governments (historical 
institutionalism, HI) and national governments’ logics of appropriateness (sociological 
institutionalism, SI). Accordingly, Europeanisation scholars have sought answers for the 
ways in which the EU and its rules, regulations, norms and values affect member and 
candidate states at their domestic levels. Two major factors appear to influence this 
issue. The first one is the adaptational pressure coming from the EU to member states 
due to the divergence between EU level and domestic level structures. The second one 
is the presence of domestic factors and actors that would respond to this pressure either 
by pro-acting or reacting (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999). These factors and actors are called 
‘mechanisms of Europeanisation’ and will be discussed in depth below. 
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Nevertheless, it is important to note that these two dimensions of 
Europeanisation are not mutually exclusive. The reason they have been explained 
separately here is for theoretical purposes only. Europeanisation is an on-going process 
and these two dimensions in practice characterise two different phases of this on-going 
process. In that sense, one of the most comprehensive explanations of the term for this 
thesis has been provided by Claudio M. Radaelli, who defines Europeanisation as: 
Processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalisation of formal 
and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ 
and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the 
making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of 
domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies (Radaelli, 
2003:30).  
 
This definition is crucial for this study because (1) it involves the role of member states 
in the process of decision-making at the EU level rather than treating Europeanisation 
as a one-way process in which EU institutions only impose their decisions on member 
states. It considers how, to what extent and why member states contribute to the EU 
legislative framework; (2) it emphasises the whole process through illustrating the roles 
of the domestic actors instead of looking and conceptualising the final domestic change. 
In other words, it examines the ways in which domestic actors perceive and contribute 
to the process of Europeanising the domestic legislative framework by bringing NI into 
the discussion; (3) it moves the scope of Europeanisation beyond the corresponding 
policies and involves the corresponding norms, values, rules and regulations; and (4) it 
stresses the importance of not only the adaptation of European norms, values, rules and 
regulations, but also their implementation and internalisation. 
 In sum, as has been discussed above, it is impossible to attribute one single 
meaning to the term Europeanisation. It takes different forms and explanations at 
different times in different research agenda. This study, examining the Europeanisation 
patterns of WFLR policies in Turkey and Germany, relies on Radaelli’s definition (cited 
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above) and accepts the term as a two-way process rather than restricting itself to either 
bottom-up or top-down dimensions. By approaching Europeanisation from such an 
angle, this study distinguishes Europeanisation from European integration, convergence 
or harmonisation. It argues that Europeanisation can only be a possible outcome of 
European integration and it has only the potential to bring about convergence or 
harmonisation, both of which in the end depend on various domestic aspects that are 
associated with the process, which are discussed later in this chapter. That is to say that 
the member and the candidate states might either accept or reject reformulating the 
national legislative framework in the light of EU requirements. Moreover, the level of 
reformulation featured at the national level may not be enough to close the gap with the 
EU, or on the contrary they may successfully conform their national structures to the 
EU’s (Featherstone, 2003; O’Connor, 2005).  
 Domestic structure, however, is a very wide description. For a careful and 
detailed analysis of the Europeanisation process, what is meant by domestic structure 
should be identified. Thus, the chapter proceeds with looking at ‘what is being 
Europeanised’; in other words, the domains wherein the effects of Europeanisation 
appear. 
2.2 Domains of Europeanisation: 
Börzel and Risse (2000) identify three major areas where EU matters and concomitantly 
the impacts of Europeanisation appear: politics, polities and policies. Their intention is 
fully practical – making the Europeanisation more suitable for empirical analysis. So, 
they argue that in order to make it more amenable, the domestic impacts of 
Europeanisation on polities, policies and politics of a country should be analysed 
separately.  
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 In their categorisation, politics involves the processes of interest formation, 
aggregation and representation of the political actors, as well as their strategies and 
cooperation with other domestic actors, mainly with interest groups. To this end, the 
research concerned with the Europeanisation of politics aims to explore the changes in 
the actions of actors who are engaged with domestic governance under EU influence 
(Börzel and Risse, 2000; Ladrech, 2010; Wiener and Diez, 2004). Further, polity alludes 
to ‘political community and its institutions’ (Wiener and Diez, 2004: 18) including 
national executives, national parliaments, national courts or regional institutions 
(Ladrech, 2010). Hence, the Europeanisation of polities examines whether and how any 
of these institutions have witnessed a change with respect to the EU. Lastly, the 
Europeanisation of policies refers to any kind of transformation and adjustment to 
national policies, as well as the logic behind policy-making and problem solving due to 
EU influence (Börzel and Risse, 2003). 
Relying on Börzel and Risse, this research devotes itself to policy 
Europeanisation and aims to examine the transmission of EU WFLR policies in German 
and Turkish contexts. However, in order to strengthen the analysis and reach a more 
holistic and accurate conclusion, this study also considers Ulrike Liebert’s (2002) 
argument that Europeanisation matters not only in terms of the changes that take place 
in the administrative and legislative structures of national governments, but also in the 
extent to which the national states feel ‘European’. That is to say that Europeanisation 
includes how EU values and norms as well as policy-paradigms are internalised and how 
they shape discourses and identities at national levels. Therefore, as can be seen from 
Figure 2.1 below, this study explores the impact of the EU WFLR model on Turkish and 
German models in four different levels: (1) Policy Europeanisation, which is probably 
the most common and widespread dimension, looks at the adjustments on national 
legislative frameworks (Diez et al., 2005). As Ketola (2013: 35) puts forward, it 
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examines ‘(a) what is required by the EU and (b) to what extent the country’s legislative 
framework meets those requirements or how it may need to change’. It concentrates on 
the level of fit and misfit between the member or candidate state policies and the EU 
level policies (Risse et al., 2001). It would not be controversial to say that this dimension 
is the first step of exploring the Europeanisation process of a country. It examines how 
and to what extent Turkish and German reconciliation measures differ from the EU 
reconciliation measures and what changes Turkish and German governments have made 
throughout the process. (2) Discursive Europeanisation aims to understand the attitudes 
of domestic actors towards Europeanising the national WFLR policies and the framing 
of WFLR Europeanisation in domestic actors’ language. It explores the ways in which 
EU WFLR is referred to within party campaigns, party programs or social movement 
campaigns (Cowles and Risse, 2001; Diez et al., 2005; Ketola, 2013). This dimension 
can be considered as a tool to identify both the domestic actors that support the EU way 
of reconciling work and family life and thus accelerate the adaptation of those policies, 
and the domestic actors that challenge EU-induced policies and prefer to preserve the 
national framework. (3) Political Europeanisation aims to back up discursive 
Europeanisation and looks at how domestic actors react to and operate within this 
process. Although the literature on political Europeanisation restricts itself solely to 
domestic political actors, in order to draw a more detailed picture on the domestic actors’ 
roles throughout the process, this study also includes NGOs because in both countries 
the civil society organisations (CSOs) in general, but women’s NGOs in particular, 
appear as a highly strong component of the process. Finally, since the EU requires a 
stronger convergence from its member and candidate states in the areas where the level 
of misfit is high, which is true for both of the selected countries, this study does not limit 
itself to the governance level alone, but uniquely considers how corresponding European 
values and norms are practised by German and Turkish citizens. Accordingly, the last 
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level is (4) Societal Europeanisation – whether, why, and to what extent, EU standards 
of reconciling work and family life affect the identity formation at the domestic level. 
Put simply, how ‘European’ do individuals feel while they are reconciling their work 
and family lives?  
Figure 2. 1: The domains of Europeanisation. 
As can be seen from Figure 2.1 above, this thesis approaches policy Europeanisation 
from four different levels, each of which stands as a single element of the whole process. 
Nevertheless, as Cowles and Risse (2001) have stated, no matter which level of 
Europeanisation has been studied, there are certain conditions in order for 
Europeanisation to operate and the chapter proceeds with discussion of these. 
2.3. Operationalising Europeanisation: 
Comparative research on Europeanisation pinpoints that the ways in which 
Europeanisation operates differ between a member state and a candidate state due to the 
nature of their relations with the EU. Therefore, the chapter analyses how 
Europeanisation operates in Turkey and Germany separately. 
2.3.1. Europeanisation of a member state: 
Cowles and Risse (2001) develop one of the most significant and elaborate frameworks 
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of Europeanisation’. They perceive Europeanisation as a two-way process – an 
institution and policy building process at the EU level first, followed by the effects of 
these institutions and policies on EU member states. Accordingly, Europeanisation can 
operate only if there is a misfit (Duina, 1997) or mismatch (Héritier, 1996) between 
European policies and institutions on the one hand and national policies and institutions 
on the other. Put simply, they argue that there must be a gap between what is required 
by the EU and the extent to which the country’s legislation framework meets those 
requirements (Ketola, 2013). They call the degree of this gap between the EU 
requirements and country’s framework ‘the goodness of fit’ (Cowles and Risse, 2001). 
They further argued that this misfit between domestic and EU levels will eventually 
cause an adaptational pressure on member states: a larger gap would lead to stronger 
pressure coming from the EU and vice versa (Cowles and Risse, 2001; Ladrech, 2010). 
In the meantime, they note that the existence of this adaptational pressure does not 
necessarily narrow that gap between national and EU levels or bring change to domestic 
structures. Existing domestic political and cultural conditions, which they call 
‘mediating factors’, may facilitate or prohibit the change at the national level (Cowles 
and Risse, 2001). In other words, they may accelerate or decelerate the process. 
(Domestic political and societal factors and actors have been identified as mediating 
factors and the ways in which they shape the operation of Europeanisation are discussed 
below in section 2.4.).  
The ‘goodness of fit’ argument has been cited as a very useful framework to 
explain how Europeanisation proceeds. Nonetheless, it has also been criticised from 
various angles (Héritier, 2001a; Héritier, 2001b; Radaelli, 2003). One that is important 
for this study is offered by Claudio Radaelli, who highlights its insufficiency in 
comprising first the soft laws developed at the EU level and second the bottom-up 
dimension of Europeanisation (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004; Radaelli, 2003). His critique 
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is very applicable to this study because: (1) the EU WFLR policy package consists of 
both soft and hard laws; and (2) one of the selected countries, Germany, is a powerful 
founding member of the union, so that its Europeanisation process in the broad sense is 
expected to be two-fold, including an uploading process on the one hand and a 
downloading process on the other (Dyson and Goetz, 2003). 
Bulmer and Radaelli (2004) state that Europeanisation of soft laws differs 
significantly from Europeanisation of hard laws. While Europeanisation operates 
‘horizontally’ with respect to soft laws, it operates ‘vertically’ when it comes to hard 
laws. Vertical Europeanisation makes a sharp distinction between the EU level and 
domestic level and leads to new policy-making or policy adjustment, whereas the 
horizontal makes a smoother distinction between the EU level and domestic level and 
leads to policy learning at the domestic political sphere. Moreover, Bulmer and Radaelli 
outline three modes of governance, namely ‘governance by negotiation’; ‘governance 
by hierarchy’ and ‘facilitated co-ordination’. The first governance mode, governance by 
negotiation, refers to the bottom-up dimension of Europeanisation and operates through 
vertical mechanisms. Member states try to upload their own preferences to the EU level 
in order to decrease the level of later adaptational pressure. The second mode of 
governance, governance by hierarchy, refers to the top-down dimension of 
Europeanisation. At this stage in their conceptualisation, the uploading is over and the 
model to be downloaded is ready for member states to adapt. This mode of governance 
is usually valid for EU hard laws and operates through a vertical Europeanisation 
mechanism. The last mode of governance is facilitated co-ordination; this applies to EU 
soft laws, and thus operates through horizontal mechanisms and refers to ‘a platform for 
learning about good practice’ rather than policy change (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004: 
12). Because it works horizontally and functions in transferring soft laws, which are 
non-binding measures, it is expected to result in policy learning at the domestic level 
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(Jacquot, 2008; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999). Learning here defines a process of 
internalising EU norms, values, rules and practices. It results in modifications and 
alterations in policy makers’ paradigms and thus in the policy-making process (Göksel, 
2011; Jacquot, 2008; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999). By formulating Europeanisation in 
this way, Bulmer and Radaelli (2004) involve formerly neglected aspects of 
Europeanisation. However, their formulation concerns member states rather than 
candidate states. As one of the cases this study considers is not yet a member, the chapter 
proceeds with a discussion of the ways in which Europeanisation operates in candidate 
states. 
2.3.2. Europeanisation of a candidate state: Conditionality 
The research on Europeanisation was originally concerned with EU member states. 
However, the context of enlargement, and mostly Central and Eastern European 
countries’ (CEEC) desire to join the EU, led the EU to influence the restructuring of 
their domestic legislation (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005). This is reflected in 
the Europeanisation literature under the term ‘conditionality’. Scholars engaged with the 
term have sought to explain the Europeanisation processes of non-member but candidate 
countries (Grabbe, 2003; Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005). Before describing 
how conditionality works, it is important to underline the distinction between democratic 
conditionality and the acquis conditionality. While the former concerns the adaptation 
of basic democratic and human right norms, the latter focuses on the transposition of 
certain EU laws into the domestic legislative frameworks (Lavenex and 
Schimmelfenning, 2009). The former mostly appears in the early stages of the EU 
membership trajectory, whereas the latter, upon which this study focuses, appears at the 
later stages of the accession processes.  
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Conditionality is a process wherein a candidate country tries officially to 
convince the EU of its current capacity to enact EU laws, regulations, norms and values 
at the domestic level. This undoubtably leads to a move at the domestic levels from 
internal standards towards EU standards. Therefore, it could be argued that 
conditionality triggers a Europeanisation process in candidate countries. The process 
actually starts when the country decides to apply for membership. The country gains an 
official status when the European Council recognises this candidacy and declares it 
eligible (Keyman, 2013). Prior to doing so, the Council expects the applicant country to 
fulfil the so-called Copenhagen criteria – certain pre-determined rules and laws that the 
country needs to follow and implement in order to be eligible to join the EU. They can 
be summarised as (1) guaranteeing democracy and ensuring the protection of human 
rights and minority rights; (2) a functioning market economy and ability to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the EU; (3) the ability to take on the 
obligations of membership and implement the EU acquis, which refers to all existing or 
potential rights and obligations of the EU including the binding and non-binding laws, 
rules and regulations, as well as the norms and values (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2013; 
Keyman, 2013).  
These determine the country’s possible readiness for the full membership3 
(Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2013). Once the Council officially recognises and declares the 
candidacy status, the Europeanisation process officially begins. With this official 
recognition, the applicant country starts receiving the ‘Accession Partnership 
Documents’ – official documents prepared by the EC that identify the reforms needed 
to be done at the domestic level in order to align the domestic legislative structure to the 
                                               
3 Ideally, a candidate country gains an official candidacy status when it completely meets the Copenhagen criteria. 
Yet, in practice, most countries gain the official candidacy status before they completely met the Copenhagen criteria, 
and therefore, they cannot start the negotiations for the full membership immediately (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2013).  
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EU acquis, together with the financial and technical aid provided by the EU to the 
applicant country for the reforms. In response to these documents, the applicant country 
draws up a detailed action programme for the adoption of the EU acquis. Then the 
Commission reviews this ‘National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis’ and 
transmits its thoughts on the proposed reforms, in terms of compliance with the EU 
acquis to the applicant country, through annual ‘Progress Reports’ (Ministry for EU 
Affairs, n.d.; Dimitrova, 2002; Linden, 2002; Schimmelfenning et al., 2003). As can be 
seen, this is highly asymmetrical (Grabbe, 2003).  
In such an asymmetrical relationship, the EU appears as an organism which is 
eligible to define certain prerequisites that the candidate country has to meet in order to 
achieve membership status (Vachudova, 1995). In contrast to member states’ 
Europeanisation processes, the Europeanisation process of candidate states is one-
dimensional, meaning that candidate states are not involved in the EU policy-making 
and institution building processes. Thus, they cannot influence any policy outcome at 
the EU level. Theoretically speaking, Europeanisation in candidate states operates both 
vertically and horizontally as in the member states. However, unlike with member states, 
Europeanisation in candidate states does not have the bottom-up dimension; therefore, 
it lacks the governance by negotiation mode. It only starts after the decision has been 
made at the EU level and consists of the adaptation of those EU standards. On the other 
hand, the EU and its member states expect candidate countries to prove their 
‘Europeanness’, to demonstrate that they share the same norms, values and legal 
structures as the EU and its members so that they would not remain as an outsider. This 
gives the EU extensive power of sanction over these countries (Schimmelfenning and 
Sedelmeier, 2005), meaning that the EU requires a broader and deeper integration from 
them. Accordingly, candidate countries are required to adapt not only EU hard laws, but 
also the EU soft laws. Furthermore, candidate countries are expected to exhibit a policy-
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making paradigm change (Dimitrova, 2002; Linden, 2002; Schimmelfenning et al., 
2003). In that sense, it can be argued that the Europeanisation process of the candidate 
countries holds the policy learning potential so it contains facilitated co-ordination as 
defined by Bulmer and Radaelli (2004).  
To sum up, the concept of conditionality is regarded as the key instrument of the 
Europeanisation processes of the candidate countries. Although Grabbe (2003) states 
that there is no big difference between the way in which Europeanisation operates in 
member states and the way in which it operates in candidate states, the term 
conditionality highlights two important points, already mentioned above. The first is that 
because candidate countries are not members yet, they do not have a say in forming the 
policy package at the EU level, which ultimately creates an asymmetrical relationship. 
The second point is the uncertainty of their status, meaning that these countries gain an 
official membership status conditioned on how Europeanised they are (Grabbe, 2003). 
Nevertheless, as the operation of Europeanisation is relevant for both the member and 
candidate states, this study does not make a distinction between the candidate and the 
member states while explaining their Europeanisation processes, but relies on the 
Europeanisation literature (Grabbe, 2003; Lavenex and Schimmelfenning, 2009; Tocci, 
2005). Ideally, once the EU spells out the rules of acquis, candidate states – perhaps 
even more than member states – should adopt them. The EU clearly appears as an 
external push-factor and an oracle for policy-making in both member and candidate 
states. However, in practice neither a member nor a candidate state transposes those 
rules of acquis flawlessly (Tocci, 2005) and fully accommodates their policy framework 
to the EU. Europeanisation has a clear impact on member and candidate states in terms 
of changing their legislative status quo. Yet that is not to say that there will be a fully-
fledged policy change in domestic structures. Member and candidate states will not 
necessarily be totally Europeanised. Their Europeanisation processes are filtered 
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through a number of factors leading to different Europeanisation outcomes. By and 
large, the literature on Europeanisation points to existing welfare models and the 
national social policies as the main sources of this filtration (Pfau-Effinger, 2005). As 
any kind of social policy is an intentional outcome – an intentional preference, more 
precisely – of certain groups of political actors, it could easily be argued that domestic 
political actors are the beating hearts of the Europeanisation processes. They are 
involved in policy-making by hampering the status quo, thus helping Europeanisation 
to bring change, or by defending the status-quo and favouring policy stability. Either 
way, they make their legislative decisions on the basis of different purposes (Börzel and 
Risse, 2003; Héritier, 2005; March and Olsen, 1998; Peters, 2005; Tocci, 2005; Tsebelis, 
2002). The chapter continues by illustrating the roles of those domestic actors and their 
ideologically motivated conscious actions throughout the Europeanisation process. 
2.4. Roles of the domestic actors: 
The literature on Europeanisation states that the second condition for Europeanisation, 
to be materialised alongside the misfit and the concomitant adaptational pressure, is the 
capacity of domestic actors ‘to exploit the opportunities and avoid the constraints 
coming from such a misfit’ (Börzel and Risse, 2003:64). Throughout the 
Europeanisation process, member and candidate states appear as entities who carry the 
possibility of policy change as an outcome of the EU adaptational pressure. Simply put, 
whether they (member and candidate states) end up with policy change or preservation 
of the status quo depends very much on the behaviours of domestic actors determining 
the political agenda in those states. 
  Taking its lead from the literature on Europeanisation (Börzel and Risse, 2003; 
Hix and Goetz, 2007; Korpi, 2006; Radaelli, 2003), this thesis has divided those 
intervening domestic actors into two major groups in order to theorise their actions. The 
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first group, the so-called ‘catalysts’, consists of those capable of exploiting the 
opportunities and avoiding the constraints coming from a misfit. They are the ones who 
are in favour of the policy change and thus work for the change. Concomitantly, their 
presence accelerates the process of Europeanisation. The second group, the 
‘antagonists’4, consists of the decelerators whose presence would favour the status quo 
as they work to veto the policy change but to preserve the national legislation (Korpi, 
2006). Categorising domestic actors as catalysts and antagonists is particularly 
important for this study because it constitutes a bedrock of the empirical analysis carried 
out in this thesis. Three of the four empirical chapters base their findings on this 
catalyst/antagonist categorisation.  
 Although the Europeanisation literature successfully elucidates conditions under 
which Europeanisation will operate and in what direction it can lead, the primary 
question of why actors (governmental or nongovernmental) perform in a particular way 
(accelerating or decelerating the process) has not been addressed. That is to say that 
Europeanisation, which is not a theory in itself but more of a guiding framework 
explaining how possible change can occur, remains quite insufficient in terms of 
illustrating the reasons for the behaviours of domestic actors throughout the process. For 
a complete exploration of the Europeanisation process, those reasons need to be 
examined and explained. After all, Europeanisation can bring transformation at the 
national levels only if domestic actors seize upon the relevant EU standards. This is 
where the second aspect of the theoretical framework of this study – the NI – comes to 
the scene (Börzel and Risse, 2000; March and Olsen, 1998). In seeking to answer 
                                               
4 Korpi (2006) in his inspiring work ‘Power Resources and Employer-Centered Approaches in 
Explanations of Welfare States and Varieties of Capitalism Protagonists, Consesters and Antagonists’ 
identified the actors, who were opposed to extention of social citizenship rights as antagonists. This thesis, 
however, applies the term to German and Turkish actors, who refuse to support the process of 
Europeanising the national WFLR policies.   
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questions of which domestic actor did what and why, this study appeals to the three 
forms of NI: RCI, HI and SI (Ketola, 2013; Ladrech, 2010; March and Olsen, 1998; 
Peters, 2005) that are explicated below.   
2.5. New Institutionalism: 
NI is the enhanced version of institutionalism – a political science theory with the aim 
of explaining the emergence of ‘institutions’ and individuals’ behaviours within them 
(March and Olsen, 1998; Peters, 2005). The concept of an institution can be viewed as 
the practices and rules that define an appropriate way of behaving for specific groups of 
actors in specific circumstances (Peters, 2005). Research on institutionalism endeavours 
to theorise the actions of individuals towards those rules and practices. NI adds to this 
framework seven new variants (Normative Institutionalism, Rational Choice 
Institutionalism, Historical Institutionalism, Sociological Institutionalism, Empirical 
Institutionalism, Constructivist Institutionalism and International Institutionalism) to 
enrich the exploration of individual behaviours (ibid.). This study refers to three of these 
to explain the roles of mediating factors throughout the Europeanisation process. In the 
application of this theoretical framework to the Europeanisation process, the misfit, and 
the concomitant adaptational pressure, appears as an institution which might offer new 
opportunities to, or exert new restraints on, member and candidate states. Member and 
candidate states are perceived as specific groups of actors with the potential to react to 
these new opportunities and restraints (Bennett and Checkel, 2015; Börzel and Risse, 
2000; Schimmelfenning, 2010; Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005). Accordingly, 
they appear as a group of actors whose behaviours need to be analysed. 
  A number of notable Europeanisation scholars have pointed to RCI as the first 
of three useful frameworks for conceptualising how member and candidate states 
respond to the adaptational pressure coming from the EU (Börzel and Risse, 2003; 
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Featherstone, 2003; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Ketola, 2013; Ladrech, 2010; March and 
Olsen, 1998).  RCI relies on ‘a logic of consequentialism’ (March and Olsen, 1989: 162) 
and perceives individuals as rational and goal-oriented beings, who evaluate the costs 
and benefits of a certain process, as well as anticipating other’s behaviours, before 
making their own decisions (Ketola, 2013; Pollack, 1999). It postulates maximum utility 
to the actors’ behaviours. From this point of view, each individual actor at the domestic 
level – whether be it a political actor who is responsible for making the corresponding 
policies or a civil society actor who tries to shape those policies by various lobbying 
activities – is expected strategically to calculate the potential gains and potential losses 
of meeting EU requirements (Featherstone, 2003). Those Europeanisation scholars 
holding a more actor-centred approach (Börzel and Risse, 2003; Scharpf, 1999; 
Schimmelfenning, 1999; Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005; Tocci, 2005) have 
argued that domestic actors will facilitate change through working to meet those EU 
requirements and Europeanise the national legislative structure only if they perceive the 
gains of Europeanising the domestic policy model to be greater than the compliance 
costs. It is also important to note that even if domestic actors choose to be catalysts rather 
than antagonists, it does not necessarily mean that they pursue a policy-making paradigm 
change. Actors pushing for policy change and adopting EU laws into their national 
legislative frameworks might be strategically adopting those rules of the EU, which does 
very little to change their mind-sets. Acting as a catalyst throughout the process on the 
grounds of utility maximisation does not necessarily result in social learning 
(Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2005).  
 HI emerges as another very fruitful approach for explaining the Europeanisation 
process of a member or a candidate state from an actor-centred perspective. Again with 
a particular focus on the domestic actors’ preferences, this strand of thinking suggests 
that domestic actors’ decisions on supporting either the Europeanisation or the status 
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quo are very much related to the past (Pierson, 2000). That is to say that, policy decisions 
made in the past and the patterns they created, or any kind of historical incident, are 
crucially important in determining whether an actor would prefer to accelerate the 
Europeanisation process or decelerate it (Hall, 1986; Peters, 2005 and Pollack, 2006). 
In that sense, the treaties that member states have signed, the laws they have passed or 
the agreements they have made in the past surely shape the domestic change. Ketola 
(2013) has already linked this to Europeanisation and argued that if the residuals of the 
past are contrary to the EU requirements, then the domestic actors are likely to act as an 
antagonist and vice-versa. Yet it is important to note here that this may lead to two 
different outcomes depending on the efficiency of the earlier policies and political 
trends. On the one hand, if the initial decisions or the political incidents experienced 
have been felt inadequate or negative, then the actors would be likely to avoid making 
any kind of new decision that might recall those formerly failed ones. Therefore, HI 
would impact the current decision in a reactionary fashion. On the other hand, effective 
past decisions are likely to lead domestic actors to keep the political and policy legacies 
alive (Esping-Andersen, 1996; Peters, 2005; Meyer and Pfau-Effinger, 2006). HI would 
thus operate in a path-dependent fashion. 
 One last possible theoretical lens that can help explain why member and 
candidate states have been or have not been Europeanised is SI, which suggests ‘social 
learning’ (Risse, 2004a). This variant of NI claims that instead of trying to calculate the 
opportunities that Europeanisation can offer and the constraints that Europeanisation can 
exert, or to link these opportunities and constraints with the past, actors within the 
member and candidate states ‘follow a logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 
1989: 23). That is, they have already considered the rules, regulation, norms and values 
that have been developed at the EU level as ‘the right thing to do’ (Börzel and Risse, 
2003; Risse, 2004b). In contrast to the two aforementioned variants of NI, SI expects 
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Europeanisation to bring a change to member states through social learning and a 
process of persuasion. This means that domestic actors facilitate the Europeanisation 
process not because they think it is gainful, but because they are convinced that meeting 
EU requirements is the most appropriate and right action to take (Schimmelfenning and 
Sedelmeier, 2005). Of all the domestic actors, the ones who have come to share the same 
logic with the EU fall under the catalysts and redefine their interests accordingly. The 
actors who are not persuaded by the appropriateness of the EU requirements continue to 
veto the process. The literature on NI refers to catalysts as ‘change agents’, who have 
come to share the same views with the EU and prefer to accelerate the social learning 
and internalisation process. These change agents might be government officials who 
have already internalised the EU standards and passed laws in line with the EU 
requirements or they might be NGOs lobbying the government (Schimmelfenning and 
Sedelmeier, 2005). 
Figure 2. 2: The intersection of Europeanisation and NI.  
 
 As Figure 2.2 above shows, the adaptational pressure and reform requirements 
coming from the EU have been received and assessed by the political and civil society 
actors within the member and candidate states before they take action in terms of 
Europeanising their national legislative structures. On the basis of (a) cost-benefit 
calculations; (b) the impacts of the past decisions; and (c) shared norms and values, 
Adaptational Pressure from 
the EU
Europeanisation process
Potential change  
Domestic responses of the 
member/candidate states 
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domestic actors prefer either to act as catalysts or as antagonists during the whole 
Europeanisation process. Yet frequently, national political milieus lack harmony in 
terms of how to act, with groups holding quite antagonistic and mutually exclusive 
views. Their simultaneous existence then raises the primary question: what brings about 
policy change and Europeanises the national legislative framework? The anticipated 
answer to this question is that the more catalysts there are, the more likely the member 
or candidate state is Europeanised. It is not, however, that straightforward. Apart from 
the number of catalysts, their position within the society also influences the trajectory 
of the Europeanisation process. It might be assumed that catalysts in the political sphere 
holding policy-making competence rather than being part of civil society, trying to shape 
the process by lobbying the policy-makers, would increase the possibility of 
Europeanisation. But, their status within the political spectrum is another important 
aspect. For example, whether the catalysts are from the ruling party or from the 
opposition parties, as well as whether they are in a monolithic government or a coalition 
government, also has a considerable impact on the nature of the Europeanisation 
process. Ultimately, no matter whether they are government officials or NGOs, their 
national and international collaborations influence the legislative and administrative 
adjustment process of a member or a candidate state (Tsebelis, 2002). It is important to 
note that these are theoretical tools to identify the outcomes of the Europeanisation 
process of a member and a candidate state. In order to spell out the precise 
Europeanisation outcome, one has to illustrate how these power relations actualise in 
practice; that illustration is delivered throughout this study. The chapter proceeds with 
the possible outcomes of Europeanisation.    
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2.6. Europeanisation patterns:  
This study accepts the term Europeanisation as a two-way process hence, it aims to 
understand (a) the impact of the EU on domestic structures and (b) the impact of 
domestic structures on the EU. Under the scope of the first aim, two key questions arise: 
(1) how much change has been brought about by Europeanisation? And (2) to what 
extent has policy learning occurred at the domestic political structures? With respect to 
the first question, the Europeanisation literature (Börzel and Risse, 2003; Cowles and 
Risse, 2001 and Radaelli, 2003) identifies four possible outcomes covering the extent 
and direction of the change that can be discerned. An additional outcome was added by 
Börzel (2005) and Börzel and Risse (2005), resulting in five typical potential outcomes 
of domestic change emerging from the Europeanisation process. These are: (1) inertia, 
which refers to lack of change. It occurs in the absence of a similarity of EU laws, rules, 
regulations, choices and models at the national level (Radaelli, 2003: 37); (2) absorption, 
which indicates change as adaptation (Hall, 1993). It occurs when member and candidate 
states incorporate European policies or ideas into their programs and domestic 
structures, respectively, but without substantially modifying existing policies and 
institutions, and the degree of change is low (Börzel and Risse, 2009:14); (3) 
accommodation, which occurs when, as with absorption,  member and candidate states 
adapt their existing policies and institutions without changing their essential features and 
underlying policy paradigm, but where there is a modest degree of change; (4) 
transformation, which refers to the pragmatic change that occurs when the fundamental 
logic of political behaviour changes in order to meet the EU requirements; and (5) 
retrenchment, which refers to the situation when the national policy become less 
European than it was (Radaelli, 2000; 2003).  
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It is important to distinguish accommodation from absorption, even though they 
are quite similar and both refer to an incomplete change. Neither absorption nor 
accommodation exhibit a fully-fledged replacement of existing domestic structures with 
Europeanised ones. Member and candidate states which feature either absorption or 
accommodation adjust their existing policies and institutions or introduce new ones in 
line with the EU. Yet, they do not abolish the old ones and in the end, these remaining 
opposing measures cast a shadow over the change. The difference between them is that 
accommodation involves a ‘patching-up’ (Heritirer, 2001: 201), which means 
associating new policies and ideas with the existing ones, and thus leads to a higher 
degree of change than absorption. However – because it lacks a change in the attitudes 
of the policy-makers and therefore lacks policy learning – it cannot be argued that it 
would bring a total convergence, especially in the long run (Börzel and Risse, 2007). 
 As Europeanisation is beyond policy change at the domestic levels and is likely 
to create policy-making paradigm change, the domestic outcomes of Europeanisation 
are not limited to those five mentioned above. While seeking answers for the second 
question, the extent of the policy learning, scholars engaged with soft Europeanisation 
(Brooks, 2012; Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004; Radaelli, 2008) distinguish thick learning 
from thin learning. The former refers to considerable and decisive changes both in policy 
outcomes and policy-making processes and leads to substantial policy convergence, 
whereas the latter is not as drastic as the former and denotes only a change in the policy 
outcome. That is to say that, thick learning influences political elites’ policy-making 
paradigms, and thus is expected to result in a relatively stronger convergence for the 
national states with the EU, whereas the same is not expected from thin learning because 
it remains insufficient in influencing the ways in which political elites approach to 
corresponding policies (Radaelli, 2008).  
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 While examining the impact of domestic structures on the EU (the second aim 
of this thesis), bottom-up Europeanisation scholars have highlighted a considerable 
difference from one member state to another in terms of their capacity to contribute to 
the EU policy package, even though each member state tends to upload its own policy 
preferences to the EU level in order to decrease the ultimate adaptation cost. Börzel 
(2002) identifies three different outcomes depending on the member state’s policy 
uploading performance and preference. The first, pace-setting, refers to actively shaping 
European policies according to domestic preferences. Pace-setters not only manage to 
export their national policy preferences to the EU but also push their national preferences 
into the negotiation processes so that eventually other member and candidate states will 
transfer them into their own national levels. The second outcome, foot-dragging, is 
exactly the opposite of pace-setting. It aims at stopping or at least assuaging the attempts 
of other member states to upload their domestic policies to the European level. Foot-
draggers are highly reluctant to receive more convergence requirements from the EU; 
they rarely provide policy proposals to the EU or allow other member states to do so. 
Finally, fence-sitting consistently aims neither at initiating and promoting specific 
policies at the European level nor at preventing the attempts of others to do so. Fence-
sitters do not attempt to upload national policy-preferences to the EU either because they 
do not have the action capacity or because they do not wish to be involved in policy-
making process. They only form coalitions with pace-setters or with foot-draggers 
depending on the policy area (Börzel, 2002: 197).   
 Various authors (Diez et al., 2005; Kaliber, 2014; Ketola, 2013; Radaelli, 2008; 
Tocci, 2005) have proved that Europeanisation has certainly been affected by and 
affected national structures and has brought about changes in domestic structures and 
influenced the mind-sets of key actors in charge of policy-making. However, as can 
clearly be seen from the discussion above, the effect of Europeanisation on member and 
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candidate states and the extent of the change it has brought about, as well as the impact 
of member states on the EU policy package, varies from one country to another as well 
as from one policy field to another. Since this study restricts itself to WFLR, the chapter 
proceeds with how the Europeanisation operates in this specific policy area.          
2.7. The relevance and application of the theory: 
While defining Europeanisation above, it is argued that Europeanisation is a broad and 
general phenomenon, which has been subject to various conceptualisations provided 
from different approaches in the field of European studies. It follows that not every 
aspect of the conceptualisation is applicable for this study. Therefore, relying on Diez et 
al. (2005), Bulmer and Radaelli (2004), Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999), Jacquot (2008), 
Radaelli (2003) and Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2005), this study has developed 
its own interpretation.  
 While exploring the Europeanisation patterns of Turkey and Germany in the 
specific policy area of WFLR, Europeanisation is taken to refer to an ongoing process 
of transmission of corresponding EU policies into selected countries’ domestic political 
and cultural structures. Europeanisation conceived in this way necessitates a three-fold 
analysis. The first is the analysis of what is Europeanised. Of three major dimensions 
within which Europeanisation can take place – policy, polity and politics (Börzel and 
Risse, 2000; Diez et al., 2005; Ketola, 2013) – this study restricts itself to 
Europeanisation of related policy, yet examines it at four different levels: policy, 
discursive, political and societal. 
 The second analysis focuses on the ways in which Europeanisation operates 
while transferring different forms of policies. As WFLR contains what could be defined 
as hard and soft governance aspects (a more detailed discussion of these can be found in 
Chapter 4), how Europeanisation operates for each of those two forms of law requires 
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different explanations. Additionally, the fact that Germany is a founding member and 
Turkey a candidate country also leads Europeanisation to operate quite differently in 
each. The Europeanisation process of Turkey is one-dimensional, meaning that Turkey 
is not capable of contributing to the policy-making process at the EU level, whereas 
Europeanisation operates more mutually in Germany. That is to say that Germany is 
involved both in the policy-making and policy-transferring processes. Accordingly, as 
can also be seen from Figure 2.3 below, this study argues that first Germany strives to 
upload its domestic preferences to the EU level on the basis of its political and 
administrative capacity, which can operate through both vertical and horizontal 
mechanisms. Here, this study examines how and to what extent Germany has been 
involved in the WFLR policy-making process at the EU level. It further analyses which 
possible outcome of bottom-up Europeanisation – pace-setting, foot-dragging or fence-
sitting – Germany exhibits.  
 After the decision is made at the EU level on the basis of negotiations with the 
member states’ representatives, the EU begins requiring convergence from its member 
and candidate states. This is where the top-down dimension and Turkey come into 
consideration. As there are both soft and hard laws at the EU level to be transferred by 
the member and candidate states, the Europeanisation operates through vertical and 
horizontal mechanisms. Here, vertical Europeanisation refers to member and candidate 
states’ adaption and implementation of hard reconciliation laws (such as the Pregnant 
Workers Directive; the Parental Leave Directive, Part-time Work Directive and Fixed-
term Work Directive). The transposition of the corresponding hard laws onto the 
national legislative systems of Germany and Turkey will be analysed alongside two 
aspects. These are speed and extent (Duina, 1997). Speed here signifies whether or not 
the law was adapted by the country before the deadline defined by the EU. The extent 
refers to the scope of the adaptation, such as whether all relevant criteria of the 
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legislation were adopted, whether any adjustments were made after the adaptation, and 
whether any opposing laws remained.  
 On the other hand, horizontal Europeanisation refers to member and candidate 
states’ adaption and implementation of soft reconciliation laws (for example, the Lisbon 
Strategy and Barcelona targets). As transferring the EU soft laws results in social 
learning, these cannot be analysed by looking at countries’ national legislative, 
administrative or constitutional frameworks. Therefore, the Europeanisation of EU soft 
WFLR policies will be analysed by tracing the changes in the manners, behaviours and 
ideas of the domestic actors. Whether Germany and Turkey demonstrate thick or thin 
learning will be revealed.  









 The final analysis concentrates on the mediating factors of Europeanisation in 
Germany and Turkey. As this study approaches Europeanisation as a process that feeds 
and shapes the policy frameworks at national levels, but also a process that has been fed 
and shaped by the historical, cultural and political dynamics of national states, it gives a 
particular importance to the roles of those domestic actors. In other words, this study 
expects the impacts of Europeanisation on German and Turkish reconciliation models 
to be filtered through the domestic actors’ existence (Meyer and Pfau-Effinger, 2006; 














Lisbon Strategy  
Horizontal 
Policy Learning   
the best practices 
Horizontal 
 46 
Tsebelis, 2002). Therefore, while explaining the patterns of Europeanisation of WFLR 
policies in Turkey and Germany, this thesis pays particular attention to the actors’ roles 
during the whole process and explains it through NI theory. 
2.8. Conclusion:  
This chapter presented the theoretical framework of this study. While examining the 
Europeanisation patterns of WFLR policies in Germany and Turkey from an actor-
centred perspective, this study relies on the combination of Europeanisation and NI 
literature. The literature on Europeanisation is applied in order to explain how and to 
what extent the EU WFLR policies influence Turkish and German WFLR policies. In 
doing so, this thesis acknowledges the two-way nature of Europeanisation, which 
emphasises member and candidate states’ capability of shaping the trajectory of their 
Europeanisation processes, rather than considering them as passive recipients of the 
adaptational pressure. Accordingly, considerable attention has been paid to domestic 
responses to the EU requirements and conditions whereby NI is incorporated to the 
theoretical framework. Europeanisation has also been accepted as a very uneven path, 
with a highly complex process of implementation. Therefore, alongside exploring the 
EU influence on domestic legislative frameworks, this thesis examines domestic state 
mechanisms, domestic attitudes and views towards the EU and the process of 
Europeanising the domestic WFLR model.  
 Having explained the theoretical framework developed to explore the 
Europeanisation processes of Germany and Turkey in this specific policy area, the thesis 
proceeds with a methodological discussion, presenting the rationales behind the 
methodological choices made.
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN and METHODOLOGY 
This chapter presents the methodological approach adopted to investigate the research 
questions identified in this study. It explains how this research has been conducted and 
the rationale behind the methodological choices. The chapter consists of five sections. 
The first section describes the comparative cross-case research design and discusses why 
it was chosen as the most suitable for this study. The second section justifies the 
qualitative approach, the third discusses the research ethic, whereas the fourth and fifth 
sections focus on data collection methods and ethical considerations respectively. 
Finally, the chapter concludes by describing and justifying the data analysis technique 
used in this study. 
3.1. Comparative cross-case study: 
At the simplest level, case study is an intensive research method that provides richly 
detailed information (either descriptive or causal) of a particular single case or small 
number of cases (Gerring, 2017; Hakim, 1987; Hammersley and Gomm, 2002). Like 
any other research method, case studies aim at describing, understanding, examining, 
comparing and explaining. What distinguishes case studies from other research methods, 
first and foremost, is their exceptional focus on particular cases. It is, therefore, highly 
important to explain what a case is. Depending on the research aims and questions, a 
case might be a certain process (e.g., democratisation, urbanisation, industrialisation or 
Europeanisation); state or state-like entity (e.g., nation-state, region, municipality, city 
or village); organisation (e.g., NGO, firm, school or political party); social group (e.g., 
certain race, ethnic group or a protest group); or even a specific role or relationship (e.g., 
working women’s relationship with their children) (Gerring, 2017; Hakim, 1987).  
 Case studies strive to provide an ample, complete and in-depth knowledge of the 
empirical case(s) under examination (Hamel et al., 1993). They may aim at different 
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things; they may devote themselves to describing a case in-depth, or comparing more 
than one case on the basis of a set of research questions. It is called cross-case study 
when it devotes itself only to two cases and comparative cross-case study when it is 
explores those two cases on the basis of commonalities and differences in events, 
activities and processes (Eckstein, 2002; Gerring, 2017; Ragin, 1997). Case studies, be 
they comparative cross-case studies or a study focusing on a single case, ultimately 
allow the researcher to either test a theory or construct a new one. In other words, the 
cases explored and analysed via case study generate the foundations of social theories 
(Gerring, 2017; Hamel et al., 1993).  
 Case studies, regardless of the number of the cases that they are investigating 
and their aim with respect to theory (testing or generating), may be descriptive or causal. 
That is to say that a case study may focus on describing a certain historical or social 
event or may focus on explaining the causal inferences of a process. Gerring (2017) calls 
the latter exploratory causal case study, and describes it as a case study which aims to 
answer a research question that asks what accounts for the occurrence of a particular 
phenomenon. ‘In these kind of case studies, the researcher works backward from a 
known outcome to its possible causes’ (p.66). Finally, case studies, exceptionally, are 
determined to analyse the case(s) in their naturally occurring settings, either unpacking 
the causal social relations and complex interactions or describing a historical event 
(Hammersley and Gomm, 2002).  
 Given all the aforementioned advantages of the method, this study compares two 
cases with a particular emphasis on the casual relations and interactions within each 
case. It is therefore a comparative causal cross-case study which can usefully be 
employed when seeking in-depth and fuller answers for ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions. 
According to Schramm (1971), a key objective of a case study is to illustrate a decision 
or set of decisions (most likely political) from a holistic view. In other words, despite its 
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success in providing encompassing, analytical and highly meaningful knowledge on 
certain research inquiries, the real strength of the case study lies in its ability to illustrate 
why and how a political decision was taken, together with its implementation process 
and the results it brought about. Accordingly, this study considered case study as the 
most appropriate research method to explore the Europeanisation processes of two pre-
selected countries from an actor-centred perspective. As has been mentioned in Chapter 
2, the Europeanisation process of a country is strongly shaped by the domestic actors’ 
decisions on the trajectory of the reforms. This necessitates the researcher to reveal the 
driving forces behind the reforms taken or rejected, which the case study does 
comprehensively (Schramm, 1971). 
3.2. Qualitative approach:  
For a complete and careful exploration of the research aims and questions listed in 
section 1.5, this study adopts a qualitative approach, which has the advantage of 
explaining events in a more fluid and rich way. This section thus presents the basic 
characteristics of qualitative research design. It is difficult to provide a precise 
description of what qualitative research is, as a wide variety of techniques and 
philosophies fall under its umbrella (Bryman and Burgess, 1995; Hennink et al., 2015). 
In a broad sense it can be defined as a research approach that allows the researcher to 
explore and understand social behaviours, experiences, processes, circumstances, 
perspectives or histories in-depth on the basis of systematic research methods (Hennink 
et al., 2015; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). These methods include focus groups, interviews, 
and document analysis (Hennink et al., 2015). 
 The qualitative research was developed from an enthusiasm for exploring and 
understanding human behaviours in their own social contexts (Richards and Morse, 
2013). It is worth noting that understanding here is used as a deeper concept. As well as 
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referring to the researcher’s endeavour of trying to understand the human behaviour 
from her or his own perspective, it also covers the researcher’s effort to understand 
human behaviour from the perspective of the population studied. The researcher 
emphasises ‘the subjective meaning that people attach their views’ (Hennink et al., 
2015:18) or their personal intentions, motivations and rationales behind their actions. 
The latter explanation of understanding is called ‘Verstehen’ within the literature, a 
concept frequently applied by Max Weber (1975) and which constitutes the core element 
of qualitative research (Hennink et al., 2015).  
 In line with the main aims of qualitative research mentioned above, some of its 
key features can be summarised. First, it is holistic because the ways in which it has 
been formulated aim at explaining the whole context. Second, it is inductive because it 
seeks to create a new understanding on the basis of the data collected as the research 
proceeds, instead of starting with an understanding to be tested. Finally, it is interpretive5 
because it acknowledges the fact that social reality is not an entity as such, but 
constructed on the basis of the people’s own interpretations, experiences and 
observations, and it seeks to illustrate those subjective meanings that individuals attach 
to it (Bryman, 2016; Bryman and Burgess, 1995). 
 A qualitative approach is considered as the most appropriate and applicable 
approach to this study for three reasons. First, qualitative approaches are generally better 
at understanding unanticipated, shifting and puzzling phenomena (Lewis, 2003), which 
is the case in this study. The Europeanisation processes of both Turkey and Germany 
are highly complex and, as elaborated further in Chapter 5, they contain various ebbs 
and flows. Second, qualitative research is considered to be the most appropriate strategy 
                                               
5 Qualitative researchers aim at understanding the social world through analysing how individuals 
interpret it, in contrast to natural scientific models. Interpretivism is an epistemological position which 
emphasizes the view of the individual towards the social world (Bryman, 2016; Strauss and Corbin, 1998).   
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when identifying the various effects or consequences that arise from a policy or policy-
making process (Lewis, 2003). In both Germany and Turkey, there are various meanings 
attached to WFLR. Therefore, WFLR policy-making has been subject to highly tense 
debates in both countries. Finally, it is also suggested to employ a qualitative inquiry 
when the explanation of the issue will be derived from the data as the research proceeds 
(Richards and Morse, 2013), as it emphasises ‘getting the insiders' perspective’ (Punch, 
2005:238). This is very important for this study for two reasons. First, it investigates an 
issue that very little is known about. There have been many accounts of the historical 
and contemporary development of WFLR policy, both at the EU and national levels. 
However, the actor-centred analysis of the transmission process of corresponding EU 
standards into domestic levels, and the internalisation of those standards by domestic 
political and non-political actors, have been less researched. Therefore, it is necessary 
to gather this information from qualitative data collected by the author. Second, the issue 
under investigation is a process which has been shaped by the related actors’ personal 
decisions, information about which needed to be obtained from the actors themselves.  
3.3. Data collection: 
One of the main distinctive features of qualitative research, in terms of data collection, 
is that it draws mainly on ‘words’ about people’s lives, lived experiences, ideas, 
emotions and motivations, rather than on statistical, mathematical elements (Bryman, 
2016; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Accordingly, within the scope of qualitative research 
techniques, the data used in this study have been collected through a combination of 
literature review, document analysis and semi-structured in-depth interviews. 
3.3.1. Document analysis:  
As can be seen from Table 3.1 below, the documents analysed within the scope of this 
study are diverse. They consist of:  
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o Legislative and policy documents (EU, Turkey and Germany);  
o EU Country Reports;  
o EU National Action Plans (NAPs);  
o EU Assessment of Programme reports;  
o EU Accession Partnership Documents; 
o Council Recommendations on NAPs; 
o Turkey’s Harmonisation Packages; 
o Party programs of the main political parties (Turkey and Germany);  
o Election campaigns of the main political parties;  
o Public speeches of the political elites;  
o Newspaper articles (Turkey and Germany). 
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Aim of analysing:  
 
EU hard and soft laws on WFLR, child-care 
provisions, leave provisions and working 
time provisions. 
  
To ascertain the EU’s stance towards WFLR 
and to identify the nature of EU work and 
family life policies.  
Academic literature on WFLR policies.  
 
 
Legislative/policy documents of Turkey and 
Germany including their constitutional 
provisions, major national laws and 
measures on WFLR, child-care provisions, 
leave provisions and working time 
provisions 
 
To identify Turkish and German 
reconciliation of work and family life policy 
structures and their differences from the EU. 
 
EU country specific reports (Germany) 
  
To outline the EU’s requirements of Turkey 
and Germany. 
 





   
To explore countries’ responses to the EU 
requirements. 
 








To reveal the EU’s assessment of countries’ 
harmonisation trajectory.  
Annual Progress Reports (Turkey) 
 
 
Party programs, party and election 
campaigns of the main political parties. 
 
 
To explore whether and to what extent the 










The analysis of this wide range of documentary material has been accompanied by 80 
semi-structured in-depth interviews that were conducted with various actors in Belgium, 
Germany and Turkey between November 2016 and April 2017. Semi-structured in-
depth interviews have been chosen for two key reasons.  
 First, they offer the researcher the opportunity to understand people’s personal 
decisions together with the main motivations behind those decisions. Second, they help 
the researcher to understand, in a very detailed way, people’s personal interpretations 
of, and responses to, certain complex processes as well as the personal impacts of those 
processes (Bryman, 2016; Richards and Morse, 2013). These aspects of semi-structured 
in-depth interviews fully overlap with the main aim of this study, which is to unfold the 
domestic influences on, and domestic responses to, Europeanisation processes, together 
with the corresponding actors’ personal motivations that shaped those responses. The 
semi-structured nature of the interview is also very important for this study as it explores 
scarcely analysed and highly actor-centred issues. It gives space to the participants to 
express some personal thoughts and experiences which may not previously have been 
sought or recognised. This allows the researcher to bring up new concepts or create new 
questions during the interview in line with the flow of the conversation, while still 
keeping the participants focused around the pre-determined general themes, thus 
providing some level of consistency (Bernard, 1988; Flick, 2011; Hennink et al., 2015). 
Prior to commencing the fieldwork, four different interview guides (one for EU 
representatives, one for political elites, one for advocacy CSO representatives and one 
for key academics and research CSO representatives) were developed on the basis of 
key research questions outlined in Chapter 1 (See Appendix 1). Although most of the 
interview questions stemmed from the analysis of literature focusing around certain 
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themes, considerable space was left for respondents to shape the conversation and bring 
about unanticipated themes. 
 In order to understand the EU’s requirements of Germany and Turkey, as well 
as to obtain EU representatives’ views on Turkey’s and Germany’s WFLR policy-
making trajectory, and along with consulting the official documents, the researcher 
interviewed nine EU representatives. Another reason for conducting interviews with 
these EU representatives was to understand the EU approach towards WFLR policy-
making; in other words, to reveal the EU policy paradigm. As can be seen from Table 
3.2 below, three of these representatives were gender equality policy experts from 
different European organisations lobbying the EU commission and national 
governments for a better WFLR policy structure. Four were policy experts from EU 
social partners, who are engaged in consultation with the EU WFLR policies. 
Additionally, in order to gain more internal information about how the European 
Parliament (EP) assesses German and Turkish WFLR models and their reform 
processes, the researcher had one interview with a member of the Women’s Rights and 
Gender Equality Committee (FEMM Committee) and one interview with a member of 
the Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality Commission.      
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Table 3.2: Categorisation of interviewee type in Brussels.  
Interviewee: Number: Code: 
 






















After identifying the EU’s views on the ways in which Turkey and Germany had framed 
their WFLR models, in order to reveal the inner dynamics behind those models (which 
generates the core analysis of this study), the researcher focused on the selected 
countries. She first identified the corresponding domestic actors, who are in charge of 
WFLR policy-making. Once they had been identified, the researcher conducted her 
interviews with them. As can also be seen from Table 3.3 below, these actors in this 
study are: 
o The former and current family ministers; 
o The former and current ministers of the EU; 
o The former and current ministers of labour;  
o The former and current ministers of foreign affairs; 
o Representatives of woman branches of mainstream political parties;  
o NGOs working in the fields of gender equality; women’s rights and children’s 
rights; education and family; 
o Trade unions; 
o Employers’ organisations;  
o Religious organisations. 
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There were three main rationale behind conducting interviews with German and Turkish 
Members of Parliament (MPs) and government officials. First, to ascertain how they 
have perceived the idea of Europeanising the domestic WFLR models; in other words, 
what the main driving forces were for them while acting either as catalyst or as 
antagonist. Second, to discover whether, why and to what extent they have internalised 
the EU way of WFLR policy paradigm – whether the Europeanisation process brought 
any policy learning in this policy area or not. The third reason for interviewing MPs and 
government officials was to reveal their contributions to the process as well as the 
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barriers they have faced throughout the process. While choosing the deputies to be 
interviewed, particular attention was paid to their affiliation to gender, family and social 
policy issues in both Turkey and Germany. Additionally, in the German case, an effort 
was made to choose respondents who are Members of the European Parliament (MEPs).  
 In both countries, NGOs and trade unions have appeared to be important 
components of the process in terms of both shaping the policy outcome and providing 
WFLR services. In order to understand their influence on the whole Europeanisation 
process, they have also been interviewed. The majority of these organisations were 
located in Berlin, Dusseldorf, Munich and Dresden for Germany, and Ankara and 
Istanbul for Turkey. There was no particular reason for choosing these cities apart from 
the fact that the related NGOs happened to be located in them. In order to avoid any kind 
of bias, the women’s NGOs and trade unions were chosen on the basis of their affinity 
with the subject, regardless of their political and ideological backgrounds. Finally, 
Turkish and German key academics, whose research interests lie in the area of social 
policy (family policy, gender equality policy and employment policy in particular), 
gender studies and European studies were identified as participants, and interviewed 
regarding why and to what extent the EU way of reconciling work and family lives has 
been practised at the national societal levels.   
 As can be seen, the interviewees were selected on the basis of their professional 
knowledge, expertise and experience regarding the issue being studied, rather than on a 
random basis. This type of sampling is defined as ‘purposive sampling’ and is very 
useful to get a better explanation on the investigated issue as the researcher speaks 
directly to the relevant person (Richards and Morse, 2013). As politicians and EU 
representatives are often difficult to reach, the researcher was aided by several 
gatekeepers that either she herself or her supervisors already had contact with. These 
gatekeepers, who had close contacts with the target interviewees, provided the 
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researcher their contact details. They were then contacted via e-mail and telephone to 
schedule an interview. When the researcher contacted the first potential interviewee, she 
asked for suggestions of others, a ‘snowball sampling technique’ (Richards and Morse, 
2013). As representatives of NGOs are more easily reached to collaborate, the researcher 
contacted them directly, but still asked for recommendations of more interviewees who 
might be relevant to the research. Each interview conducted within the scope of this 
study lasted between 40 and 100 minutes and 77 out of 80 were digitally recorded. In 
those three interviews which the researcher was not allowed to record digitally, she took 
extensive notes during the interview and completed the verbatim transcription as soon 
as possible after the interview.    
3.4. Ethical considerations:  
Ethical approval for the study was obtained from Ulster University.  Prior to conducting 
the fieldwork, all respondents were provided with the participant information sheet (see 
Appendix 2), containing detailed information about the research and the structure of the 
prospective interview. Prior to commencing the interview, the participants were asked 
to sign a consent form (see Appendix 3) and a signed copy was kept by both the 
researcher and participant.  
 Participants were reminded that they could terminate the interview at any time 
in case of any discomfort and that they had the right to refuse to answer any question 
without giving an explanation. Although the researched topic is not exceptionally 
sensitive, a particular sensitivity has been given to anonymity and confidentiality. The 
anonymity of participants was protected and any personal reference or information that 
might identify the respondents was excluded. Furthermore, interviews were recorded 
only if the respondent felt comfortable about it and gave permission. Following the 
interview, the researcher transcribed the recorded data herself and kept the data securely 
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in her password-protected device. No person other than the researcher and her 
supervisors had access to the collected data.  Finally, all the interviews conducted 
within the scope of this study took place either in respondents’ offices or public spaces 
like cafés or restaurants, depending on where the respondent wanted the interview to be, 
as this was considered to minimise risk both for the researcher and the respondent.  
3.5. Data analysis:  
Having explained how the necessary data for this study were collected, this section 
outlines the analysis procedure. Analysis was carried out through a combination of 
process tracing and thematic analysis.  
 Thematic analysis was chosen as the appropriate data analysis technique for this 
study due to its ability to summarise and pinpoint the key features of a very complex 
data set (Braun and Clarke, 2006), as well as its flexibility in terms of leaving some 
room for emergence of unanticipated insights (Boyatzis, 1998). Additionally, process 
tracing was employed as it is argued to be the best data analysis technique for 
‘identifying the intervening causal process – the causal chain and the causal mechanism 
– between an independent variable(s) and the outcome’ (George and Bennett, 2005:206). 
Simply put, process tracing is considered to be one of the most appropriate data analysis 
techniques for this study because its aims fully overlap with the aims of this study. 
Process tracing is particularly useful when exploring what has caused a particular 
outcome and why (Beach and Brun Pedersen, 2013; Bennet and Checkel, 2015; George 
and Bennett, 2005). Since this study is not only interested in explaining the 
Europeanisation patterns of German and Turkish WFLR policies, but also aims to trace 
how and why Germany and Turkey have come to feature those particular patterns, 
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process tracing was employed. Of the three different forms of process tracing,6 
‘explaining outcome process tracing’ has been applied. This aims to craft a sufficient 
explanation of a particular outcome through analysing the intervening variables’ 
interactions, rather than testing theory-driven prior hypotheses (Beach and Brun 
Pedersen, 2013).  
 This combination of thematic analysis and process tracing ultimately enabled the 
researcher to conduct a deeper exploration of the highly complex Europeanisation 
processes of Germany and Turkey by working backward from their Europeanisation 
outcomes towards the causes of the outcome with a particular emphasis on subjective 
experiences and interpretations of the intervening domestic actors – the causes of the 
outcome. Taking advantage of this methodological combination, the analysis of the data 
for this study proceeded in three inter-related stages.  
 The researcher began the research procedure by identifying the fit and the misfit 
between the selected countries and the EU. The documentation of fit and misfit relied 
on Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 2002) three welfare pillar conceptualisation and 
familialisation/de-familialisation distinctions; these are discussed in-depth in Chapter 4. 
These parameters are: (1) level of market and state support in relaxing familial 
responsibilities; (2) alleviating women’s work and family conflict and (3) strengthening 
women’s labour market attachment (Esping-Andersen, 2002; Lewis, 2009; Orloff, 2001; 
Stratigaki, 2004). Comparing policy structures from such an angle helped to clarify 
whether the policies ensure that women can be both breadwinners and home-carers, 
resulting in ‘gender sameness’ (Orloff, 2001:141), or whether they continue prioritising 
their motherhood roles. This documentation was then followed by the analysis of the 
EU’s requirements and views on each country with respect to their divergences in terms 
                                               
6 Beach and Brun Pedersen (2013) argues that process tracing can be applied with three different research 
aims: (1) to test a priori hypotheses; (2) make generalizations and (3) explain the outcome. 
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of WFLR policies. This allowed the researcher to set the starting point by establishing 
the main EU criticisms with regard to Turkish and German WFLR legislative 
frameworks.   
 In the second stage of the data analysis procedure, having identified the EU’s 
requirements of each country, the researcher focused on each country’s responses to 
these requirements. In doing so, first the domestic WFLR laws introduced under the EU-
influence were analysed on the basis of aforementioned parameters. Then, in order to 
understand the ways in which these laws were made and what is the main ideology 
behind those laws, the domestic actors who are related to WFLR policy-making were 
identified. They were first divided into two main categories: (a) catalysts (the ones who 
are acting in favour of adaptation of EU standards) and (b) antagonists (the ones who 
disagree with the potential change and hence act to prevent or at least decelerate the 
adaptation process). Each category was then divided into additional sub-categories 
according to the domestic actors’ rationale behind their decisions on whether to be a 
catalyst or an antagonist. Dividing each category into additional sub-categories followed 
the thematic analysis roadmap created by relying on Boyatzis (1998) and Braun and 
Clarke (2006) and displayed in Figure 3.1 below.  
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After the completion of the verbatim transcription of the interviews as well as the 
transcription of the notes taken during the interviews, an intensive repeated reading of 
the entire data set took place. The researcher coded the most repeated reasons, which 
then comprised the main themes of the study. Given the density and amount of the data 
collected, the researcher used NVivo-11, a software program considered a valuable 
instrument for analysing dense qualitative data. After identifying the codes, she 
collected all the raw data associated with a particular code in one document in order to 
ease the generation and writing up the analysis of the themes. 
 In the final stage of the data analysis procedure, in order to explain how and why 
two countries which shared similar WFLR policy characteristics at the beginning of their 
Europeanisation processes exhibited different Europeanisation patterns, the researcher 
compared Germany and Turkey on the basis of the similarities and differences of the 
themes that emerged from the domestic actors’ responses. This eventually revealed the 
key points around where and why Turkey lagged behind Germany in terms of 
Europeanising her WFLR model.   
3.6. Conclusion:  
This chapter aimed to show the methodological decisions made while seeking answers 
for the research questions identified with regard to the Europeanisation puzzles of 
Germany and Turkey. The research design of this study is constructed on the basis of a 
comparative causal cross-case research technique holding a qualitative approach. 
Accordingly, this study utilised a consolidation of document analysis and semi-
structured in-depth interviews while collecting the necessary data, and a combination of 
thematic analysis and outcome-explaining process tracing while analysing the data. 
Having discussed the research methods employed in this study, the next chapter turns to 
the contextual framework. 
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CHAPTER 4. CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter introduces the contextual framework of the study. More precisely, it 
explains how WFLR has turned into a highly contested policy area across European 
welfare states, but particularly in Germany and Turkey. Here, the discussion focuses on 
how and why Germany experienced a similar path to the rest of the Europe, where 
WFLR policies have emerged as a concomitant result of women’s increasing labour 
market participation, while they have been introduced in the Turkish context as part of 
Turkey’s EU-accession process. Since, in one form or another, various risks and 
inequalities emerged in almost all EU member states, the EU has acknowledged the 
importance of WFLR policies and placed an increasing focus on reconciliation policy-
making. This particular policy sphere, which formerly had been left to national level 
initiatives, therefore has gradually become an area of greater cohesion. EU documents 
have begun to require a relatively stronger convergence from member and candidate 
states, which eventually has prompted them to reconfigure their existing reconciliation 
models.  
Section two of this chapter, accordingly, focuses on the EU and examines the 
EU rationale behind reconciliation policy-making, including an outline of EU legislation 
regarding WFLR. As the main aim of this study is to compare how German and Turkish 
WFLR models have changed under the EU influence, it is also important to look at their 
national models prior to their Europeanisation processes. Sections three and four 
concentrate on the WFLR models that the two selected countries pursued up until 2000. 
Section three presents the German reconciliation model prior to EU influence while the 




4.1. New social risks and inequalities: 
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, an increase in the number of women entering 
higher education, women’s increased desire towards self-development, the structural 
transformation of the labour market from industrialism to de-industrialism creating 
relatively more flexible working conditions, and the increased gap between consumer 
prices and income, together with the increased dominance of service employment, 
combined to alter the prevalent family model and concomitantly the life-paths of family 
members (Crompton et al., 2007; Drew et al., 1998; Esping-Andersen, 2009; Hemerijck, 
2013; Lewis, 2009). 
 The traditional male breadwinner family model, which consists of a heterosexual 
married couple with children, living under the same roof, where the husband is 
associated with an intense period of education followed by an uninterrupted full-time 
employment until retirement, while the wife dedicates her life to homemaking (Esping-
Andersen, 2009), was the prevalent family model among European welfare states. From 
the late 1970s, however, the ‘adult worker model’ of the family or at least the ‘one-and-
a-half earner family’ model, together with ‘lone parent families’, have rapidly 
proliferated across Europe (Esping-Andersen, 2009; Lewis, 2006). These changes were 
reflected in changing gender roles and particularly in the roles of women. Post-industrial 
women have come to be less associated with purely domestic tasks and more with 
lifelong employment (Esping-Andersen, 2009; McDonald, 2000). Their labour force 
participation has become more continuous, even among mothers of small children. They 
remain in the labour market and contribute to the family budget – although there are 
considerable cross-national variations (Crompton et al., 2007; Drew et al., 1998; Lewis, 
2006, 2009). While this has been perceived as an improvement in terms of women’s 
status within society, as they could be freed from the dependency on either their fathers 
or male breadwinner partners, it has also been argued that this shift exacerbated existing 
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social risks and inequalities and even created new ones (Esping-Andersen, 1999, 2002, 
2009; Hemerijck, 2013; Lewis, 2006, 2009). Gosta Esping-Andersen (2009) uses the 
term ‘Incomplete Revolution’ to delineate this paradox. He perceives these drastic 
changes in women’s life-courses as on a par with revolution because they led to a global 
welfare state transformation (Hemerijck, 2013); but also as incomplete, since the 
existing social policy structure of European welfare states were not fully ready to off-
set this new trajectory, and thus could not mitigate the emergence of new social risks 
and inequalities. 
 The unequal gendered division of paid and unpaid work that emerged with the 
increasing labour market participation of women, and a corresponding rise in the dual 
earner family model, which causes multiple chain effects, can be identified as the 
encompassing and key social inequality of the post-industrial society (Bennett and 
Dixon, 2006; Esping-Andersen, 1999; Hemerijck, 2012; Jenson, 2006; Lewis, 2009). 
First, the disproportionate amount of domestic work carried out by women and assumed 
to be their responsibility impedes women’s self-investment by limiting their 
opportunities for labour market training and progression (Hakim, 2000; Lewis, 2009). 
Second, in the absence of appropriate social provisions, women try to balance this 
disproportionate domestic work with their paid work by working part-time. This causes 
additional inequality as these part-time jobs are frequently insecure, low-paid and 
secondary and are associated with more restricted entitlement to pension benefits during 
retirement (Lowson and Arber, 2013). Since this shift towards dual earner families did 
not happen overnight, residuals of the traditional male breadwinner family model are 
inevitable and hold the potential to generate an income polarisation between ‘working 
rich’ and ‘working poor’ families. While two earner families may enjoy a relatively 
higher income and become the working rich, the conventional single earner families 
have access to relatively lower incomes – the so-called working poor (Hemerijck, 2013). 
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The consequences of this include increasing socio-economic heterogeneity in the society 
and greater vulnerability to family and child poverty for the latter group (Esping-
Andersen, 2002, 2009; Hemerijck, 2013). The literature identifies additional social and 
demographic risks, such as that the ambition of a typical post-industrial woman to build 
a stable, secure and lifelong career forces them to postpone or forego marriage and 
childbirth, leading to population ageing (Esping-Andersen, 2009; Hemerijck, 2013; 
Krapf, 2014; Lewis, 2009). 
The aforementioned problems have appeared in almost all EU member states, 
yet at different times to differing degrees. These differences stem from the dynamic 
shape of labour markets, the domestic realities of family structure and gender relations 
(Hantrais, 2007). Therefore, the chapter proceeds with a detailed discussion of newly 
emerging social risks and inequalities as well as their causes in Germany and Turkey 
respectively. 
4.1.1. New social risks and inequalities in Germany: 
Along with other developed European welfare states, Germany has been required to 
respond to societal changes. Germany’s complex historical background and the 
corporatist conservative welfare state model, which asserts the family as the main 
welfare provider (Ostner, 2010), mean that the effects of this transformation have been 
felt more acutely in comparison to some other states. 
 Germany initially lagged behind other European states such as Britain, France 
or Belgium in terms of industrial production. However, due to a highly skilled labour 
force, a good educational system, a strong commitment to the Lutheran work ethic and 
a protectionist economic strategy, it did not take long for Germany to become a world 
leader in industrialisation, along with Britain and the United States (Lewis and 
Zitzlsperger, 2010). With slight falls in gross domestic product (GDP) at different times, 
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Germany maintained a strong industrial economy based on heavy manufacturing. 
Although industrial economies generally grow in tandem with the traditional male 
breadwinner family model, things developed differently in Germany due to the bitter 
consequences of the Second World War (WW2). The post-war division of Germany saw 
differences emerge between the former East Germany (the German Democratic 
Republic – GDR) and the former West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany – 
FRG). Both parts experienced an economic recovery on the basis of industrial labour 
market rules and regulations, but there were strong differences in the gender composition 
of the labour markets (ibid).  
 Like many other industrialised countries, the FRG evolved with a strong 
adherence to the traditional male breadwinner family model, based on the gendered work 
and care dualism (Ostner, 2010; Trzcinski, 2000), while the GDR prioritised gender 
sameness in all walks of life including the labour market. Throughout this divided 
period, the FRG, under the extremely conservative Adenauer administration, aimed at 
reversing the increased female employment rate7 and sending woman back to their main 
duty: home-caring (Bird, 2004; Grebe, 2009 and Roberts, 2016). Therefore, the FRG 
exhibited a sharp gendered division of labour between men and women, which was 
reflected in the life path of a typical Western German woman. Bird (2004) and Gottschall 
and Bird (2003) examine longitudinal empirical data on German women’s WFLR habits 
from the 1960s to the end of 1990s. They agree with Myrdal and Klein (1956), who 
argue that, throughout its existence, women in FRG followed a particular lifecycle made 
up of three conducive phases. The first phase refers to the period when women are 
engaged with extended education and training followed by full-time employment. This 
                                               
7 Due to WW2, many women in Germany willingly or unwillingly participated into the labour market. 
The female employment rate increased during the war from about 5.1 million in 1939 (26%) to just over 
7.25 million in 1943 (Office for National Statistics, 2013).  
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phase continues until marriage and ends with the marriage. Then the second period 
begins when they give birth to their first child and withdraw from the labour market or 
at least sharply curtail their working hours. This period lasts until the middle years of 
the child. Finally, the third and last phase begins, when women return to employment 
but usually to flexible part-time jobs (Hantrais, 2004; Drew et al., 1998; Lewis, 2006, 
2009; Ostner, 2010). Jane Lewis (2006), comparing the behaviours and attitudes of 
women from four different nationalities, found that West German women were happy 
to quit or at least withdraw their careers for family altruism.  
Eastern German women, on the contrary, followed a different life-path. The 
Socialist Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands – SED) 
endorsed a classical Marxist ethos and saw women’s employment and their salvation 
from the private sphere as the biggest part of women’s emancipation (Ferree, 1993; 
Wagener, 2002). Additionally, the GDR economy desperately needed the full 
integration of women in the labour market (Ferree, 1993). Under these circumstances, 
GDR women, unlike women from the FRG, were expected to be associated with lifelong 
employment (Künzler et al., 2001). They sustained a continuous employment trajectory 
with only a very short break right after giving birth. According to Pfau-Effinger and 
Smidt (2011), for GDR women to do otherwise would be unimaginable. Especially for 
the younger generations, who were both born and raised in the East, combining 
motherhood with full-time employment and sharing domestic responsibilities with their 
husbands was central to their identities. Official statistics show that one year before the 
unification of Germany the female employment rate was 78.1% in the East while it was 
only 55% in the West (Lewis, 2006).                                     
Following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, both parts of Germany witnessed 
considerable transformation with respect to their labour market and family structures. 
In the course of unification, after a very short-lived economic boom fuelled by the 
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industrial expansion (Lewis and Zitzlsperger, 2010), the German economy based on 
manufacturing goods for export begun to shrink. Difficulties in adapting the GDR’s 
statist economy to a market economy, the outdated shape of industry legated from the 
GDR and a global trend of de-industrialisation paved the way for a shift from a heavy 
manufacturing industrial economy to a de-industrial economy primarily based on high 
quality service sector such as finance, design, marketing and consultancy services in 
unified Germany (Lewis and Zitzlsperger, 2010; Roberts, 2016). By 1990, the service 
sector accounted for 29.5% of German GDP, compared to around 10% in 1960, and this 
figure continued to increase until it reached 50% in 2000 (Lewis and Zitzlsperger, 2010). 
 Professional areas of the service sector are associated with more flexible 
working conditions, but also are low-paid compared to the industrial sector (İlkkaracan, 
2010). Therefore, this demise, or at least the reduction, of heavy manufacturing activity 
in Germany ultimately altered the gender composition of employment both voluntarily 
and involuntarily. More flexible working conditions became very tempting for women, 
even those with family responsibilities, and the representation of women in the labour 
market grew rapidly (Toksöz, 2015). In addition, the rising prices made it very difficult 
for families to survive, especially with a single earner, and encouraged women to be in 
the labour market and contribute to the family budget. This shift triggered an upward 
trajectory in German women’s employment. As can also be seen from Table 4.1 below, 
there was a small but decided increase in female employment rates in Germany between 
1990 and 2000, with the exception of the first two years, which Lewis and Zitzlsperger 
(2010) explain through the general unemployment rise in Germany.  
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52.7 42.7 63.6 2000 53.1 45.1 61.6 
Source: Germany Labour force participation Stats. (NationMaster, n.d.).     
Evidence points to an assuaged traditional male breadwinner family model supremacy 
in Germany in the wake of unification. In other words, due to the buoyant ambition of 
German women to build a stable, secure and lifelong career, the prevalence of the 
traditional male breadwinner family model gradually came to an end. Germany started 
to witness an intense and painful transition toward new family models, which do not 
function on the basis of sharp work/care dualism (Ostner, 2010; Trzcinski, 2000).  
 The existing social policies, however, remained inadequate in temporising the 
new labour market, family and gender realities. Therefore, they failed to prevent women 
being subject to a number of social risks and inequalities. Although German women said 
farewell to their sole housewifery roles and welcomed paid employee roles (Ostner, 
2010; Pfau-Effinger and Smidt, 2011), they continued to be responsible for the bulk of 
domestic tasks. Thus, they came to carry the double burden of paid employment and 
unpaid housework, which caused various risks and inequalities. To the fore of these, ‘the 
fertility rate fell below the replacement level in 1994’ (when female employment started 
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to rise) and has stagnated there (Sobotka, 2012). Germany has come to have one of the 
lowest fertility rates, with 1.5 children per woman in 2015 (Statista, n.d.), and the highest 
childlessness rate (23%) (Beaujouan and Sobotka, 2017) among the EU member states. 
Furthermore, in the absence of appropriate family-friendly social policies, which would 
assist women to balance their work and family lives, German women looked to part-
time and midi-jobs (Lewis, 2009; Trzcinski, 2000). Although this served as a panacea 
in the short term, it substantially impacted on German women in the long run. Working 
part-time or in flexible working arrangements incarcerated women in the secondary 
labour market associated with low-paid, insecure jobs where progression opportunity is 
low. In addition, low-paid jobs reduce the ability to earn sufficient pensions for 
retirements, and therefore reproduce women’s economic dependency on their male 
partners. As a result, as in many other European welfare states, WFLR appeared as an 
urgent need in Germany.  
German policy-makers have gradually acknowledged the importance of WFLR 
measures (Erler, 2011). In line with Esping-Andersen (1999:73). ‘Any typology of 
welfare regimes remains valid only as long as history stands still’, meaning that the 
current socio-economic and socio-politic developments may lead to small modifications 
of the welfare models. The strong conservative corporatist welfare model of Germany, 
which initially did not touch upon reconciliation, has gradually been subject to various 
amendments that are discussed in the later stages of this chapter. 
4.1.2. New social risks and inequalities in Turkey: 
As with many other late-industrialising countries, Turkey deviated from European 
welfare states with regard to women’s labour market participation trends, trends which 
had salient impacts on their life-paths. In the course of the 1970s, when women’s labour 
market participation was increasing in the European welfare states, Turkey experienced 
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an opposite trend because the Turkish labour market was still operating on the basis of 
import-substitution industrialisation (Hemerijck, 2013; Toksöz, 2015).                                                                                                                          
 The main reason for this was to protect domestic capital from the international 
competition and provide a domestic demand-driven growth. This, in return, enabled 
relatively high wages and ample job opportunities, but only for male workers because 
these were capital-intensive sectors, which are generally associated with men as they 
require physical strength (İlkkaracan, 2010). This male-dominated working culture 
created a male-dominated trade unionisation, which closed another window of 
opportunity in terms of female employment. The lack of women’s representation within 
the trade unions left women’s unequal positions even in terms of labour market entry 
uncovered and women’s demands could never appear on any collective labour 
agreement (Toksöz, 2015). All in all, a consolidation of the high wages which allowed 
a family to survive with a single earner, and the lack of women’s representation within 
the trade unions, who formed a potential strong pressure group at the time, did nothing 
but strengthen the prevalence of the traditional male breadwinner family model 
(İlkkaracan, 2010).  
 Added to this, throughout the 1970s, Turkey was experiencing a massive 
migration from rural areas to big urban cities (Makal, 2015) which exacerbated the 
already low female employment rates. A typical Turkish woman living in a small rural 
region and working as an unpaid family labourer in the agricultural sector had difficulty 
adapting to the labour market conditions of the big urban city due to her relatively lower 
educational background, thus she frequently became a full-time housewife (İlkkaracan, 
2010). In the light of these domestic developments in Turkey, it would be fair to argue 
that men and women have followed completely different and even unequal life-paths. 
The husband was associated with the paid work and the wife with the unpaid domestic 
work (Ecevit, 2010), as evidenced in official statistics. The female employment rate in 
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Turkey in the early 1970s was below 19%, while the EU average was above 30% 
(İlkkaracan, 2010). 
 In the 1980s, Turkey experienced the adverse impacts of increasing petrol prices 
and a worsening foreign currency bottleneck. Even though Turkey had been employing 
a closed economy model until the 1980s, the country found itself in an economic 
recession mainly caused by the 1973 Oil Crises, which resulted in economic stagnation 
in the Western world. These economic maladies paved the way for Turkey to move 
towards export-oriented industrialisation (Toksöz, 2015). On the 24th of January 1980, 
Turkey introduced export-oriented industrialisation policies (Buğra and Savaşkan, 
2014), which appeared to offer a glimmer of hope with respect to female employment. 
Export-oriented industrialisation is expected to extend labour-intensive sectors in 
traditionally female areas such as the textile, garment and food industries (İlkkaracan, 
2010; Toksöz, 2015). But contrary to expectations, Turkish women’s labour market 
participation continued to remain low apart from very small changes, and represented 
an atypical case, rising only from 19% to 20% (Toksöz, 2015). The sharp gendered 
division of labour between men and women remained throughout the 1980s too. 
Although the labour market conditions were in favour of increased female employment, 
the contemporary political conjuncture of Turkey continued to exclude men from unpaid 
domestic work and women from paid work. 
 The second coup in Turkish history, in 1980, had ruthless impacts on the labour 
market structures and concomitantly on the family form. The military regime 
successfully suppressed any kind of action associated with left-wing ideas and 
eventually opened a window of opportunity for the rise of political Islam as well as the 
emergence of Islamist organisations (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014), which first altered the 
labour market structure and subsequently the place of women within the labour market. 
In the aftermath of the 1980 coup, the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi – RP), holding an 
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explicit Islamic approach toward all walks of life including the economy, came to power. 
In the first tenure of their governance, the RP ardently started privatising the economy 
through supporting small and medium-size enterprises from different pious, 
undereducated and underdeveloped provincial towns through various government 
programs and credit arrangements (ibid). This new emerging business elite, backed by 
the government, dominated the Turkish labour market. They started forming their own 
business associations, trade unions and professional chambers (ibid), which went in 
tandem with the reproduction of the traditional male breadwinner family model. The 
RP’s determination to make new business actors out of formerly neglected pious 
businessmen from various small regions was taken over and perhaps better performed 
by the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) after the RP 
was closed down by the military authorities in 1997 (Atabay, 2014). So, during the 
period between 1980s and 2000s, unlike its European counterparts, Turkey continued to 
pursue the traditional male breadwinner family model due to the strong traces of Islam 
and the corresponding conservative social and cultural order (Buğra and Savaşkan, 
2014).  
 This interrelated consolidation of the labour market and the prevalent family 
model, combined with the family and kin solidarity welfare model of Turkey, led to a 
conservative gender regime. This conservative gender regime maximised women’s 
domestic responsibilities and encouraged them to stay at home and care for their family 
members, rather than supporting their labour market participation (Bozçağa, 2013; 
Buğra and Keyder, 2006; Dedeoğlu, 2012). As can also be seen from Table 4.2 below, 
there was a continuous decrease in female employment rates in Turkey, whereas it was 
the other way around across Europe. 
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54.1 30.9 77.8 2000 46.7 24.8 68.5 
Source: Turkey Labour force participation rate Stats, (NationMaster, n.d.).   
 Under these circumstances, Turkish women experienced social risks and 
inequalities which needed to be mitigated through various social policies. Yet, the social 
risks and inequalities experienced by Turkish women were different than those risks and 
inequalities experienced by European women. Until the mid-2000s, Turkish women 
were highly dependent on their spouses for economic and social support. The majority 
lacked economic independence because only workers actively engaged in the labour 
market and regularly contributing to the social security schemes were able to benefit 
from state provisions (Dedeoğlu, 2012). Given that it was mostly men associated with 
paid labour, children and women could access services only through their husbands and 
fathers, increasing their dependence. Moreover, women’s myriad domestic duties paved 
the way for their exclusion from any kind of vocational provisions (such as trainings, 
promotion, etc.). Building on the already large educational gap between men and 
women, this exclusion did nothing but consolidate the supremacy of the family for the 
majority of women. On the other hand, the minority who needed to work were largely 
forced into secondary insecure jobs because they could not find a place for themselves 
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in the primary labour market (Ecevit, 2010). The risks and inequalities that Turkish 
women have experienced for more than three decades are not derived from their double 
burden of work and family responsibilities. Instead, Turkish women have suffered from 
the lack of measures supporting their labour market participation. Besides, the dominant 
socio-political and socio-cultural ambiance in Turkey has regarded women as the 
representatives of their family honour (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2013). The better they serve 
their motherhood, the higher the honour held by their family.  
 It is important to note that, over the last two to three decades, German women 
have gradually become more engaged with paid employment. Thus, they have come to 
shoulder employment responsibilities along with their already existing familial 
responsibilities. Although German women have begun to gain their economic 
independence, it does not mean that they have become fully equalised with men. In order 
to be in the labour market, German women have had to make some sacrifices, such as 
postponing or even foregoing marriage and childbirth, facing the paid employment and 
unpaid domestic work conflict and trying to solve this conflict by working in secondary 
jobs. These issues that German women have been facing have gradually been 
acknowledged by the German politicians. While being still poor, a number of WFLR 
measures have organically begun to appear in official policy documents in Germany. 
Meanwhile, most Turkish women were still responsible for the maintenance of the 
household. Most of them still lacked a work life which would need to be balanced with 
their family lives. Therefore, what they needed for gender equality was not WFLR 
policies, but rather, policies encouraging their labour market participation. For this 
reason, WFLR policies did not appear organically in the Turkish context. As mentioned 
above, their development in the Turkish context occurred in tandem with Turkey’s EU-
accession process. This thesis anticipates that the differences between Germany and 
Turkey – in terms of how and why WFLR has turned into an important policy area – 
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will play a significant role throughout their Europeanisation processes. Having 
explained the German and Turkish contexts with respect to WFLR policy development, 
the chapter now focuses on WFLR at the EU-level. 
4.2. WFLR within the EU: 
In the course of the post-industrial era, especially during the 1990s, the EU adopted a 
new policy paradigm with respect to employment, economic and social policy (Morel et 
al., 2012). The key aims of this policy paradigm shift included tackling the ageing 
population and low economic growth (de la Porte and Jacobsson, 2012), increasing 
global competitiveness (Morel et al., 2012), and alleviating bankruptcy risks among 
member states (Lundvall and Lorenz, 2012), as well as responding to changing family 
forms (Lewis, 2006). This new paradigm, known as the ‘social investment perspective’ 
within the comparative welfare state analysis literature (de la Porte and Jacobsson, 2012; 
Morel et al., 2012), was centred on the idea of economic growth through full 
employment among all citizens, including those with family responsibilities (de la Porte 
and Jacobsson, 2012; Goetschy, 1999). In the achievement of this aim, formerly 
neglected WFLR policies have come to be perceived as key means because they 
simultaneously contribute to two different goals (Esping-Andersen, 2009; Hemerijck, 
2012, 2013; Morel et al., 2012; Morgan, 2012). On the one hand, WFLR measures allow 
women to be more active in the labour market without giving up on their motherhood 
roles (Jenson, 2009; Lewis, 2006, 2009; Morgan, 2012), which would also prevent 
falling fertility rates and labour scarcity in the long-run. At the same time, by transferring 
women’s disproportionate domestic workload either to the state or at least to the market, 
they also are expected to alleviate the unequal division of labour within families. 
Therefore, particularly since the mid-1990s, WFLR have come to be an inseparable part 
of the EU social policy model, rather than being a supplementary policy field as was 
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historically the case (Caracciolo di Torella and Masselot, 2010; Kantola, 2010; Lewis, 
2009; Stratigaki, 2004). Ferree (2008:239) highlights the significance attributed to 
WFLR by arguing, ‘it is not a side issue, instead, a rudimentary European value’.   
As can be seen from Table 4.3 below, over the last three decades, WFLR policies 
have increasingly begun to appear in EU policy documents (Caracciolo di Torella and 
Masselot, 2010; Drew et al., 1998; Fahlen, 2012; Hantrais, 2004; James, 2012; Lewis, 
2006, 2009, Stratigaki, 2004) both in forms of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ laws. That is to say that 
while some of them are legally binding initiatives such as treaties, directives and the 
European Court of Justice’s rules that must be transposed by the Member States into 
their national legislative frameworks, some others are quasi-legal instruments with no 
legal binding forces, such as guidelines, roadmaps and recommendations8 (Aybars, 
2007; Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004; Kantola, 2010; Liebert, 2003).
                                               
8 The EU of today was launched in 1957 as the EEC with the main aim of economic growth and 
integration. Therefore, it does not have the full competence on family policy legislations but on 
employment and gender equality policies. And because WFLR intersects with family, employment and 
gender equality policy, the EU is not able to exert a full autonomy on member states in this area. Therefore, 
reconciliation generated from both the hard and soft measures (see Aybars, 2007; Beveridge and Velluti, 
2008; Kleinmann, 2002; Thevenon and Neyer, 2014).  
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o Member and candidate states should provide 14-
weeks maternity leave with a payment or an 
allowance; 
o Job dismissal protection during the leave and the 
right to return the same job with the exact same 
working conditions, or to an equivalent position; 
o Member States shall bring into force the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions necessary 
to comply with this Directive not later than two years 
after the adoption thereof or ensure, at the latest two 
years after adoption of this (EEC, 1992).   
 
Protective Legislation for 
Women in the Member 
States of the European 
Community Communication 
by the Commission (1987) 
 
o Limit women’s working hours and provide 














o Member and candidate states should provide 
working parents an individual non-transferable at 
least 18 weeks of leave in case of child birth and/or 
adoption until the eighth birthday of the child;  
o Job dismissal protection and the right to return the 
same job or to an equivalent position  
o The right to request for working hours and/or 
patterns change for a set period of time according to 
parents’ needs; 
 
Fourth Action Program for 
Equal Opportunities for 
Women and men (2004-2008) 
 
o Promote flexible leave provisions for 
reconciling personal and professional life. 
 
Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU 
(2000) Article 33 
 
o Job dismissal protection coming from any 




o Member states shall bring into force the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions necessary 
to comply with this Directive or shall ensure that the 
social partners have introduced the necessary 
measures by agreement by 8 March 2012 at the 
latest. They shall forthwith inform the Commission 
thereof (EU, 2010). 
Strategic Engagement for 
Gender Equality 
(2016-2019) 
o Modernise the current EU legal framework 
















o Member States should take and/or 
progressively encourage initiatives to 
enable women and men to reconcile their 
occupational, family and upbringing 
responsibilities arising from the care of 
children (CEC, 1992:2). 
 
Council Resolution (2000) 
 
o Ease to reconcile working life and family 
life, in particular via childcare provisions 
 
 
Barcelona Council (2002) 
 
o Member States should provide childcare 
by 2010 to at least 90% of children 
between 3 years old and the mandatory 
school age and at least 33% of children 




Strategy for equality between 




o Make further progress in reconciliation of 
work and family life policy development 
particularly affordable and high-quality 
care 
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Lisbon Strategy (2000) 
 
o Make it easier to reconcile working life 
and family life, in particular by setting a 



















97/81/EC Part time 
work Directive 
 
o Member and candidate states should introduce 
measures facilitating access to part time work 
for both men and women in order to ease their 
WFLR;  
o Eliminate any kind of discrimination against 
part time workers and improve their working 
quality. 
o Member States shall bring into force the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions 
necessary to comply with this Directive not 
later than 20 January 2000, or shall ensure 
that, by that date at the latest, the social 
partners have introduced the necessary 
measures by agreement (EC, 1997).  
 
Fourth Action Program for 
Equal Opportunities for 
Women and men (2004-
2008) 
o Promote flexible working arrangements for 







o Member and candidate states should remove 
any kind of discrimination from the fixed-
term contracts; 
o Provide fixed-term workers the opportunity to 
access corresponding trainings.  
o Member States shall bring into force the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions 
necessary to comply with this Directive by 10 
July 1999, or shall ensure that, by that date at 
the latest, management and labour have 
introduced the necessary measures by 
agreement (EC, 1999). 
Strategic Engagement for 
Gender Equality (2016-2019) 
 
o Modernise the current EU legal 
framework in terms of flexible 
working arrangements 
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 Due to a significant number of social democratic or relatively more leftist MEPs 
in the EP, who are more likely to endorse the view that comprehensive WFLR policy is 
the key prerequisite of gender equality as well as economic growth, the EU has 
introduced four hard laws. They have the power to ask member and candidate states to 
amend the existing laws and/or to introduce new provisions that decrease the misfit with 
the EU. These are the Part-time Work Directive, the Pregnant Workers Directive, the 
Parental Leave Directive and the Fixed-term Work Directive (Hemerijck, 2013; Kantola, 
2010; Lewis, 2009). These directives comprehensively set the rules regarding maternity 
and paternity leave durations and payment during the leave, working times, 
breastfeeding arrangements and pregnant women’s health and safety in the workplace. 
However, they fail to include childcare provisions – known to be the biggest obstacle to 
women’s employment and thus to economic growth – as these fall outside the scope of 
the EU’s full competences (Beveridge, 2008; Kantola. 2010). Accordingly, in order to 
compensate for this lack, the EU has introduced numerous soft laws, considered to be 
useful tools in expanding the competence towards the hitherto unregulated areas 
(Beveridge, 2008). The key rationale behind introducing these soft laws was to support 
the regarding hard laws and explore the domestic conjuncture in the member states for 
a prospective directive (ibid). As shown in Table 4.3 above, similar to hard laws, they 
serve the goals of strengthening women’s labour market attachment and easing their 
labour market entrance through alleviating their familial burdens as well.  
 WFLR measures have witnessed an almost fifteen-year ‘golden age’ from the 
mid-1990s to mid-2000s. Yet, it was through the introduction of the Open Method of 
Coordination (the so-called OMC) in 2000 that they gained a new dimension, as the 
OMC brought a new approach to social policy-making at the EU level (Esping-
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Andersen, 2009). In March 2000, at the Lisbon Summit, while setting the new agenda9 
for the following ten years, the European Council introduced the method to be utilised 
while reaching the goal. This new methodological foundation was the OMC (Hemerijck, 
2009, 2013), which ultimately nourishes the Europeanisation of national WFLR 
policies.  
 The OMC is a two-fold process based on the exchange of information, ideas and 
experiences, which eventually sets common objectives. After the common objectives 
are identified at the EU level on the basis of this benchmarking among member states, 
the EU first expects its member and candidate states to converge their legislative 
frameworks with the corresponding EU standards. Then, in the case of convergence 
failure, rather than imposing hard laws or imposing strict sanctions, the EU provides 
detailed feedback, including country specific policy recommendations and solutions 
(Beveridge, 2008; Vural, 2011; Esping-Andersen, 2002). Due to the OMC, member and 
candidate states are expected to download the soft EU WFLR measures into their 
national legislation. So, it is possible to argue that particularly from the 2000s, the EU 
started to require a relatively stronger convergence from its member and candidate states 
in this specific policy area. 
WFLR measures by nature may seem a bit dispersed as they have been 
constructed and implemented in the employment policy, family policy and gender policy 
nexus. With slight differences in the content of the laws, they might serve to change the 
redistribution of work between men and women, or to improve women’s employment 
opportunities by easing their familial responsibilities (Duncan, 2002; Lewis, 2009; 
Mazur, 2002; Stratigaki, 2004). Since the main focus of this thesis is to explore the 
                                               
9 The European Council agreed on a strategic goal over the decade 2000-2010, for the EU to become the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more 
and better jobs and greater social cohesion. It specifically stated that the overall aim of employment and economic 
policies should be to raise the employment rate to as close to 70% as possible by 2010 and, as part of that goal, to 
increase the employment rate for women to more than 60% by the same year.  
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Europeanisation processes of the selected countries in this specific policy area, it 
concentrates on the EU approach towards WFLR policies. In doing so, it appeals to two 
interrelated aspects: (a) Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 2002) three welfare pillar 
conceptualisation and (b) familialisation and de-familialisation distinction. While 
developing his welfare regime typology, Esping-Andersen (1990) defined the welfare 
regimes on the basis of different welfare distribution arrangements between the family, 
the market and the state10. He argued that three complementary welfare pillars operate 
simultaneously in order to provide welfare (see Figure 4.1 below) and different countries 
lean on different entities for different welfare needs.  










For example, Mediterranean countries rely on the family for care provisions and the state 
comes into play only after the families’ capacity for care provision is exhausted, whereas 
Scandinavian countries pre-emptively hand the reins of care provision over either to the 
market or to the state. Theoretically, the former exemplifies a familialised arrangement, 
whereas the latter represents a de-familialised one. Since Esping-Andersen developed 
his welfare regime typology, the distinction between familialisation and de-
familialisation has been used to define the level of state or market support in relaxing 
                                               
10 In his book Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen excluded the distribution of care provisions 
from his typology and focused more on the relationship between market and the state and thus has been criticised 
from various perspectives, especially from feminist scholars. These criticisms have been acknowledged by Esping-
Andersen and while revisiting the welfare typology he included the care arrangements into his study (see Esping-











families’ care responsibilities. In that sense, familialisation is used to denote a welfare 
model, wherein the family is the main care provider. On the other hand, de-
familialisation refers to seeking to curtail individuals’ welfare dependence on kinship.  
 It is important to note that both Esping-Andersen himself and notable feminist 
scholars (Lewis, 2009; Ostner, 2010; Pfau-Effinger, 2005) use the term in a broader 
comparison of welfare regimes. However, this thesis applies it solely to WFLR 
arrangements as the central aim is to trace the Europeanisation processes of German and 
Turkish WFLR policies. To this end, it could be argued that both familialised and de-
familialised WFLR policies ultimately aim to aid women in reconciling their work and 
family lives, yet there is a salient difference between their methods. As revealed in Table 
4.4 below, while familialised reconciliation policies help women by easing their work 
responsibilities and providing them a greater amount of time to spend with their families, 
de-familialised reconciliation policies do the opposite. Their cumulative aim is to 
encourage women to participate in the labour market by transferring care obligations 
from the private to the public sphere (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Leira, 2002; Lohmann 
and Zagel, 2016).  
 A closer examination of the EU WFLR measures indicates de-familialisation. As 
studies of EU gender politics, especially from the second half of 1990s onwards, have 
shown, due to the social investment approach and also to Sweden’s entry into the Union, 
the EU’s approach towards WFLR gradually become more and more related to women’s 
labour market participation (Bacchi, 1999; Mazur, 2002; Stratigaki, 2004). The EU 
directives with respect to WFLR increasingly aimed at maximising women’s full-time 
employment in member states by reducing their disproportionate share of domestic tasks 
(Leitner, 2010). This would eventually bring economic growth, first at the national levels 
and then at the supranational level (Lewis et al., 2007). Through shorter leaves, 
expanded childcare provisions and more flexible working-time arrangements, the EU 
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aimed at liberating its female citizens from their familial tasks. The EU WFLR policies, 
therefore, encouraged women to enter into the labour market, return to the labour market 
shortly after delivering their children and remain lifelong members of the labour market 
(Hoskyns, 2000). This approach of the EU clearly chimes with Esping-Andersen’s 
notion of de-familialisation. 









Childcare benefits   
 The cumulative aim of these policies 
is to assign a maximum of care 
provisions to family. By allocating 
care provisions in the family sphere, 
familialistic WFLR policies reproduce 
the traditional family norms and 
values. 
 
Homecare allowances  
 







Public and high-quality 
child care services  
De-familialised WFLR measures aim 
to integrate as many women as 
possible into labour market by 
transferring their family 
responsibilities to the state or at least 
to the market.  
 
Free public care for 
elderly   
 
Short, well paid and non-
transferrable parental 
leave arrangements  
 
Protection against job 
dismissal and position 




Sick and care leaves 
 
 Although WFLR policies have enjoyed a strong emphasis for a decade and a 
half, they came to be side-lined in the second half of the 2000s. The 2008 Euro crisis, 
followed by the severe European debt crisis in 2009, together with the European 
Parliament’s increased number of conservative rightist MEPs in favour of austerity, saw 
social policy provisions disrupted (Hemerijck, 2013). To this end, WFLR policies lost 
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the political enthusiasm and momentum that they had enjoyed in the previous decade. 
However, during 2010 and 2011, they reappeared on the policy-making agenda at the 
EU level. Moreover, the EU has acknowledged that it is almost impossible to reach the 
Europe 2020 targets in the absence of comprehensive reconciliation measures 
(Hemerijck, 2013; Natali, 2010). In order to avoid any potential backlash with respect 
to WFLR policies, social partners and European social institutions, specifically the 
COFACE and the European Women’s Lobby (EWL), announced 2014 the ‘Year of 
Reconciling Work and Family Life in Europe’ (COFACE, n.d.). They put an exceptional 
effort into expanding WFLR measures with a particular aim of composing the disperse 
measures under one comprehensive package. The package consisted of both legislative 
and non-legislative initiatives covering leave schemes, care services and flexible 
working arrangements. This long-awaited demand came into existence on April 26 
2017, when the EC released the European Pillar of Social Rights, in the form of 
recommendations listing key principles for driving the future EU social policy agenda. 
One of these principles focused on the reconciliation of work and family life and 
subsumed various legislative and non-legislative measures (Perez, 2017).  
 In sum, due to the aforementioned new social risks and inequalities that appeared 
in almost all its member states, as well as the aim of making the EU the most competitive 
and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, the EU has adopted the social 
investment perspective, which emphasises WFLR (Morgan, 2012). Although the EU 
competence was relatively limited for a very long time, with the introduction of the 
OMC, documents started to require a relatively stronger convergence from member and 
candidate states. In the end, this prompted states to reconfigure their existing 
reconciliation models. In other words, the EU encouraged its member and candidate 
states to Europeanise their WFLR legislation (Liebert, 2002). In that sense, it is possible 
to argue that this pressure coming from the EU ignited change in each state. However, 
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as Jane Lewis (2009:120) argues, they all followed different paths depending on their 
policy and political contexts: ‘Each welfare state welcomed the 21st century in different 
places in terms of patterns of female labour market participation… as well as in respect 
of existing policies.’ 
Therefore, in examining the Europeanisation processes of the nation states, it is 
also important to explore their departure points. The following section of this chapter 
thus focuses on the empirical cases and gives detailed information about their 
reconciliation policy frameworks in the early 2000s. 
4.3. The domestic WFLR policies in selected cases: 
Relying on Ulrike Liebert (2003), who highlights the importance of the domestic social 
policy model and the policy priorities on the Europeanisation outcome, this section looks 
at German and Turkish WFLR models before the launch of the OMC and before the 
Helsinki Summit. As already mentioned, since the OMC, Germany, and since the 
Helsinki Summit, Turkey, are expected to download both EU hard and soft WFLR laws 
into their national legislative frameworks. Therefore, this thesis accepts 2000 as an 
historical marker, representing the beginning of the German and Turkish 
Europeanisation processes. Although the German and the Turkish WFLR models before 
2000 had an important number of similarities, the politics of the policies showed 
significant variations, which can be expected to play an important role in the course of 
their Europeanisation processes. Therefore, the initial domestic models are explained 
separately and the chapter proceeds with Germany.   
4.3.1. WFLR policies in Germany before the launch of the OMC: 
Prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the FRG – and afterwards, unified Germany – has 
often been cited as the perfect exemplar of ‘conservative corporatist regime’ (Esping-
Andersen, 1990). Two main characteristics of this regime are: (a) strong adherence to 
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the traditional male breadwinner family model, based on the gendered work and care 
dualism and (b) the principle of subsidiarity, which requires an individual to seek help 
first from the family and to consider the state as the last resort (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 
Korpi, 2000; Ostner, 2010; Trzcinski and Camp, 2014). This played an important role 
in Germany being laggard in developing de-familialised WFLR measures, thus showing 
considerable contrast with the EU itself and other EU member states (Ostner, 2010; 
Palier, 2006; Pfau-Effinger and Smidt, 2011; Trzcinski, 2000; Von Wahl, 2008). 
 During the late 20th and very early 21st centuries, the one and only federal policy 
with respect to WFLR was the Maternity Protection Law (Mutterschutzgesetz), which is 
a basic form of maternity leave but far from being de-familialised (Grebe, 2009). The 
law required mothers to end their careers with childbirth and dedicate their lives to 
family altruism (ibid.). Alongside the socially accepted male breadwinner and female 
homemaker family model, minor deviant family forms have also existed such as 
working-class families, which need a dual income to survive, and single mothers, who 
need to work and care simultaneously. Although they were not welcomed by society and 
considered as rabenmutter11, their work and family life conflicts were acknowledged by 
the German government (Rüling, 2010). Yet a very limited solution was provided 
(Grebe, 2009; Rüling, 2010). Few, poorly designed, kindergarten services were the only 
time-present WFLR measures. Their main concern was the education of children, 
especially those coming from the lower socio-economic strata (Pffau-Effinger and 
Schmidt, 2011). Furthermore, there were neither federal nor länder childcare policies. 
Enrolment of children in these kindergartens was completely left to parents’ initiatives 
(Grebe, 2009; Rüling, 2010).  
                                               
11 A Nazi concept, referring to, a loveless, heartless, cruel, unnatural, or uncaring mother; a bad mother 
who does not take good care of her children (Retrieved from: https://www.german-
way.com/tag/rabenmutter/). It is used to indicate mothers who, contrary to socially accepted family norms 
and values, engaged in gainful employment and neglected her familial duties.  
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Slight extensions to childcare services had been made during the Nazi era. One 
of the most notorious figures of German history, Adolf Hitler and his party had put a 
tiny effort into improving WFLR – but this was limited to improving poor childcare 
facilities. It is very important to note that this had nothing to do with women’s 
employment or gender equality (Grebe, 2009; Roberts, 2016), which can be proved by 
an ample extension of maternal leave. In the light of ‘Blood and Soil’ (Blut und Boden)12 
ideology, Hitler and his German Workers’ Party (Deutsche Arbeiterpartei-DAP), 
prioritised child wellbeing and pro-natalism. The main concern of the government was 
boosting the birth rate and improving child wellbeing so that they could raise the 
superior Aryan ‘master race’ (Roberts, 2016). With this goal, they extended the childcare 
services slightly and put them under state control. But on the other hand, they also 
extended the duration of the ban on puerperant women’s employment. In the course of 
the Nazi era, WFLR policies held the aim of reinforcing traditional gender roles, which 
restrict women to the domestic sphere to care for the children. In other words, they were 
highly familialised.  
As explained earlier, following WW2 and for the period of 40 years until 
reunification, each part of Germany had very different labour market trajectories with 
opposing family and WFLR models (von Wahl, 2008). In the FRG, wherein the political 
agenda focused on upholding and reinforcing the traditional care/work dualism, 
increasing women’s employment rates was elusive. This resulted in a considerable lack 
of WFLR initiatives.
                                               
12 The main ideology of Hitler and his party. According to this ideology, German people have the right to 
live on German soil so it aims to expand German territory and German nation.  
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First report on the current 
situation of Families in 
Germany.  
o Germany needs to improve its family 








o Cash benefit to be paid to parents who 




Motherhood Leave Act 
(Mutterschaftsurlaubgesetz) 
 
o 6 -month period of optional maternity 
vacation with a monthly payment of 
750 DM only to working mothers 












Child-raising Benefit Act 
(Bundeserziehungsgeldgesetz) 
 
o Replaced the Motherhood Leave Act 
and introduced Child-raising Benefit 
payable to all mothers not only birth 
mothers for the first 18 months; 
o Introduced parental leave 
(Erziehungurslaub)-a flat rate parental 
leave scheme for 10 months to either 
mothers or fathers with a permission 




As Table 4.5 above shows, FRG WFLR policies were constructed around a strong male 
breadwinner family model. Lack of institutionalised childcare provisions together with 
the long maternity and parental leaves clearly engaged women with domestic work and 
mothering, rather than labour force participation. Therefore, it could be argued that West 
German policies pursued high familialisation and very low de-familialisation. On the 
contrary, due to its considerable capital and labour force shortages, the GDR had no 
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choice but to provide comprehensive WFLR measures. Accordingly, during its 
existence, it has facilitated the combination of work and family life through so-called 
‘Mommy Policies’ (Muttipolitics) (Ferree, 1993). These Mommy Policies were 
underpinned by §10 of the 1965 GDR Family Code, which openly highlights the 
importance of WFLR (Grebe, 2009).  









1st Implementation Regulation for 
the Order to Establish Pre-school 
and After-school facilities (1st 
Durchfuhrungbestimmung zur 
Verordnung uber die Einrichtung 
der vorshulischen Erziehung und 
Horte) 
 
o Extensive childcare facilities and 
material assistance for women to 
combine their work and gainful 




Household day (Haushalttag) 
 
 






Family Code, Art. 10 
 
o The relations of spouses to each 
other must be designed in such a 
way that women can reconcile 
their professional and social 







o 6 weeks paid leave before and 20 





Baby Year (Babyjahr)  
 
o A year-long maternity leave with 




As can be seen from Table 4.6 above, the GDR WFLR policies have always been 
extensive. However, that is not to say that they were all de-familialised. The care policies 
indeed exhibited high de-familialisation by locating care work under the state 
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responsibility, thus encouraging women’s employment. But on the other hand, all leave 
policies were directed at women. They therefore reproduced the assumption that women 
are the ones naturally responsible for childcare and domestic work, which was already 
the dominant notion in the West.  
It is often argued that, with unification, all West German legislative, social and 
moral aspects were imposed on the East (Erler, 2011; Ostner, 2010). However, it was 
not that straightforward. In addition to several demographic factors delineated earlier in 
this chapter, East German women’s fear of losing their worker identity encouraged them 
to lobby for the signing of the bilateral unification contract ‘Einigungvertag’, which 
promised an increased attention to WFLR and an exceptional effort to preserve GDR’s 
childcare network (Erler, 2011). Therefore, as listed in Table 4.7 below, WFLR policy 
slowly but surely has begun to appear in German legislative framework.  
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Child and Youth Assistance 




o A statuary right for 
every child between 
the ages three and six 
in a childcare place on 













o A basic tax allowance 
to parents (€1080 for 
single and €2160 for 
married parents); 
o A separate allowance 
of €1500 for childcare 
related expenses for 







Childraising Allowance Law 
(Bundeserziehungsgeldgesetz) 
 
o Full-paid maternity 
leave starting six 
weeks before the 
expected due date and 
ending eight weeks 
after childbirth;  
o Job dismissal 
protection from 
dismissal either with 








o A flat rate parental 
leave scheme for 36 
months with a 
financial 
compensation for the 











 By the time the OMC was launched, there were four laws regarding WFLR in 
the German legislative framework. Closer examination of those laws indicates a lack of 
de-familialisation. Germany was at this time a prototype of the conservative corporatist 
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welfare model identified in Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare typology; with 
conservative right political parties in power, this resulted in German policies that 
focused on allowing women to maintain their care-giver roles rather than emphasising 
their career ambitions. The scarce supply of public childcare facilities induces citizens 
to count on family and kinship (mainly the female members of the family) with respect 
to care, which is underpinned by the considerably long and transferrable leave schemes. 
All in all, it could be argued that the German WFLR model, prior to the introduction of 
the OMC, was a familialised one, allocating care to the family rather than transferring it 
either to the state or market. This reinforced traditional gendered family roles, and thus 
showed a high level of misfit with the EU. Simultaneously, the German model received 
a high level of adaptational pressure from the EU and EU institutions. Referring to the 
‘goodness of fit’ argument, it can be argued that a consolidation of the high level of 
misfit and high level of adaptational pressure eventually paved the way for a 
Europeanisation process in Germany in this specific policy area. 
4.3.2. WFLR policies in Turkey before the Helsinki Summit: 
Before the Helsinki Summit, when Turkey was declared an official EU candidate, the 
Turkish state did not pay much attention to how women reconciled their work and family 
lives, because women’s active presence within the paid labour market was not socially 
accepted (Kandiyoti, 1988). In that sense, as can be seen from Table 4.8 below, the 
Turkish parental leave provisions, childcare facilities and working time arrangements 
remained highly primitive and showed a high level of misfit with the EU, appearing as 
a salient obstacle to Turkey’s membership.   
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o 6 weeks before and 6 weeks after in 
total 12 weeks of paid maternity leave.  










o Companies with more than 150 female 
workers are forced to provide 
comprehensive nursery rooms;  
o Companies with more than 300 female 
workers are obliged to provide 










 Leave provisions in Turkey before the introduction of the new Labour Code in 
2003 were very immature and far removed from the EU standards. It was only the 1971 
Labour Code which for the first time granted female public sector employees twelve 
weeks of paid maternity leave (Labour Code, 1971 Article 70), with the right to ask for 
an additional six unpaid months. There was a clear distinction between the public and 
private sectors with respect to job protection. While women working in the public sector 
were guaranteed job protection until the end of their maternity leave, women employed 
in the private sector did not have any guarantee against dismissal. The employer had the 
right to dismiss the worker without notice. Under the Labour Law of 1971, only fathers 
employed in the public sector were entitled to a (three to ten day) legal parental leave. 
The Code did not include any reference to the paternity or parental leaves of fathers 
working in the private sector (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2013). Rules and regulations 
regarding their leaves were totally left to companies’ initiatives – a reflection of the 
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perception that it was not appropriate for fathers to be involved in domestic work in the 
Turkish social context. 
 After an almost ten-year stability in terms of WFLR measures, in 1987 the 
Turkish Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MoLSS) introduced an official bylaw 
regarding the working conditions of pregnant or breastfeeding female employers as well 
as nursing room and care centre provision. The bylaw required companies employing 
more than 150 female workers to provide comprehensive nursery rooms, and companies 
employing more than 300 female workers to provide comprehensive childcare centres 
and pre-school facilities (İlkkaracan et al., 2015). Unlike most of the other European 
countries, Turkey did not provide any legal right to children in terms of childcare place 
enrolment. Another cornerstone of WFLR, working time arrangements, were also highly 
disappointing in Turkey before the OMC. Although the majority of women were 
working part-time in order to be able to reconcile their work and family lives, part-time 
or fixed-term employment policies were not covered by the 1475 Labour Act legislation. 
In the absence of legal policies with respect to working time arrangements, part-time 
workers were working with no job guarantees, predominantly low wages and limited 
opportunity for progression, in what were regarded as secondary and informal jobs 
(Dedeoğlu, 2012).  
 All in all, the Turkish WFLR model was also highly familialised prior to the 
Helsinki Summit. Rather than easing women’s labour market participation through 
lightening their domestic responsibilities, Turkish policies successfully reflected the 
patriarchal social order of Turkey and encouraged women’s motherhood roles, which 
was demonstrated by official statistics. At the time Turkey was declared an official EU 
candidate state, the female employment rate was 26.33%, one of the lowest rates among 
the OECD and EU countries (İlkkaracan et al., 2015). In the same year, the total number 
of childcare services across the country was only 7.660, which could cover 212,603 
 99 
children. This means only 9.8 per cent of all Turkish children were enrolled with a 
formal childcare place, while the OECD average was 28.1 per cent (ibid). It is important 
to note that these numbers reflect only children between three and six years old. There 
is a lack of any official statistics regarding childcare enrolment of children below age 
three (Ecevit, 2015). This lack clearly reflects the Turkish government’s attitudes toward 
external childcare for younger children (ibid.) By and large, Turkish women tried to 
reconcile their working lives with their family lives by working part-time in those so-
called secondary jobs. The combination of these low employment statistics and poor 
legislation saw a high level of misfit between Turkey and the EU, which eventually led 
Turkey to Europeanise her WFLR model.    
4.4. Conclusion:  
Social policy is not a frozen entity. As it is defined as a set of legislation and activity 
applied by governments with the aims of alleviating existing social risks and inequalities 
and improving people’s life quality (Esping-Andersen, 2009; Taylor-Gooby, 1996), 
social policies change with the fluctuant conditions of the day. Simply put, at certain 
points in time when some policies are needed, others may lose their urgency. In this 
respect, although the need for WFLR policies was not acknowledged until the 1990s, 
since then they have been given increasing attention. Women have come to have both a 
work life and a family life, which need to be reconciled through comprehensive policies; 
women’s labour market participation was argued to be depressed due to the absence of 
such policies. In that sense, over the last three decades, in line with its newly adopted 
social investment approach, the EU has prioritised WFLR policy-making and started to 
require a relatively stronger convergence from its member and candidate states. This has 
had a marked influence on the EU member and candidate states and started a 
Europeanisation process in each of them.  
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 This chapter, accordingly, located Germany and Turkey within this broader 
picture and diagnosed their changing needs in order to show how WFLR has historically 
appeared in their legislative frameworks. It argued that while Germany followed a path 
in line with the general trend in Europe, wherein reconciliation policies appeared as 
corollary, Turkey appeared as a completely unique case. In other words, the trajectory 
of women’s employment in Germany begged for reconciliation policies, whereas they 
have been artificially integrated into the Turkish policy framework via external forces. 
An increased number of German women entering the labour market saw the emergence 
of new social risks and inequalities within Germany, which turned WFLR policies into 
a significant policy area. On the other hand, Turkey emphasised WFLR policies mostly 
due to the adaptational pressure coming from the EU, because Turkish women’s 
employment trends have not witnessed a considerable change like the general trend in 
Europe. Yet, regardless of how and why corresponding policies have come into 
existence, by 2000 they both pursued a highly familialised model. In other words, both 
Turkey and Germany showed a high level of misfit with the EU. The goodness of fit 
argument, would concomitantly expect them to experience a Europeanisation process in 
this specific policy area as this study aims to illustrate.  
 Having explained the Turkish and German WFLR models prior to the launch of 
the OMC and the Helsinki Summit, the following chapter turns to illustrate the 
Europeanisation processes in each country. The thesis proceeds with a discussion of 
policy Europeanisation and examines the EU requirements of Turkey and Germany, as 
well as the policy reforms pursued by the two countries. 
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CHAPTER 5. POLICY EUROPEANISATION 
This chapter presents findings relating to policy Europeanisation, which has been argued 
to be the most common and widespread dimension of the Europeanisation process of a 
country (Diez et al., 2005). More precisely, it aims to shed light on the legislative 
changes pursued between 2000 and 2017 under EU influence.  
 To accomplish this, the chapter is organised in four sections. The first section 
explores the bottom-up Europeanisation of Germany because this thesis argues that the 
Europeanisation process of a member state begins when the member state starts trying 
to shape the EU policy package in line with its own policy preference. To this end, the 
first section of this chapter seeks to understand Germany’s role in shaping the EU WFLR 
package. The aim of bottom-up Europeanisation is to reduce the level of misfit between 
the domestic and the EU legislative framework and the concomitant adaptational 
pressure. Having explained the bottom-up Europeanisation outcome of Germany, in the 
second section the chapter turns to outline the EU’s requirements of Germany and also 
Turkey, this time with respect to their WFLR policies. In the third section, the discussion 
focuses on the legislative changes featured by the selected countries in response to EU 
requirements on the basis of Esping-Andersen’s (1999) concept of de-familialisation. A 
closer examination of WFLR policies made in both Turkey and Germany under EU 
influence indicates an incomplete and contradictory Europeanisation because both 
governments have continued to pass familialised laws, which would push women back 
to the familial sphere, while simultaneously passing de-familialised ones. This in the 
end has done nothing but produce an ambivalent Europeanisation process in both 
countries. Therefore, the fourth and final section of this chapter examines the puzzling 
notions of the legislative changes. The chapter introduces the departure point of this 
thesis as it outlines the domestic policy reforms – which are deemed to be conscious 
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preferences of a certain ideology – made under the EU influence. By identifying the 
selected countries’ legislative responses to the EU requirements, it lays the groundwork 
for further illustrations at discursive, political and societal levels.  
5.1. Bottom-up Europeanisation: 
Several stands of literature (both theoretical and empirical) demonstrate that Germany 
plays an exceptionally important role in shaping EU policies (Bulmer et al., 2000; 
Dyson, 2003; Roberts, 2009, 2016). German influence is at its maximum in certain 
policy spheres: the monetary sphere; agricultural policy; asylum and immigration 
policies; and the EU’s military and defence activities (Bulmer et al., 2000; Roberts, 
2016), but not employment policies or family policies. In other words, in this specific 
policy area of WFLR, Germany cannot be shown as a pioneer actor in shaping the EU 
policy package.    
 Closer examination of EU WFLR indicates the lack of German input within 
those policies. As has been discussed in Chapter 4, the EU WFLR policies encourage 
women to enter into the labour market; return to the labour market shortly after 
delivering their children and remain within the labour market for life (Hoskyns, 2000). 
This approach of the EU, which chimes with Esping-Andersen’s term de-familialisation, 
could hardly be considered as German input because German WFLR policies imply a 
huge deficit in de-familialisation. Thus, it is unjustified to argue that Germany has 
succeeded in uploading its own policy preferences to the EU level in the specific policy 
area of WFLR.  
 The reasons behind Germany’s failure to shape the EU WFLR policy package 
by and large contradict the literature on bottom-up Europeanisation. The financial 
contribution of member states to the EU budget, together with the number of their MEPs, 
have been stated to be two key elements of the success of member states’ policy 
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uploading process alongside the duration of their membership and their relationships 
with other member states (Börzel, 2002).  
 To start with, each year between 2000 and 2017, the financial contribution that 
Germany made to the EU was (a) considerably higher than the money that Germany 
received from the EU and (b) higher than other member states’ contributions to the EU. 
The net contribution of Germany to the EU budget was 8.16 billion euros, 5.12 billion 
euros and 11.95 billion euros in 2000, 2005 and 2012 respectively (Roberts, 2016). 
Between 2000 and 2017, the least amount that Germany paid to the EU was 15.62 billion 
euros (in 2002); whereas 13.056 billion euros was the maximum amount that Germany 
received from the EU (in 2013). As can be seen, the financial contribution of Germany 
to the EU and its predecessor institutions remain considerably high, so that Geoffrey 
Roberts called the EU ‘paymaster’ to Germany (ibid: 200). On average, throughout her 
Europeanisation process, Germany made a net contribution of 8.5 billion euros while 
France’s contribution was 3.5 billion euros and the UK’s, 4.9 billion euros (Roberts, 
2009). Therefore, the anticipated relationship between financial contribution and 
successful uploading of domestic policy preferences, in the case of WFLR, is not 
supported in the German case. Similarly, the number of the MEPs cannot be taken as a 
reason behind the failure to upload these policies: in all parliamentary terms between 
2000 and 2017, Germany was the country with the highest number of MEPs. The 
number of German MEPs in EP was 99 in the fifth (1999-2004), sixth (2004-2009) and 
seventh (2009-2014) parliamentary terms and it is 96 in the current parliamentary term. 
So, although a member state with a high number of MEPs is expected to be successful 
in shaping the EU policy package, Germany remained unsuccessful in shaping the EU 
WFLR policy framework. Finally, Germany, being one of the founding member states, 
has put an exceptional effort into establishing warm relations with other member states, 
both the central and periphery ones, since the foundation of the Union (Bulmer, et al., 
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2000; Lever, 2017; Roberts, 2009). Yet, this did not bring success to Germany in terms 
of uploading its domestic policy preferences in this specific policy area of WFLR. 
Throughout the whole Europeanisation process, all four pre-conditions associated with 
the success of influencing the EU policy package do not stand up when applied to 
Germany. While they ensured Germany a privileged position together with France 
among the other six founding member states, which Germany exploited in shaping the 
EU policies in several other policy areas (Bulmer et al., 2000), WFLR remains an 
exception.  
Within these highly complex circumstances, the roles of the German MEPs offer 
some explanations. The principal aim of German MEPs in shaping EU policies is to 
anchor Germany more firmly within the EU and to obtain peace and prosperity from the 
whole European integration project (Bulmer, et al., 2000; Roberts, 2009). Towards this 
end, German MEPs have focused on shaping different policy areas such as monetary, 
agriculture, immigration and defence policies, but not WFLR. Second, the European 
Parliament Groups and the European Parliament Committees to which German MEPs 
belonged during the fifth and sixth, seventh and eighth EP terms had a huge influence 
on Germany’s capacity to influence the EU WFLR policy package. In all four terms, the 
majority of the German MEPs13 were members of the European People's Party (EPP) 
group and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) group; these are 
centre-right political groups with a rather conservative approach to gender roles, and in 
favour of neo-liberal policies. For these two groups, the division of labour based on 
gender and the subsidiarity principle are still important. They hold with the idea of 
women being wives and wives being mothers. Accordingly, they believe that member 
                                               
13 In the fifth term, 53 of those 99 MEPs were members of the EPP. Similarly, in the sixth term, while 49 
MEP were member of EPP, 7 of them were part of the ALDE. In the sixth term numbers have not changed 
much. While 42 MEP were involved in the EPP, 12 in ALDE. Finally, in the current parliamentary term, 
34 of 96 German MEPs are working with the EPP and 4 of them are with ALDE.   
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state governments should not provide pre-emptive WFLR measures; instead, they 
should wait until the private households fail to secure the welfare of family members 
(Phinnemore and McGowan, 2013). This situation has concerned the relatively more 
progressive MPs in Germany from other political parties. For instance, a senior deputy 
from the German Green Party (die Grünen), while discussing Germany’s bottom-up 
Europeanisation process lucidly argued:  
It depends, I mean of course Scandinavian countries are the ones, who literally 
make the EU reconciliation politics. It is for me because of the MEPs, where 
they stand in Brussels. For example, most of our MEPs are from EPP and some 
ALDE and of course, they keep female employment issue quiet because they still 
have the conservative ideas in their minds… But Scandinavian MEPs, they are 
engaged with United Left and Nordic Green Left, if I am not wrong we have five 
or six German members there (GPOL12).  
Such an attitude among MEPs strongly resembles sociological institutionalism (SI) from 
an actor-centred perspective as they decided not to put effort into contributing to the EU 
WFLR model on the grounds of their conservative ideas. Furthermore, it is the FEMM 
committee and the Employment and Social Affairs committee that are in charge of 
WFLR policy drafting. The number of German MEPs working in either of these 
committees has remained considerably low compared to other member states. Even 
though the Chair of Employment and Social Affairs Committee in the current 
parliamentary term is from the German Left Party (die Linke), because the EU directives 
on WFLR were introduced before he became Chair, his progressiveness could not matter 
in this sense. Therefore, the policy package at the EU level is likely to be shaped on the 
basis of other member states’ policy preferences. 
 Another reason for the lack of German contribution to the EU WFLR policy 
package, established through the researcher’s interviews with German MEPs, is 
Germany’s historical adherence to the subsidiarity principle. As German MEPs have not 
fully supported the integration process in this policy field, they remain half-hearted in 
trying to shape the policy package at the EU level, too. While discussing the reasons for 
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the lack of German input to the EU WFLR model, the aforementioned die Grünen MEP 
also openly criticised the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union 
– CDU) and the Christian Social Union (Christlich-Soziale Union – CSU) for not being 
pro-Europe and for being conservative. She cited their conservatism and anti-Europe 
stance with respect to family policies as one major reason of Germany’s lack of success 
in the uploading process: 
The number of MEPs from CDU and CSU are equal to number of MEPs from 
both die Grünen and die Linke… And you know they are the ‘conservatives’… 
So do their MEPs…They really do not have much preferences in terms of WFLR 
that’s for me one reason for not leading the discussions in Brussels (GPOL12).  
Agreeing with die Grünen MEP on CDU’s discontent with EU involvement in family 
policies, a senior MEP from the CDU stated that: 
Family life I don’t think is a policy sphere that EU should put general standards 
because, yes its dynamics affect female employment and gender equality and 
some demographic statistics I agree but at the same time it’s very local. I mean 
even the very personal relations within the families differ let’s say from Norway 
to Germany and from Germany to Great Britain, so I think countries themselves 
can make better policy choices on that than the EU…This is not my personal 
opinion, this is the dominant thought in our party, and in line with what we think, 
because we don’t want EU to involve in our family politics, we don’t contribute 
to EU level policies on family politics (GPOL2).  
Lastly but most importantly, a very fragmented approach among the MEPs 
appeared as one salient reason for diminished German influence on the EU WFLR 
package. A lack of harmony among the MEPs, in terms of their attitudes toward 
motherhood, mothers’ employment and the ideal way of reconciling work and family 
lives, has reverberated in their collaborations and eventually Germany has fallen behind 
other member states in shaping the EU level WFLR policies. A senior deputy from die 
Linke, who identifies herself as a very progressive feminist, described this situation:  
MEPs from the conservatives, I don’t think that they are really vocal. I know 
some individual members from the Green Party or from die Linke of course that 
are really working within the European Parliament but I don’t see them working 
in one line. I think the biggest problem for Germany within the European 
Parliament is they all have different sayings, they don’t speak from one mouth 
(GPOL8). 
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Her perspective was shared by another deputy from die Grünen who argued: 
We have some MEPs like Fransiska Bratner, she is the head of the family 
department. She is the most progressive person in our party, she also knows and 
deals with the all European Union issues. Also, Katja Dorner, she is also really 
progressive and vocal... Also, the SPD and die Linke are fighting on the same 
side with us… But the MEPs from the conservatives and also now we have MEP 
from AFD, it’s impossible to be on the same page with them… So, we really 
can’t do much in council meetings… But as I said, us, die Grünen, the SPD and 
die Linke, we are together because we are criticising our government back at 
home about their behaviour in the council meetings (GPOL12).  
Likewise, a deputy from the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands – SPD) Bielefeld fraction, noted that the fragmented approach among 
the MEPs was an important factor behind Germany’s lack of bottom-up Europeanisation 
process. However, unlike other interviewees, she referred to the different priorities of 
political parties with respect to the EU and their different expectations from the EU, 
which resonates with theories put forward by Bulmer and his colleagues (2000):  
The MEPs from the SPD I think are really good, I personally know that they are 
really trying to push the EU to more of a gender equal direction, which has been 
slowed down most recently. But there is again heterogeneity, devastating our 
efforts… But this time, with respect to EU relations, the heterogeneity is a little 
different than what we have discussed… It is not a matter of conservatism… We 
don’t really have conservative MEPs but it is more different MEPs prioritise 
different things. And while family policies are extremely important for some 
MEPs, some others think that Germany has bigger problems than family policies. 
So, it’s hard to find a compromise (GPOL5).  
 As a result, and in contrast to other policy areas, Germany has remained 
ineffective in influencing the EU WFLR policies. It lags behind other member states in 
uploading its own policy preferences to the EU level (Bulmer et al., 2000; Dyson, 2003; 
Roberts, 2016). This situation intrinsic to Germany is called ‘fence-sitting’ in the 
bottom-up Europeanisation literature, delineating neither actively shaping nor stopping 
the policy-making process at the EU level (Börzel, 2002). Börzel (2001) further puts 
forward four key reasons why a member state would act as a fence-sitter: (a) in order to 
avoid to be isolated among the other member states; (b) in order to achieve the policy 
results while being constrained in terms of action capacity; (c) if they consider the 
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adaptation cost reasonable and (d) if they do not consider the policy issue as a priority. 
Yet, as shown above, these four reasons identified by Börzel remain insufficient to 
explain the German example. Germany remained weak in uploading her own policy 
paradigm to the EU and exhibited a high level of misfit with the EU. In line with the 
‘goodness of fit argument’, Germany received a relatively high level of adaptation 
pressure from the EU.    
5.2 EU’s requirements for Germany and Turkey:      
In the course of the launch of the OMC, there were four hard laws (see Table 4.3 at page 
79) with respect to WFLR at the EU level that needed to be transferred into German and 
Turkish legislative frameworks. Due to their binding characteristics, downloading them 
into domestic legislative frameworks was not open to any kind of negotiation (Kantola, 
2010). In that sense, Germany was expected to download these hard laws no later than 
two years after their introduction and inform the EC thereof (CEC, 1992, 1996, 1997, 
1999). On the other hand, due to her candidacy status, Turkey did not have any strict 
deadline for the adaptation of these laws. Turkey’s Europeanisation process proceeds 
subject by subject (Kantola, 2010). Simply put, as already discussed in Chapter 2, 
Turkey is expected to download some particular policies, which the EC required from 
her through accession partnership documents and annual evaluations into her domestic 
legislation. This indeed is very straightforward: if Turkey wants to become an official 
member, she needs to meet those requirements. The sooner Turkey meets those 
requirements and incorporates them in her legislative framework, the better for Turkey’s 
membership trajectory (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2013; Tocci, 2005). To these hard EU laws 
on WFLR, a number of soft laws (see Table 4.3 at page 79) should be added. In that 
vein, one of the most important soft laws that needed to be adopted by Germany was the 
set of Barcelona targets (EC, 2008). Moreover, a number of other soft laws repeatedly 
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recommended to the member states, including Germany, are exhibited in Chapter 4 
through Table 4.3. On the other hand, again because Turkey has not yet gained official 
membership, she was exempt from these soft laws. 
 In addition to the aforementioned hard and soft laws, the EU has also provided 
regular country specific reports to Germany and Turkey. While Turkey received regular 
Accession Partnership Documents (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2013; Kantola, 2010), Germany 
received annual Country Reports (Kantola, 2010). These reports represented the 
required legislative adjustments triggered by the misfit between the domestic WFLR 
models and the EU WFLR model. Since these reports were country specific 
recommendations, their content differed from one country to another on the basis of the 
level and the nature of the misfit between the national model and the EU model.   
 While assessing the German and the Turkish WFLR measures, the EU regularly 
asked both Germany and Turkey to de-familialise their measures, to make laws which 
would ease women’s labour market participation by transferring their household 
responsibilities to the state or at least to the market. Apart from expecting the 
transmission of the aforementioned hard and soft laws, the documents have openly asked 
Germany to improve childcare and parental leave provisions as well as to increase full-
time female employment through WFLR measures. Turkey also received various 
requirements from the EU. Low female employment rates and poor childcare 
infrastructure have regularly been underlined by the official documents assessing 
Turkey’s membership. Although the official documents excluded the highly familialised 
parental leave scheme of Turkey, the EU officials interviewed under the scope of this 
thesis have pointed to the issue. Regardless of Germany being a founding member (thus 
receiving Commission recommendations) and Turkey being a candidate (thus receiving 
the accession partnership documents), the EU has focused on three interrelated aspects 
in terms of German and Turkish WFLR models.   
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Adaptational pressure on female employment rates: 
A review of the related EU documents and the interviews conducted with the EU 
representatives indicates that the low female employment rates in Turkey and women’s 
overwhelming preference for part-time work in Germany have been major points of 
concern for the EU. The German and Turkish low female employment rates therefore 
are mentioned as an issue in most of the EU documents. For example, the 2003 Council 
Recommendation on Germany covered the issue under ‘preliminary notes’ and asked 
Germany to ‘increase the employment rate of women up to 60% by 2010’ (COM, 
2003:4). In a similar vein, the first progress report, published in 2001, required Turkey 
to provide measures which would increase female employment rates. It stated that:  
The Turkish Constitution guarantees equality between men and women and sets 
the principle of non-discrimination. However, there is a need for effort to ensure 
that the equal treatment principle is implemented and enforced. In particular, 
actions should be designed to increase women's literacy through education and 
training and to improve urban employment for women (COM, 2001:38).  
Alongside the official documents, low female employments rates were repeatedly 
criticised by different official EU representatives while discussing the WFLR measures 
of Germany and Turkey. A policy expert from one of the social partners argued that:  
The Commission for instance, and we also agree with that, put a lot of stress on 
the introduction of all kind of papers on the facts that female labour market 
participation is very low not only for Germany, Germany too but also for all 
member states. This is absolutely true – very big problem and very true (EU4).  
Kantola (2010), Lewis (2007), Stratigaki (2004) and Aybars et al. (2018) argue that, 
particularly from the mid-1990s, an exceptional priority was placed on economic growth 
at the EU level. WFLR, therefore, has turned into a fruitful tool for allowing women to 
participate in the labour market. For this reason, both Germany and Turkey have been 
subject to a certain degree of adaptational pressure for an increased female employment 
rate through de-familialised WFLR measures, which would serve to liberate women 
from their domestic tasks.  
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Adaptational pressure on childcare infrastructure: 
An adequate number of accessible, affordable childcare places have been argued to be 
the lynchpin of de-familialised WFLR policies, for the fact that they significantly ease 
women’s labour market participation (Esping-Andersen, 2009; Morgan, 2012). Neither 
Germany nor Turkey have developed sufficient de-familialised childcare services, an 
issue extensively covered in most of the documents that Germany and Turkey received 
from the EU. Both countries’ strong adherence to the traditional male breadwinner 
family model, based on the gendered work and care dualism and the principle of 
subsidiarity (Aybars and Tsarouhas, 2010; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Dedeoğlu, 2012; 
Ostner, 2010; Trzcinski and Camp, 2014), played an important role in this insufficiency. 
For this reason, the EU documents and the personal interviews conducted with official 
EU representatives stress the urgent need to expand childcare provision in terms of both 
quality and quantity. While the official reports’ foci were more on the statistics and 
numbers, a number of interview partners expressed their concerns about the 
affordability, quality and opening hours of childcare facilities. For example, the 2005 
Progress Report indicated that:  
In the last four years, Turkey made a 68% increase in the number of children in 
pre-school education, yet is still low…There is still much to be done in this area 
(COM, 2005: 137).  
Similarly, a senior member of the Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality Commission 
stated that: 
Opening hours are very important so the care services should be running between 
times that parents can bring their child before work and pick up after work. So, 
it’s about facilitating… But in Germany, which is quite conservative I’d say 
kindergartens ends at 1 o’clock…How can this increase female employment? 
(EU7).  
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Even if childcare does not fall under the full EU competence, the EU officials are highly 
concerned about childcare infrastructure and ask both Germany and Turkey to improve 
it. 
Adaptational pressure on leave schemes:  
A consistently criticised aspect of German and Turkish WFLR model has been the 
parental leave schemes. It is argued that shorter maternal leave would provide for 
women’s quicker return to the labour market. This lesser amount of time spent out of 
the labour market would keep women updated in terms of their careers, which would 
benefit both the employee and the employer (Leitner, 2003; Lewis, 2002). Moreover, 
shorter parental leave, especially if it is shared equally among the parents, would also 
increase gender equality by distributing care work equally (Kantola, 2010; Stratigaki, 
2004). To this end, relatively long durations of unpaid parental leaves supported by cash 
benefits, their transferrable nature in Germany and the lack of paternal leave for fathers 
working in the private sector in Turkey have been repeatedly noted by EU 
representatives. Yet they were merged into the requirements with respect to general 
WFLR measures, rather than being covered under a separate heading. For example, a 
senior member of the Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality Commission stated that: 
Germany’s biggest problem beside the childcare is their long, long leaves, which 
is very much related to their understanding of mothers care, fathers earn… But, 
we here are screaming every day for an increased number of women in the labour 
market. But frankly how can it be possible with long leaves? That would actually 
move mostly women away from the labour market. This would create 
disincentives to stay in the labour market or to return to the labour market for 
instance after pregnancy and giving birth. And this contradicts with the objective 
of female labour market participation (EU7).  
Alongside the duration of the leaves, transferability was another point of concern of the 
EU representatives. While appreciating the German parental leave scheme, which 
obliges fathers to take at least two months of leave (discussed below), they required even 
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more equal sharing of parental leave. A senior policy expert from a social institution 
lobbying the EU Commission for better WFLR policies stated, while discussing the 
current situation in Germany: 
Germany improved its parental leave scheme… It still doesn’t have paternity 
leave but it’d be too much to expect a paternity leave from a member state when 
we don’t have it here. But yes, with this two additional months, which is usually 
taken by fathers, German parental leave is becoming better. Because what we 
say is parental leave should be individual; it should be non-transferrable 
individual (EU1). 
In a similar vein, the 2005 Progress Report for Turkey explicitly pointed to Turkey’s 
backwardness in reconciliation measures and indicated that:   
Turkey has not accepted the Article 8 of the European Social Charter on 
maternity leave of working women yet (COM, 2005: 38).  
 As can be seen from the examples above, the EU has consistently criticised both 
Turkey’s and Germany’s WFLR measures on the grounds of their familialised nature, 
and thus their divergence with the EU. In line with the ‘goodness of fit argument’, both 
Germany and Turkey received a considerable number of WFLR requirements from the 
EU, due to the high level of misfit. As discussed in Chapter 2, the literature on 
Europeanisation has already pointed to adaptational pressure as the pre-requisite for a 
Europeanisation process (Cowles and Risse, 2001). Therefore, a process of 
Europeanisation in terms of WFLR is expected both in Germany and Turkey. However, 
as Nathalie Tocci (2005) argues, it is the domestic aims, interests, the prevalent socio-
political ideology and the domestic history that determine how the process will proceed. 
On the basis of these aspects, the process might bring real change, a modest change or 
might preserve the status quo. The chapter thus continues with a discussion of the 
legislative reforms that both Germany and Turkey pursued between 2000 and 2017, in 
order to reveal the change that came about with the Europeanisation process. 
 
 114 
5.3. Legislative changes in Germany and Turkey under the EU influence: 
The period from 2000 onwards shows an uneven WFLR policy-making process with 
various ebbs and flows for both Germany and Turkey. It is plausible to argue that both 
countries welcomed those aforementioned EU requirements and agreed to adopt a 
number of reforms with respect to parental leaves, childcare provisions and working-
time arrangements (Büchs and Hinrichs, 2007; Yılmaz, 2016).  
 As can also be seen from Table 5.1 below, in January 2001, only a year after the 
OMC was launched, the Red-Green coalition government in Germany, and in 2003 the 
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) government in Turkey, 
made their first moves towards Europeanising domestic WFLR models, which 
controversially continued with ups and downs until 2017 (Bozçağa, 2013; Buğra and 
Keyder, 2006; Dedeoğlu, 2012; Erler, 2011; Grebe, 2009
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o Three-year leave to parents before 
the child turns to 12; 
o Flat rate payment of €300; 
o Protection from dismissal. 
 
Labour Code 
(2003) article 74: 
 
o 16 weeks paid leave with protection from 
dismissal and the right to return to the same or 
equivalent position to pregnant employees;  
o 1.5-hour nursing leave to breastfeeding employee 






o 14 months of paid (%67 if their 
income) leave to parents rather than 
36;  
o Obligation on each parent to take at 
least 2 months of leave.  
 
Reform on Civil 
Servant Code 
(2011): 
o 10-day paid leave to fathers working in public 







o Tax credits to parents, who share the 









o Full-paid part-time maternal leave for employed 
mothers for the first six months following the end 
of the maternal leave; 
o Flexible working arrangement rights to parents 









o 14 weeks of maternity leave to 
employed mothers with a full 
earning substitution.  
 
Reform on Labour 
Code (2015) 
additional clause 2:  
















o €1080 and €2160 tax allowance to 
single and married parents 
respectively;  




(2003) article 88: 
 
o Companies employing 100 to 150 female workers 
to provide comprehensive nursery rooms; 
o Companies employing more than 150 female 
workers to provide comprehensive childcare 











o Part-time childcare right to every 
child between age 3 and 6;  
o National aim of increasing childcare 
enrolment rate to 35% by 2013 
through opening 750.000 childcare 
place.  
Municipal Code 
(2005) article 1414: 
o Metropolitan municipalities and municipalities 




TAG (2007):  
 
o €2.15 billion increase in the 
government spending on initial 
childcare place investment;  
o Additional €770 million for the 
potential costs might exist while 
running the place.  
 
Strategic Plan of 
the Ministry of 
Education (2009): 
o National target of raising the childcare enrolment 
rate for the 3-5 age group to above 70%.  
                                               
14 The statement has been dropped from the Code in 2007 through the delegated legislation 24/1/2007 (Municipal Law no: 5393 bylaw 2).   






o €4 billion government spending for 
750.000 additional childcare place;  
o Direct federal subsidies to 




o National target of increasing the preschool 
enrolment rate for the 4–5 age group to 70% 






o €150 monthly payment to parents, 
who look after their children until 








o Five-year tax reduction for newly established 





o Childcare place right to every child 















o Statutory right of an equal treatment 





(2003) article 13: 
 





o Statutory right of an equal treatment 
of that full-time employees to fixed-
term employees.  
 
                                               
16 In Turkey, ECEC services fall under the competence of MoE or MFSP. While the MoE is responsible for providing a comprehensive care places for children aged 0-2; the 
MFSP is responsible for children aged 3-6 (İlkkaracan et al., 2015).   
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 In addition to the reforms presented in Table 5.1, a number of government-
funded projects were run in both countries. In 2004, the then family minister Renate 
Schmidt, who was the first family minister in Germany since the Nazi period to be vocal 
about extremely low German fertility rates (Rüling, 2010), launched the information 
campaign ‘More Care for Kids – Germany gets Family Friendly (Mehr Kinderbetreuung 
– Deutschland wird familienfreundlich)’ (Ripperger, 2005). The biggest aim of this 
campaign was to focus political attention on care and work dualism and initiate new 
policies to alleviate it through expanding public childcare provision. More recently in 
2010, the German Federal Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and 
Youth agreed to fund the establishment of ‘Federal Forum Men (Das Bundesforum 
Männer)’, an umbrella organisation committed to involving more men in domestic work 
with the slogan of ‘sustainable reconciliation policy for fathers (nachhaltige Balance 
von Arbeits – und Privatleben ein für Vaters.)’.  While these German initiatives aimed 
at de-familialising the existing WFLR legislation, closer examination of the content of 
the Turkish initiatives suggests the opposite.  
 In 2005, the Turkish government started a project called ‘Back to Family (Aileye 
Dönüş Projesi)’, which encouraged parents (mostly mothers) to care for their children 
themselves at home by paying them monthly 300TL (Bozçağa, 2013). Additionally, in 
2015 the Turkish government initiated a project called ‘Grandmother Project 
(Babaanneye ve Anneanneye Çocuk Bakım Parası)’. In a like manner to the Back to 
Family project, the Grandmother Project provided grandmothers with a 450TL monthly 
allowance for taking care of their grandchildren (Daily Sabah, 2017). Then, in 2017, 
with EU funding, the MoLSS started the ‘Home-based Childcare Project (Evde Çocuk 
Bakımı Projesi)’ in three pilot cities. The ministry agreed to pay €300 to mothers of 
small children, who are already employed or planning to return to the labour market, in 
order to be able to employ childminders (SGKemeklilik, 2017).  
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 The overall picture regarding these legislative amendments depicts a social 
policy transformation that has led to an upgrading and widening of WFLR policies. 
Steps taken suggest both Germany and Turkey have been putting effort into de-
familialising their WFLR policies as they clearly attempt to transfer the domestic work 
from largely being a woman’s responsibility to being a government responsibility. 
Shorter leaves endowed both mothers and fathers with greater public childcare 
provisions and universal childcare enrolment rights in Germany; maternal leaves in 
common with the EU standard, together with targets to expand childcare provisions in 
Turkey indicate qualms about the strong adherence to traditional male breadwinner 
family model. In other words, conservative gender roles maximising women’s domestic 
responsibilities and supporting them to stay at home and care for their family members 
had begun to be evaporated. Both Germany and Turkey have come a long way in terms 
of Europeanising their WFLR policies. Through unburdening women’s familial 
obligations, both governments eased women’s entry into the labour market, and also 
provided some policy tools that would help them to remain in the labour market. Yet 
that is not to say that the selected countries have pursued a fully-fledged Europeanisation 
in this specific policy area.  
 From a critical perspective, most of the aforementioned legislative reforms made 
under the EU influence are vague and highly contradictory. That is because both 
governments, while passing de-familialised reconciliation laws, also continued passing 
familialised reconciliation laws and kept several familialising policies in place instead 
of abolishing them, which contradicts the EU approach toward WFLR. Therefore, both 
the German and the Turkish WFLR frameworks continued to show both fits and misfits 
with the EU and made their Europeanisation processes rather uneven. The chapter thus 
proceeds with illustration of these puzzling notions within the Europeanising moves.  
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5.4. Puzzling notions within the legislative reforms: 
Chapter 2 has already distinguished Europeanisation from convergence. It argued that 
convergence is only one possible outcome of Europeanisation. In other words, a member 
or a candidate state holds the potential for convergence or divergence at the end of its 
Europeanisation process due to the speed and extent of downloading the EU standards 
(Duina, 1997). They might: (a) Europeanise their domestic legislative framework; (b) 
preserve the domestic legislative framework; or (c) partially Europeanise the domestic 
legislative framework. In this regard, both Turkey and Germany have partially 
Europeanised their domestic WFLR legislation in terms of both the speed and the extent. 
  While some of the corresponding policies have changed under EU influence, 
some others have remained intact or been downloaded into the domestic legislative 
framework with a considerable delay. This has eventually resulted in an incomplete and 
contradictory Europeanisation process in each country, wherein the de-familialisation 
impact has been eclipsed by the familialised policies. These contradictions within the 
reforms constitute a puzzle that requires solving because they are conscious preference 
of a certain ideology. 
5.4.1. Speed of the reforms: 
With respect to the speed of required reforms, it would be safe to argue that the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions that the German government passed under the 
influence of the EU clearly indicate a belated transmission, especially regarding 
maternity leave, parental leave and childcare provisions. It took 17 years for Germany 
to align its maternity leave with the EU. While the EU expected its member states to 
provide a paid maternity leave as of 1994, Germany provided only partially paid 
maternity leave until 2011 (Krapf, 2014). Female employees in Germany were able to 
receive just 67% of their salaries during their maternal leaves. Lack of sufficient income 
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because of giving birth is arguably open gender discrimination and likely to increase 
women’s financial dependency on their partners (İlkkaracan, 2010). In other words, it is 
against the logic of de-familialisation and an anti-Europeanising move.  
 Furthermore, the EU parental leave directive (96/34/EC) obliged all member 
states to provide at least three months of non-transferrable leave both to men and women 
for childcare purposes, together with a job protection as of 1998 (EurWORK, 1998). 
Although the first reform of German parental leave policies in 2001 covered the latter 
clause, it was already three years later than the deadline given by the EU and omitted 
the non-transferrable notion. As can be seen from Table 5.1 above, the second parental 
leave reform in 2007 covered both clauses. Since the 2007 Parental Leave Act, Germany 
has been providing a non-transferrable parental leave to both mothers and fathers. 
However, the passing of the law in 2007 constitutes a nine-year delay for Germany in 
meeting the EU requirements with respect to parental leaves. Here, it is very important 
to note that, despite the delay, Germany is one of the few member states who 
downloaded this law into its own legislative framework, apart from the Scandinavian 
countries which represent the vanguard of de-familialised WFLR policy-making (Lewis, 
2009). More precisely, it is only Germany among the six founding member states 
(Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) that has aligned 
its parental leave legislation with the EU (ibid). 
 Finally, Germany appeared as a problematic case in meeting the Barcelona 
targets as well. In 2002, as mentioned in Chapter 4, the EU asked its member states to 
provide childcare to at least 90% of their children between three years old and the 
mandatory school age, and to at least 33% of their children below three years of age, 
attaining these Barcelona targets by 2010 (Plantenga et al., 2013). Although Germany 
agreed to meet these targets, the official statistics, especially with regard to the childcare 
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enrolment rate of children below three years old, show that Germany could not meet the 
Barcelona targets in time (Kalicki et al., 2017).  
 On the other hand, although Turkey did not have particular deadlines by which 
to download the EU standards into her own legislative framework, doing so quickly 
would be more favourable to membership. However, in a like manner to Germany, there 
has also been a considerable deficit in the pace of the reform in Turkey. While Turkey 
was sailing in the same direction as the EU within the first six years of her 
Europeanisation process, the seas were not smooth. With the AKP’s second victory in 
the Turkish general elections in 2007 and another disappointment in the sixth EU 
enlargement in the same year17, reforms almost in all spheres including WFLR policy 
area slowed down (Kubicek, 2013; Yılmaz, 2016). It would be safe to argue that Turkey 
took no more steps with respect to Europeanising its WFLR measures except the unmet 
childcare expansion target set by the Ministry of Education (MoE) in 2009. This stagnant 
period, which lasted until the introduction of the 10th Development Plan in 2014, has 
often been criticised by the EU. The 2012 progress report touched upon the absence of 
the progress in alignment with the acquis in the field of labour law and clearly 
highlighted the need for WFLR policy-making:   
There has been no progress in Measures on improving the work-life balance are 
not fully in place, and the existing ones mainly focus on women rather than a 
gender mainstreaming approach… Provision of childcare facilities for working 
women remained an issue; work on a regulation on parental leave did not proceed 
(COM, 2012: 26&65).  
 Gözde Yılmaz (2016), while describing how Turkey’s relation with the EU 
switched from Europeanisation to de-Europeanisation, applied the term ‘selective 
Europeanisation’ to this period, wherein the pace of the reforms was reduced. She argues 
                                               
17 The 2007 enlargement of the EU welcomed Bulgaria and Romania joining the EU but not Turkey even 
though Turkey was featuring the accession negotiation process (see  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_6.5.1.html).    
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that Turkey continued passing reforms, but only in particular policy areas and to a 
limited extent. The lack of measures regarding childcare provisions, leave schemes and 
working time arrangements show that reforms have not been continued within the 
WFLR policy field. Building on Yılmaz, it is plausible to claim that this prosaic period, 
in which Turkey lost her initial enthusiasm, overshadowed the Europeanisation process.  
5.4.2. Content of the reforms:  
With respect to the content of the reforms, puzzling aspects of German and Turkish 
WFLR policies have been summarised under three main themes, all of which eventually 
decelerated the process of Europeanising the domestic WFLR policies. These themes 
are: (a) disincentives for female employment; (b) incentives for the reproduction of 
women’s motherhood roles; and (c) lack of state responsibility.      
Disincentives for female employment:  
The EU stubbornly presses for WFLR policy-making in order to increase female 
employment rates (Caracciolo di Torella and Masselot, 2010), whereas a number of laws 
already existing in German and Turkish legislative frameworks, and some passed 
throughout their Europeanisation processes, tended to be less compatible with female 
employment objectives. 
 Homecare allowances, the monthly payment to parents (mostly to mothers) who 
do not put their children into crèches and care for them at home until the child turns 
three (Fleckenstein and Lee, 2014; Krapf, 2014), are the first example of female 
employment disincentive in the German case. The EU asked Germany to provide WFLR 
measures in a de-familialised manner in order to increase female employment but this 
law seems to contradict de-familialisation logic. Although the government defended this 
law as ‘an essential part of our policy of freedom of choice’ (Rüling, 2010), and allocated 
£319 million (Malm, 2012) to the programme, it can be perceived as conservative 
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welfare model heritage, which eventually impaired the Europeanising of the German 
WFLR model. While discussing the trajectory of Germany’s Europeanisation process 
within this specific policy area, a senior policy expert from one of the social partners 
openly criticised Germany for passing this allowance law: 
So, there is a change, the change is taking place. But it’s going not that quickly 
as we might want or as we expect…So, it’s early to speak because Germany is 
acting unpredictably on this… One year they pass a law for childcare registration 
for infants…the next, cash benefit for stay-home-mothers (EU5).  
Similarly, the two clauses of the Family and Dynamic Population Structure Protection 
Plan of Turkey also hold a highly familialised policy paradigm. As shown in Table 5.1 
above, the plan guaranteed the right to work part-time, with a salary paid on full-time 
work rate, for employed mothers for the first six months following the end of the 
maternal leave and the right to flexible working arrangements for parents until their 
children reach the mandatory school age (Cumhuriyet, 2015). Although paying a full-
time salary for part-time work due to care responsibilities implies acknowledgement of 
the importance of the formerly invisible care-work, it also removes women from the 
labour market. While receiving a full-time salary but working part-time seems highly 
logical to women in the short run (TA2), it can significantly impair their chance of 
returning to the labour market. As Bianchi and her colleagues (2000) argue, the more 
time they spend at home, the less attractive they become to employers. This clearly 
reflects the familialised policy logic of Turkey, and concerns the EU. A recent 
document, the 2016 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy Report, stated: 
Legislation on part-time work for working parents has been adopted. The lack of 
institutions and services to care for children, the elderly and sick people, 
including for long-term care, continue to hinder women’s employment due to the 
gender bias for caring responsibilities (COM, 2016: 60). 
 In order for the Europeanisation process to bring convergence, existing policies 
based on an opposing logic should also be eliminated. However, even though the 
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German government passed a number of de-familialised WFLR policies, it remained 
reluctant to alleviate the existing familialised ones. The joint taxation system 
(Ehegattensplitting) peculiar to Germany, which aggregates the incomes of spouses then 
divides the aggregated amount into two and takes this latter number into account while 
calculating the tax rate (Künzler et al., 2001), and the health-insurance system of 
Germany, which provides coverage for non-working spouses (usually wives) with no 
extra charge (Künzler et al., 2001; Ostner, 2010), clearly assuage women’s employment. 
Although they are of relevance to the policy area of WFLR, they implicitly discourage 
transferring the care responsibility to the state or market and reinforce the view of 
women as the main carers. They negate the EU approach towards WFLR policy-making 
and hamper Germany’s Europeanisation process in this policy area. As both pieces have 
been part of German legislative framework for a very long time, they appeared in many 
EU documents. The Council Recommendation on Germany's 2014 NAP bluntly 
criticised Germany for both the joint taxation and the health insurance systems:  
Together with the still insufficient availability of full-time childcare facilities 
and all-day schools (see Section 3.3), the joint taxation of income for married 
couples (Ehegattensplitting) and free health-insurance coverage for non- 
working spouses discourage women in particular from increasing the number of 
hours they work. This is reflected in a low proportion of women working full-
time and one of the lowest numbers of hours worked on average by women in 
the EU, despite a relatively high female employment rate (COM, 2014:14).   
Incentives for the reproduction of women’s motherhood roles:  
Another puzzling notion of German and Turkish WFLR policies made under the EU 
influence is the fact that they implicitly and explicitly support the role of women as 
mothers and providers of unpaid domestic work within the family.  While more explicit 
in Turkey, the task of caring for children is assigned to mothers in both countries. In the 
German case, although the 2007 Parental Leave reform encouraged fathers to be 
involved in the care work, by obligating each parent to take at least two months of the 
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leave, the minimum duration given to each spouse is less generous than what the EU 
asked for. In a similar vein but even worse, fathers have completely been excluded from 
the picture in the Turkish case. The only law concerning fathers’ roles in care is the 
second bylaw of the Labour Code, which was added in 2015 with the Omnibus Bill. 
Although the law covers paternal leave, the content is highly under-developed. It 
provides only ten days of leave to fathers working in the public sector and five days of 
leave to fathers working in the private sector (Labour Law, 2003, article 74:2). While 
most EU countries have begun to divide the parental leave more or less equally between 
the parents, the same cannot be said of either Germany or Turkey. They clearly 
reproduce the traditional work/care dualism, where women are associated with domestic 
work and men with earning a living, therefore, reaffirming women’s roles as mothers. 
Moreover, Article 88 of the Turkish Labour Code, by basing the existence of childcare 
facilities on the number of female workers rather than the number of total workers, 
reproduces the traditional gendered division of labour patterns and naturalises women’s 
carer roles. 
 To these highly familialised laws and bylaws, two aforementioned projects with 
the same logic, operated by the Turkish MoLSS and Ministry of Family and Social 
Policy (MFSP), should be added, as both perpetuate women’s association with care 
work. While the 2005 Back to Family project does so by transferring child and elderly 
care back into the family sphere through providing cash benefits in return, the 
Grandmother Allowance project does so by rewarding only grandmothers for caring for 
their grandchildren, rather than grandparents, even if they both are retired. Relying on 
these examples, it can be argued that despite the high level of adaptational pressure for 
de-familialised WFLR measures coming from the EU, both Turkey and Germany 
reproduce the traditional male breadwinner family model. The existence of laws, bylaws 
and projects clearly contradicts the EU paradigm behind WFLR as they neither distribute 
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the care work equally among parents nor transfer it from women’s shoulders to the state 
or market. Hence, it can be argued that they impair the Europeanisation process in each 
country by stressing women’s motherhood roles.  
Lack of state responsibility:  
In addition to the aforementioned familialised laws, which paved the way for a continued 
misfit with the EU, there are also a number of policies where the German and Turkish 
governments abstained from taking the responsibility and left the implementation of the 
law vague. The ways in which the TAG and its revised versions were formulated in the 
German case, the 2005 Municipal Law reform and the 88th article of the Labour Code in 
Turkey can be given as clear examples for these vague rules and regulations. 
 According to the Germany’s federal state structure and the TAG, the federal 
government leaves the financial and regulative responsibility regarding childcare 
provisions to länder governments. The federal government covers only one third18 of the 
local authorities’ spending on childcare and leaves the rules and regulations to länder 
governments’ initiatives (Andronescu and Carnes, 2015; GPOL8). This multi-actored 
arrangement results in de-centralised opening hours and fees, which implicitly 
confounds the WFLR Europeanisation process in Germany.  
 First, each local government has been responsible for defining the opening hours 
of the childcare facilities and in most cases, these did not run full-time. According to 
Lohmann and Zagel (2016), childcare places operating half the day, rather than 
operating on the same schedule as workplaces, implicitly restrict women from full-time 
employment and fail to transfer care responsibility from family to the state. In other 
words, they contradict de-familialisation logic, and impair the Europeanisation process 
                                               
18 The other two third comes from the länder government, the municipalities and other various 
nongovernmental institutions, be it the church or the local NGOs (see Andronescu and Carnes, 2015; 
Schöber and Spiess, 2015). 
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of Germany. Second, there has also been a lack of centralised childcare fees. The cost 
of a regular childcare place has differed according to the family income, the länder and 
the age of the child (Krapf, 2014; GPOL10). In crowded länder like Berlin or Nordrhein-
Westfallen, where the demand has been much higher than the supply, the fees of 
childcare places remain very high (Schöber and Spiess, 2015). As a result, these cross-
country variations in terms of both fees and opening hours function as an obstacle to 
Europeanisation of German WFLR model.  
 Similarly, the Turkish government openly lays the responsibility of childcare 
place promotion either on the private companies through the 88th article of the Labour 
Code or on the municipalities through the 14th article of the Municipal Code. In both 
cases, there is no sanction regarding non-fulfilment of the requirement. In addition to 
this, there is very little monitoring of companies by the state (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2013; 
İlkkaracan, 2015). Under these circumstances, most companies prefer not to follow the 
regulation, which ultimately results in low childcare enrolment and female employment 
rates in Turkey (İlkkaracan, 2015). In a similar vein, through the aforementioned 
Grandmother Project, the Turkish government again is leaving responsibility for 
childcare with the familial sphere rather than transferring it to the market or to the state. 
Since the core aspect of de-familialisation is transferring the care responsibility from 
families either to state or to market, these legislations imply a very low level of de-
familialisation, and a very low level of Europeanisation.   
 All in all, in response to the high level of pressure coming from the EU, both 
governments have made significant reforms during their Europeanisation processes. 
Yet, they also kept alive the laws which would push women back into the familial 
sphere. Their existence ultimately influenced the overall reform picture and diluted the 
Europeanisation processes of German and Turkish WFLR policies. 
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5.5. Conclusion:  
This chapter has sought to document the policy Europeanisation processes of selected 
countries. This has been demonstrated through the legislative reforms featured by 
Germany and Turkey under the EU influence. Building on the ‘goodness of fit’ 
argument, due to their high levels of misfit with the EU, both countries received high 
levels of adaptational pressure in these areas. In return, both governments have adopted 
a series of reforms touching upon all three components of WFLR. However, in both 
cases reforms remained contradictory, incomplete and half-hearted. While introducing 
de-familialised reconciliation laws, they have not abolished existing familialised ones 
and continued passing new familialised ones as well. As such, both Germany and Turkey 
have featured an incomplete Europeanisation process rather than a fully-fledged one. 
Referring to five possible outcomes of Europeanisation identified by Börzel and Risse 
(2003) and Radaelli (2003), it would not be unjustified to argue that Germany has 
exhibited an ‘absorption’ whereas Turkey has exhibited an ‘accommodation’. 
 As demonstrated above, throughout her Europeanisation process Germany 
successfully downloaded EU standards into her national legislative framework. 
Numerous laws and bylaws passed by the German government between 2000 and 2017 
exhibited a considerable level of de-familialisation. However, the German government 
did not show the same enthusiasm in abolishing the familialised laws, which could be 
identified as a legacy of the conservative corporatist past of German welfare state. This 
unique situation of Germany resonates with what Börzel and Risse (2009:14) calls 
absorption. Similarly, Turkey has undergone an uneven Europeanisation process. The 
Turkish government, like the German government, has downloaded EU standards into 
her own national legislative framework without abolishing the former opposing laws. 
Yet, because the level of change in Turkish context is lower than the level of change 
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pursued in the German context, it is more accurate to refer to Turkey’s Europeanisation 
patterns within this specific policy area as ‘accommodation’. 
 Relying on the combination of an extensive policy analysis and interviews with 
official EU representatives, this chapter contends that in order to feature a fully-fledged 
Europeanisation, both Germany and Turkey need to improve their childcare provisions, 
leave schemes and female employment rates. There is still a salient gap between the EU 
and Turkish and German legislation in terms of childcare provisions and leave schemes 
resulting in contradictory reforms. In order to understand why the reforms that have so 
far taken place remain contradictory, despite the high level of pressure coming from the 
EU, it is necessary to interrogate domestic actors’ views on and expectations from the 
EU membership, female employment, gender equality and WFLR. That is because any 
kind of legislative decision is an intentional outcome – preference – of a certain ideology 
(Tsebelis, 2002). The following chapter, therefore, will turn to the position of domestic 
actors with regards to their views on Europeanising the German and Turkish WFLR 
legislation.  
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CHAPTER 6. DISCURSIVE EUROPEANISATION:  
Building on the premise that domestic actors (be they governmental or 
nongovernmental) fine-tune the process of Europeanising WFLR policies, this chapter 
investigates the German and Turkish actors involved in their countries’ Europeanisation 
processes. More precisely, the discussion within this chapter focuses on the views of 
domestic actors towards Europeanising the WFLR model, as well as the framing of 
WFLR Europeanisation in domestic actors’ language, which resonates with the aims of 
discursive Europeanisation. As mentioned in Chapter 2, discursive Europeanisation 
focuses on the reasons behind domestic actors’ decisions to act as catalysts or 
antagonists throughout the process (Diez et al., 2005; Ketola, 2013). It tries to 
understand the ways in which domestic actors perceive the idea of Europeanising their 
domestic WFLR legislation. This chapter begins by identifying the domestic actors 
relevant to WFLR policy-making in each country. Here, relevant actors are categorised 
as catalysts and antagonists on the basis of their positions throughout the process. After 
classifying the catalysts and the antagonists, the chapter proceeds to explore how they 
have perceived the Europeanisation of WFLR policies and to what extent they have 
reflected it in their discourses. Finally, the chapter concludes by discussing the level of 
internalisation of EU norms and values regarding WFLR by the domestic actors. 
6.1. Actors of the process: 
Throughout the processes of Europeanising both German and Turkish WFLR models, 
the competences of policy-making have been shared by a range of domestic actors. As 
can be seen from Figure 6.1 below, they all were highly tangled in the contemporary 
German and Turkish conjunctures, to the extent that it was almost impossible to make a 
sharp distinction between catalysts and antagonists.   
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 At the civil society level, a key group advocating policy reform in both countries 
(be it for more de-familialised policies or be it for more familialised policies) has been 
women’s organisations. As WFLR policies are embedded in a nexus of employment, 
family and gender equality policies, they also matter to trade unions, employers’ 
organisations and family organisations in both Germany and Turkey. Finally, because 
of the subsidiarity legacy in Germany, German religious organisations also feature in 
discussions about WFLR policy-making. At the political level, mainstream political 
parties and several commissions within the German Parliament (Bundestag) and the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi – TBMM) are key 
players in policy reform. Additionally, due to the Municipal Law Article 14 (which 
exerts competence on local governments in providing childcare services), local 
municipalities in Turkey; and due to Germany’s federal nature, the local länders in 
Germany, also have a stake in WFLR policy-making.  
 In both countries (see Figure 6.1 above), the major political parties located to the 
left of the centre, whose members identified as more progressive and liberal than their 
counterparts, appeared as catalysts. Strikingly, some senior members of the main centre 
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right party of the Bundestag – the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich 
Demokratische Union – CDU) – also joined the catalyst camp in Germany. All these 
domestic actors had their own idiosyncratic reasons for catalysing the process. 
Accordingly, their perceptions of greater EU involvement in the WFLR sphere differed. 
However, in spite of the differences in their reasons and perceptions, these actors all 
welcomed the process and supported the policy change. To this end, there are some 
examples of cooperation across the groups. On the other hand, right, centre right and 
extreme right parties – namely the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket 
Partisi – MHP) and the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – 
AKP) in Turkey; the CDU and the Christian Socialist Union (Christlich-Soziale Union 
– CSU) in Germany, together with some relatively more traditional women’s 
organisations in both countries, constituted the core of the antagonist camp. In Germany, 
antagonists also include employers and family and religious organisations. As with the 
catalysts, antagonists’ reasons and the ways in which they perceive EU involvement in 
the WFLR sphere showed overt variations. Nonetheless, antagonists also found ways to 
build alliances while considerably decelerating the processes of Europeanising German 
and Turkish WFLR.  
6.2. Actors’ perceptions of Europeanisation of WFLR policies:  
This thesis was built on the argument that the process of Europeanising domestic WFLR 
policies has been shaped by the contributions of domestic actors. However, it really is 
the ways in which they perceive the idea of Europeanising the WFLR policies, stemming 
from their ideological background, cost and benefit calculations as well as their socio-
political past, that determine their inputs to the process. Relying on the Europeanisation 
literature, which argues catalysts and antagonists are two opposing but not mutually 
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exclusive groups, this chapter explores their views on Europeanisation WFLR separately 
and proceeds with an analysis of catalysts.   
6.2.1. Catalysts:  
Catalysts from each country, highly unsatisfied with the current state of their own WFLR 
measures, saw the EU’s greater emphasis in this specific policy area as a window of 
opportunity. To this end, they welcomed increased EU involvement in this particular 
policy sphere and tried to take maximum advantage of the whole process. There are 
three reasons for their position and the chapter proceeds with the first one. 
Constructive pressure coming from the EU:  
Some of the Turkish and German women’s organisations, who identify themselves as 
progressive and liberal, almost all the trade unions in Germany, most of the leftist and 
adversary ones in Turkey, together with the mainstream political parties from the left 
corners of both the Bundestag and the TBMM, have benefitted from the increased 
adaptational pressure coming from the EU in this specific policy field. They have seen 
it as a useful tool to trigger a reform process at the national level. The reasons for this 
include: (a) appreciation of the EU WFLR model; (b) the EU model’s usefulness in 
solidifying their own arguments; and (c) the model’s attractiveness to young women 
voters.  
a) Appreciation of the EU WFLR model: 
All the aforementioned catalysts were highly displeased with the underdeveloped and 
familialised WFLR policies of their own countries. For them, the lack of comprehensive 
WFLR policies, especially the insufficient number of childcare places together with their 
unaffordable costs and incompatible opening hours, required urgent remediation, as key 
factors in women’s continued inequality in domestic and paid employment settings. In 
that sense, they considered EU norms and values regarding WFLR policy as modern, 
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gender equal and global. Take for example one very vocal and active deputy from the 
People’s Democracy Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi- HDP), who argued: 
EU is a civilisation project, it has rules and regulations contributing to 
improvement of societies. Of course, if you want to be part of a project, you need 
to follow those rules and regulations. And I do not see anything wrong to follow 
those rules. I mean they are universal, they are global, they are modern and 
applicable to every single aspect of our lives… be it women’s rights, be it ethnic-
minority rights, be it economic policies or freedom of speech whatever comes to 
mind… And I think we surely need them. Especially today when everything is 
rapidly going back…When our women have been treated as holy mothers, when 
thousands of our citizens including a political party leader is imprisoned 
(TPOL10). 
 A senior deputy from the SPD, for example, who identifies herself as feminist, 
similarly stated that:   
We are very much welcoming the change coming with the EU because we need 
to… In order to keep up with the EU and also the EU states, we need to revise 
our gender politics and family politics regularly, which is something that we 
really would not do if it was not for the EU because you know our political 
agenda is occupied by other issues and also the number of those conservative 
MPs are quite high in our Bundestag… so I would say we are a very pro-EU 
party (GPOL5). 
Besides agreeing on the usefulness of Europeanisation of WFLR policies in 
solidifying gender equality at national levels, both in the employment and familial 
spheres, the leftist parties in Germany also noted their usefulness in alleviating the 
falling fertility rates in Germany. Some deputies from the Social Democratic Party of 
Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands – SPD), the German Left Party (die 
Linke) and the German Green Party (die Grünen) suggested that the lack of sufficient 
WFLR measures were an important reason for low German fertility rates, a point also 
evidenced by a range of population studies (Brodmann et al., 2007; Hemerijck, 2013; 
McDonald, 2002).  
The sympathetic stance of catalysts to the EU’s de-familialised WFLR policies 
has been reflected in their official documents. The majority of the documents belonging 
to the leftist parties of the two countries completely echo the EU policy-making 
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paradigm with respect to WFLR. They overtly embrace the Europeanisation of WFLR. 
The Republican People’s Party’s (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP) and HDP’s 2015 election 
manifestos openly promised to introduce de-familialised reconciliation measures, which 
occupied an unprecedented space in Turkey’s Accession Partnership Documents. While 
the CHP covered the issue under the ‘powerful women powerful society (Güçlü Kadın 
Güçlü Toplum)’ heading (CHP, 2015: 79), the HDP published a separate document 
focusing only on women and women’s issues, under the name ‘we are labourer women, 
we are the raisers of humanity (Biz’ler Emekçi Kadınlarız, Büyük Insanlığı 
Büyütenleriz)’ (HDP, 2015). Both documents touched on a very problematic aspect of 
the Turkish WFLR measures: they highlight the urgent need to amend Article 88 of the 
Turkish Labour Code, which makes childcare place provision conditional on the number 
of female employees. As mentioned in Chapter 5, basing childcare place provision on 
the number of female employees is open discrimination, which infringes on Turkey’s 
Europeanisation process. Since both the CHP and HDP were in favour of Europeanising 
the Turkish WFLR model, their election manifestos promised to base the childcare place 
provision on the number of total employees (CHP 2015: 101; HDP, 2015). The HDP, 
known as Turkey’s women-friendly party, went even further and pledged to establish 
‘Women’s Employment Support Centres’ in order to realise these aims and develop 
more policies aimed at easing women’s employment (HDP, 2015). Additionally, the 
CHP, cited in a number of studies as the pioneer and historical defender of the 
Westernisation of Turkey (Celep, 2013; Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008), openly highlighted 
the importance of EU influence in almost every policy sphere, but particularly in the 
social policy sphere (CHP, 2015: 93).  
Echoing the EU paradigm, the three major leftist parties of the Bundestag 
promised a WFLR model which would support the goal of an equal share of domestic 
responsibilities between men and women, alleviating barriers to women’s employment. 
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For example, the Green Party covered the issue in its party program under a separate 
section called ‘The Green Women Politics (die Grüne Frauenpolitik)’, stating that:  
We assist women and men, to be economically independent… For women, it 
must become easier to protect themselves through gainful employment for the 
age… We want women and men to help to share the concern for their children 
and work in partnership (Die Grünen, 2017).  
b) Solidifying their own arguments:   
Representatives of women’s organisations also welcomed the greater EU involvement 
and EU requirements in this policy area, as the official EU documents have come to be 
their biggest anchorage. An interviewee from a Turkish women’s organisation focused 
on women’s employment argued that:            
Of course, when it was only our ideas and our demands, it was a bit too much 
marginal and feminist to the Government, their concrete appearance on official 
accession documents of course eased our fight a bit, but a bit (TNGO6).  
A German grassroots feminist, also working as a senior policy expert in an umbrella 
women’s organisation, expressed similar feelings:  
The EU did a lot of course, especially in extending the childcare places, which 
was not a German idea. So, all the progress that we made came from in fact 
forced through the EU. Maybe not a direct force but it brought the opportunity 
of looking to other countries, how do they manage it and what kind of childcare 
do they offer just made us to realise that in every other country children are going 
to day-care centres at the age of 1 or 2, which is also kind of forcing. So, it’s very 
important… I know we have a way to go but we wouldn’t have achieved even 
what we have achieved until today without the push factor coming from the EU 
(GNGO7).  
c) Attracting young women’s votes: 
The most striking actor of the catalyst camp is the group of relatively more progressive 
members of the CDU. Although their reasons for welcoming the process of 
Europeanisation diverged from those of other catalysts, they also agreed with 
aforementioned catalysts in finding the adaptational pressure constructive and positive 
for the country. A number of interview partners and a number of studies on German 
family policies suggest that some change in the position of the CDU is evident with the 
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coming to power of Angela Merkel (Fleckenstein, 2011). As general secretary of the 
CDU in 2002, when the party lost the election, Merkel claimed that the main reason 
behind the election defeat was the lack of votes from younger urban women 
(Fleckenstein, 2011; Ostner, 2010). She argued that ‘women-friendly’ and more ‘gender 
equal’ policymaking would attract those young women voters (Wiliarty, 2010). To that 
end, the CDU has supported Europeanising German WFLR policies. Discussing the 
tension between the different political parties regarding de-familialisation, a die Linke 
employee working for gender issues disputed that: 
Well, now the CDU also seems highly in favour of improving WFLR politics 
but I am sceptical here… I cannot believe in their efforts as the way I believe in 
our efforts or die Grünen’s efforts… I am sure, they are more thinking about 
getting votes either from us or from die Grünen… at the end of the day, this is 
the election year (GPOL8).   
 A closer examination of CDU documents supports die Linke’s scepticism, as the 
CDU, who have aimed at catalysing the process for different reasons than the leftist 
parties, used more deliberate language in their official documents when compared to the 
leftist parties. Although the CDU documents cited Germany as the anchor of stability in 
the EU, they bypassed the EU when it came to WFLR. Firstly, emphasis has been on the 
‘family’ rather than female employment. Second, contrary to other catalysts’ documents, 
CDU’s documents covered women-related issues under the heading of ‘Family, Women, 
Youth and Seniors’. Moreover, the CDU’s election manifesto for the 2017 general 
elections promised modest tax cuts and extra money for young families (Knight, 2017). 
Arguably, despite some progressive voices within the party and some progressive moves 
made by the party, the CDU as a whole did not internalise the EU’s norms and values 
regarding WFLR. Therefore, CDU’s language highlighting the importance of the family 
for German society lends credence to a senior deputy from their former coalition partner 
SPD, who argued: 
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Any kind of initiative regarding childcare provision expansion proposed by the 
SPD have been cut by the CDU in the process of negotiation within the 
coalition…so, I think the enemy is within the government (GPOL7).  
 Overall, different members of the catalyst camp welcomed the increased EU 
involvement in this policy sphere and held highly positive views on the process of 
Europeanising their own WFLR model, on the grounds that the process would remedy 
the maladies of their domestic policies. These positive views are also reflected in the 
language of their official documents. Yet, their reasons for appreciating and accelerating 
the process show some variation. Their dissatisfaction with their own national model 
appears to be the only reason common to all the catalysts, apart from the CDU. Both the 
Turkish and German WFLR were highly familialised prior to their Europeanisation 
processes. They both contributed to the reproduction of the gendered work/care dualism 
based on inequality between the sexes (Orloff, 1993). This lack of gender equality 
contradicts with the gender equality goals of feminist women’s organisations as well as 
those of the political left, who have always been close to the feminist movement. 
Therefore, an increased adaptational pressure from the EU for more de-familialised 
WFLR models became meaningful to them. In terms of New Institutionalism (NI), this 
resonates with sociological institutionalism (SI), as catalysts already saw the de-
familialised WFLR model as ‘the right thing’ and supported it because it solidified their 
arguments. The EU standards concerning WFLR policy have been socialised by both 
the Turkish and German political left, together with relatively more vocal NGOs. A 
crucial part of the decisions made by the domestic actors to catalyse the process might 
be based on their social values. 
 A very important actor, however – Germany’s ruling party – has made its 
decisions on the basis of a rational calculation. Although the German Christian 
Democrats have also modernised their thinking and have recognised the importance of 
women’s employment, they still have their strict limitations. They have historically 
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regarded the family as the best educator, and have strongly believed that children should 
be looked after by their mothers. Yet that is not to say that they are against women’s 
employment. For them, women should work if they want unless they procrastinate their 
domestic responsibilities in general, and childcare in particular (Saxonberg, 2014; 
Wiliarty, 2010). A closer comparison of this with the EU requirements shows that there 
is a lack of common ground between what the EU asks from Germany and what the 
Christian Democrats believe. This, together with CDU’s strategic move towards de-
familialising the German WFLR model before the 2005 general elections, exhibits a 
clear utility-maximising calculus. From an actor-centred perspective, it can be argued 
that accelerating the process for vote-concerns chimes with  rational choice 
institutionalism (RCI); the CDU considered the executive office a bigger gain than 
assuaging their strong commitment to traditional conservative WFLR policies for the 
sake of a Europeanised model.      
EU funding as reform facilitator:  
Alongside favouring the constructive effects of the increased adaptational pressure for 
Europeanisation, catalysts also embraced the potential of EU funding to aid the domestic 
reform processes. As mentioned in the previous section, both German and Turkish 
catalysts viewed the EU’s requirements as a safe, global and neutral baseline, which 
would premediate them while legitimising their ideas to any opposing groups – such as 
the conservative voices in government in both cases. Similarly, catalysts in general but 
especially women’s organisations, who identified themselves as progressive and secular 
in Turkey and progressive and liberal in Germany, saw EU funding as transparent, safe 
and neutral, which would allow them to be more independent and flexible while setting 
the agenda for their projects.  
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Women’s organisations in Turkey and in Germany explain their raison d’etre as 
projects, research, advocacy, campaign and services providing for women’s prosperity 
and equality. In the achievement of these goals, and even for their own survival, these 
organisations need financial support. While one way of finding the needed financial 
support is to establish collaborations with and obtain grants from government 
institutions such as MFSP, MoLSS or MoE, the other way is searching for foreign 
funding19. A number of women’s organisation representatives from both countries point 
to the second option as the more appealing one, and the EU emerges as a promising 
donor. Although reasons for refusing to accept grants from national sources differed 
between Turkish and German catalysts (due to the differences between Germany and 
Turkey in terms of the current state of the relation between the NGOs and the 
government as well as the level of NGOs’ freedom of action), there were five main 
reasons for preferring EU funding. These included: (a) fear of potential government 
interference; (b) lack of trust in internal donors; (c) concerns about self-survival; (d) 
overlapping themes of EU and women’s NGOs; and (e) the meaning of being a rights-
based NGO. 
a) Fear of potential government interference:  
The representatives of the women’s organisations interviewed in Turkey were well 
aware of the discrepancy between their own views and the views of the current Turkish 
government regarding female employment issues. Therefore, they were highly 
concerned about potential government interference in their projects and attempts to 
remould them in line with the ruling ideology, which eventually would distant the 
project from achieving its original goals and aims. In order to avoid these difficulties 
and be autonomous in terms of the aims, goals and targets of their projects, Turkish 
                                               
19 Both in Turkey and in Germany private companies also started funding civil society organisations under 
the scope of civil responsibility initiative, yet that is a very recent trend for both countries.  
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women’s organisations give priority to EU funding even if it takes more time and effort. 
A pedagogue working as a project coordinator in a very active NGO, located in a highly 
disadvantaged neighbourhood in Istanbul, and trying to provide childcare services to the 
neighbourhood’s children, shared their lived experiences and how they became sceptical 
and antagonistic toward internal funding:  
Due to the topics we deal with, two very potential funders for us are the ministry 
of education and ministry of family. In the past we ‘somehow’ managed to find 
a common ground and run projects together. But the last application we did was 
a complete disaster. You know the residents of this neighbourhood are all from 
lower class, so they both need to work but at the same time there is no way they 
can afford kindergarten, even the public ones. So, we decided to provide 
childcare services for free only to locals. For that, we needed not a very high 
budget but a considerable budget. So, we, actually I, wrote a project to family 
ministry. After the second or the third meeting, they sent us a ‘revised’ version 
of the project, which was completely a brand new one. Nothing on the paper was 
ours. They were suggesting a place wherein children would come with their 
mothers to socialise. So, I understood that there is no way that we can agree and 
run a project together anymore. Since this, we turned our faces to international 
partners like the UN or EU or World Bank [which] seem possible targets 
(TNGO7).  
This lived experience of a rights-based NGO exemplifies how the Europeanisation 
process of a country is highly filtered by the domestic political conjuncture. For this 
NGO, the EU presents an alternative in order to avoid government interference into 
NGO’s agenda, but at the same time, also a reason to support the process of 
Europeanising the Turkish WFLR model.  
b) Lack of trust in internal donors:  
The second reason for trying to get EU funding rather than seeking funding internally, 
is some women’s organisations’ lack of trust with regard to the neutrality and objectivity 
of those internal donors. This distrust is twofold. The first, which is very similar to the 
aforementioned concern, is topic-centred. There is a perception among several women’s 
organisations that the projects granted funding from internal government sources are 
known even before they tender their proposals. For them, a project aiming to facilitate 
women’s employment would always lose to a project stressing motherhood. This 
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attitude links to the second distrust reason, which is agent-centred. As discussed in 
Chapter 7, pioneered by a women’s organisation run by President Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan’s daughter, a number of NGOs working particularly in the gender equality field 
have been established in the last five to seven years with the support of the AKP as well 
as the wealthy religious businessmen20. In addition to these AKP-supported women’s 
organisations, some women’s organisations that were established in the aftermath of the 
28 February process, which brought in brutal restrictions on Islamist circles in society 
(Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008), and are working for freedom of the headscarf, also became 
more and more close to the AKP, especially after AKP abolished the ban on the 
headscarf. These government organised nongovernmental organisations (GONGOs) are 
expected by secular and progressive women’s organisations to get the internal funding 
as their projects would be in line with the government ideology. This expectation is also 
reflected in the literature on Turkish faith-based NGOs. A number of authors have 
pointed to the significant political and financial support provided to these GONGOs by 
the local and national government (Atalay, 2013; Doyle, 2018). In line with their 
concerns, catalyst organisations have found working on a proposal to be submitted to 
the EU funding mechanism more logical and promising than spending time on a proposal 
to be submitted to internal donors.  
 Ketola (2013), however, in his inspiring work Europeanisation and Civil 
Society, finds that even a very progressive NGO working for gay, lesbian, bisexual and 
transsexual rights or a Kemalist women’s organisation actively and vocally opposed to 
abolishment of the headscarf ban would prefer internal funding on the grounds that it 
                                               
20 There is a rapidly emerging literature on Turkish faith-based NGOs over the last decade (Atalay, 2013; 
2016; Çelik and İşeri, 2016; Petersen, 2012; Zihnioğlu, 2013). Authors have argued that, from 1960s 
onwards, Turkish religious brotherhoods had turned into legal foundations, reaching peak numbers as of 
2000 (Atalay, 2013). Although they initially mostly engaged with humanitarian aid, as they have their 
roots from charity work, more recently these faith-based NGOs have come to be working in the women’s 
rights field.  
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indeed is the EU funding which has a predetermined agenda (Ketola, 2013). This 
difference in the findings perhaps stems from AKP’s sensitivity on WFLR and reveals 
how marginalised secular women’s organisations have become recently in Turkey. As 
detailed in later stages of this chapter, motherhood and family are two of AKP’s key 
values. For AKP cadres, women’s motherhood roles and responsibilities come before 
their labourer roles. To this end, the AKP overtly tried to persuade Turkish citizens to 
have more children and to be more engaged with their family (Korkut and Eslen-Ziya, 
2011), and AKP supported any kind of project sharing these goals. Under these 
overwhelmingly restrictive conditions, women’s organisations engaged with female 
employment openly expressed their feelings of isolation and considered the EU funding 
as a way out, which eventually intensified their catalyst roles. 
c) Concerns about self-survival:  
Finally, the recent political climate in Turkey cultivated women’s organisations’ interest 
in EU funding rather than that from internal institutions. As mentioned in Chapter 1, on 
15th of July in 2016, Turkey experienced its fourth military coup (see Footnote 2). 
Although the ruthless impacts of the attempt were deeply felt in any sphere of Turkish 
citizens’ lives and by NGOs in general, women’s organisations in particular appeared to 
be the most convulsed group, which led many feminist authors to interpret the coup 
attempt as ‘a war against women’ (Arat, 2017; Kandiyoti and Emanet, 2017). The state 
of emergency legally allowed the President and his cabinet to draft or even pass new 
laws without negotiating them within the parliament. In other words, the state of 
emergency permitted the ruling party to impose their vision on the whole country. The 
AKP government closed down 94 NGOs and suspended the service and funding of those 
370 within the scope of the eleventh article of the State of Emergency Act. Ten of those 
94 closed ones were organisations working for increased female employment and 
childcare facilities, such as VAKAD, Gundem Cocuk (Agendum Child), Kongreye 
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Jinen Azad (Aksam, 2016; Yöney 2016). The remaining organisations, extremely scared 
and concerned about the maintenance of their activities, hence have looked increasingly 
to external donors, including the EU. A senior policy expert from a women’s 
organisation located in Istanbul, accordingly, argued that:  
Turkey is going through hard times since the 15th of July. Things [that] happened 
to VAKAD, and to Gundem Cocuk are obvious. Leave partnership aside, it is 
even impossible to approach any government institutions. So, what is left for us 
to collaborate… municipalities… but the level of paranoia is maximum among 
them too, they do not want to cooperate with us either. So especially these days 
EU funding is a shot in our arms… because the worst-case scenario is getting a 
rejection, no closing down or no trial risk (TNGO8).  
In a similar vein, one of the project coordinators of a deep-rooted organisation, focused 
on parent-child relations, elucidated:  
Frankly, we never had funding issues. I mean we are here since early 1990s, so 
I should say we are pretty much accepted. But, now looking around what is 
happening, looking at the trajectory of the country, the state of emergency, the 
referendum, you know I will not list everything happening since 2010, we made 
a big meeting last meeting to discuss our research agenda and the potential 
financers and honestly, we are no more searching grants within Turkey 
(TNGO14).      
 Under a political climate which made it extremely difficult for Turkish NGOs to 
rely on internal funding, the EU funding seemed an attractive option on the grounds that 
there was no hidden agenda, and the EU would never interfere in the content of the 
project, or would be less likely to terminate the protocol during the lifetime of the 
project. EU funding clearly contributed to catalysts’ embracement of the process of 
Europeanising domestic WFLR policies. Women’s organisations’ adopted strategy of 
taking the most advantage of the EU in order to sustain their projects strongly implies 
the RCI perspective, but also resembles the SI perspective. That is because appealing to 
EU funding was not a simple act of utility-maximisation, it also involved women’s 
organisations’ own norms and values. They used EU funding because they perceived 
EU funding as transparent, objective, just, equal and reliable. Therefore, the strategy 
correlates both to SI and RCI perspectives.  
 146 
Similarly, any potential grant from the EU, but especially the European Social 
Fund (ESF), established for advancing member states’ national employment climate 
through co-funding national or even regional projects (Brine, 2002), appeared highly 
favourable to German women’s organisations and bolstered their catalysing attitude. Yet 
due to Germany’s relatively advanced democracy and a greater respect in Germany for 
NGOs, their reasons for preferring EU funding over internal funding differed from those 
expressed by Turkish women’s organisations, as this chapter will now explain. 
d) Overlapping themes of EU and women’s NGOs:   
Representatives from a range of German women’s organisations stated that their project 
topics usually do not fall under Government priorities, leading to numerous unsuccessful 
funding applications to German governmental institutions. Like their Turkish sisters, 
representatives of German women’s organisations also gave priority to EU funding 
applications:  
Only money that we get from Germany in this field is through the special 
research projects, special training programs regarding childcare, or some cultural 
child education projects… the ESF and ICRC are very very very important for 
us. Otherwise, we would be sitting here in our offices because our government 
is not very keen on involving or financing research projects aiming to increase 
women’s full-time employment or some special training programs regarding 
childcare, which is basically why we established this place (GNGO7).    
It is argued that the themes of the projects are linked to donors’ own objectives and 
priorities (Ketola, 2013). Relying on Ketola, it is plausible to relate this pro-
Europeanisation stance of German catalyst organisations to SI as it stems from 
overlapping project ideas.  
e) Meaning of being a rights-based NGO:  
Another reason why German women’s organisations prioritise EU funding relates to 
their own understanding of being a rights-based NGO. For them, being an NGO means 
giving voice to marginalised sections of the society. Getting grant aid or establishing 
collaborations with governmental institutions would diminish their close relationship 
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with the public. In order to avoid tainting their reputation, they have preferred applying 
to and accepting funds from the EU, despite its competitiveness and difficulties. For 
them, the EU’s multi- and supra-national nature connotes objectivity in terms of agenda-
setting for project funds, as well as the ways in which both the project itself and the grant 
application process proceeds. Accordingly, a representative of a women’s organisation 
mostly engaged with lobbying and activism states:  
To get funds from the EU, you need people to deal with those applications so on 
and so forth and here we are only four people working and these people have 
immense responsibilities. But anyhow as an organisation opinion we decided not 
to get any grant from German government but try to get from the EU…because 
you know if we are funded by the government and if it’s heard, people who need 
us might lose their trust to us. Even if nobody loses anything, we need to be free 
for our self-peace (GNGO5). 
The acceptance of EU funding on the grounds that it solidifies the rights-based 
feature of the organisation clearly chimes with the SI perspective as it drives from 
women’s organisations’ understanding of being an NGO.   
Europeanness:  
When seeking to understand the tone of the domestic actors’ language towards 
Europeanising their domestic WFLR model, ‘European identity’ appeared as an 
important, but not an overlapping, theme. The CHP as well as some NGOs who identify 
themselves as Kemalist in Turkey, and some progressive deputies who contributed to 
catalysing the process from the CDU in Germany, felt the need to Europeanise their 
WFLR model in order to prove their European identity. Yet both did so in considerably 
different ways, due to Germany being a very powerful founding member and Turkey 
being a long-lasting candidate state, whose membership is highly contested. While peer 
pressure was the driving force behind German catalysts, pursuing European values in 
terms of WFLR and proving the possibility of a secularised Muslim Turkey to Europe 
encouraged Turkish catalysts.   
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a) Peer pressure:   
Peer pressure played a very important role for some CDU members in supporting the 
Europeanisation process in WFLR sphere. Despite the ideological differences between 
the party and the EU approach to WFLR, the fear of Germany falling behind other 
countries induced some CDU deputies to join the catalyst camp. The German political 
elite, especially the CDU/CSU group, for a very long time regarded the adherence to 
traditional male breadwinner family model as a sign of advancement in terms of 
economy and prosperity. They believed that the German labour market has been capable 
of paying enough so that German families do not need two earners (Rüling, 2010). 
Furthermore, for the same group, a child raised in a kindergarten would not be able to 
become a successful citizen. Instead, they expected the child raised in the kindergarten 
to have social and psychological issues (GNGO7). As such, the German elite for a long 
time believed that their traditional male breadwinner family model is the better model. 
However, with increasing European integration, and the bitter PISA test results21 ,some 
of these elite (the ones from the CDU) have come to realise that in reality they have not 
been doing as well as they thought (GNGO7). The low PISA scores that German kids 
have received, especially, made some CDU MPs see that a child raised in a kindergarten 
might be more successful, as is the case in the Scandinavian countries. than a child raised 
at home like in Germany (GNGO7; GPOL1; GPOL2). This awakening, in line with 
Lever’s (2017:129) quiet sarcastic observation that ‘Germans like to be liked’, 
significantly softened the strict anti-EU stance of some CDU deputies with respect to 
WFLR. In order to catch up with the rest of the Europe and increase the low PISA results, 
some CDU members contributed to the Europeanisation process. A senior politician 
from the CDU recalled: 
                                               
21   In 2003, Germany was the 20th ranking country out of 30 in the PISA test (Thorpe, G. 2003 available 
at: http://www.gov.scot/Resource/Doc/30859/0023662.pdf).  
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This PISA test had a big influence on us and showed us that we had to reform 
our education policies, especially the early childhood education. Because you 
know, in the past we were very good at education…As you know by the end of 
the 19th Century, which was just before the Nazis took over the power, we were 
the leading nation in science, especially in natural sciences but also in social 
science. After the Second World War, the situation has changed of course. But 
anyway, we still considered ourselves as the country of strong education. But, 
this PISA test was a big shock for us and many discussions went on for some 
years and led us to reform in regions and also at the federal level (GPOL2). 
b) Pursuing European values in terms of WFLR: 
Starting in the late Ottoman and accelerating in the early years of the Republican era, 
Turkey has gone through a very busy reform agenda22 aiming to transform Turkey into 
a modern, Western and secular state (Arat, 1999; Aybars and Tsarouhas, 2010; Rabasa 
and Larrabee, 2008), particularly under the leadership of Ataturk and his party CHP. 
This transformation, also known as the Kemalist ideology, largely centred around 
women’s rights issues (Ketola, 2013). The CHP, being in the first place Kemalist elite, 
introduced a number of laws in order to emancipate women and dismantle them from an 
Islamic way of life (Findley, 2010). However, all these reforms took place in the public 
sphere and left the family sphere untouched. Therefore, Turkey continued to employ the 
traditional male breadwinner family model. Kandiyoti (1987:324) delineates this 
paradox intrinsic to Turkey: ‘emancipated but not liberated’; his implications are still 
valid. Being the representative of Ataturk’s secular tradition, the CHP has still been 
trying to resume the modernisation, Westernisation and secularisation of Turkey. 
Although the party has recently acquired more sceptical language around EU 
membership (Celep, 2013; Findley, 2010; Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008), party members 
                                               
22 The first Civil Code of the Turkish Republic came into force in 1926 and abolished polygamous 
marriages and the husband’s rights on one-sided divorce; it legislated for monogamous marriages and 
gave the rights of divorce, child custody and ownership of family properties both to men and women. 
Moreover, women gained the right of suffrage in 1934; the primitive maternal leave rights were introduced 
in 1945; the Law on Family Planning that legalized the sale and free dissemination of contraception in 
1965 and the same law legalised the abortion until the 10th week of pregnancy. The concept of ‘head of 
family’ given to fathers has been abolished with the introduction of the Civil Law in 2001 (Aldıkaçtı-
Marshall, 2013; Kılıç, 2010; Buğra and Keyder, 2006; Buğra and Yakut-Çakar, 2010; Dedeoğlu, 2012).  
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remain supportive of Europeanisation in this particular policy field because their anti-
EU stance is of relevance to WFLR policy. It stems from the fact that CHP is the main 
opposition in a political milieu wherein the ruling party is exceptionally in favour of EU 
membership. The CHP elite has never fully believed in the sincerity of the AKP’s pro-
EU stance. For them, this pro-EU stance was taken in order to pave the way for 
Islamising Turkey by taking advantage of the accession process in terms of human rights 
requirements (Celep, 2013; Findley, 2010; Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008). Therefore, the 
CHP elite had gradually become less pro-EU. Yet, they still regard the de-familialised 
WFLR model as a Western value that needs to be a Turkish value too, and supported the 
process of Europeanising the Turkish model: 
I think being in the labour market adds to your motherhood rather than impairing 
it. Because it’s an opportunity to invest in yourself and the more you invest in 
yourself the more you invest in your kid. Look at European mothers, I mean they 
let their kids go and those kids become stronger than our kids in future. It’s just 
us incarcerating ourselves and our kids to home for the sake of better child-
raising. No, we should adapt the European way too if we want progress (TPOL6).  
c) Proving the possibility of a secularised Muslim Turkey:  
Alongside pursuing European values in terms of WFLR, CHP also wants to prove the 
possibility of a secularised Muslim country sharing EU norms and values in such a 
private policy field. As observed by many scholars of EU studies, Turkey’s accession 
process has been significantly impaired by Islam being the dominant religion in Turkey 
(Kalaycıoğlu, 2013; Yılmaz, 2009). Here, it is important to note that Islam is not referred 
to as a theological system but more of a lifestyle (Usul, 2008). In other words, what has 
been disliked and opposed in Islam has never been the ways in which Turks believe in 
or pray for God. Instead, the issue has always been the fact that Islam interfered in the 
culture and politics (Yılmaz, 2009), which links to the issues of women’s rights. 
Women’s dominance over men in the private sphere and their subordination in the public 
sphere (be it political participation or labour market participation) thus became a very 
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symbol of Islam and accordingly this opposition to Islam (ibid, 2009; Usul, 2008). In 
that sense, the CHP, historically aiming at a radical break with Turkey’s Islamic life-
style, welcomed Europeanising the Turkish WFLR model in order to soften European 
respondents’ very strong Turko-scepticism on the grounds of Turkey’s Islamic identity. 
 Appreciating and supporting the process of Europeanisation in order to keep an 
old tradition can well be explained through Historical institutionalism (HI). 
Europeanising Turkey has in a way been handed down to CHP from its predecessors 
almost a hundred years ago. Today, the CHP is executing its predecessors’ bequest while 
Europeanising Turkey’s WFLR model. Put simply, CHP’s sympathetic stance toward 
Europeanising the Turkish WFLR model takes its roots from the very early years of 
CHP, which clearly echoes HI’s suggestion in a path-dependent fashion. Yet, on the 
other hand, supporting the process in order to recuperate the successful past of Germany 
and to spread the idea that Islamic Turks can be compatible with Christian Europeans in 
terms of WFLR, resonates well with RCI. In both cases, catalyst elites welcomed the 
process on the basis of a cost-benefit calculation. Their intention was to gain the 
maximum profit out of the process instead of internalising the EU way of a de-
familialised WFLR model. While seeking ways to increase the low PISA results, 
German elites saw Europeanisation as a window of opportunity. They have regarded the 
gains of increasing the PISA results through reconfiguring the German WFLR 
framework as greater than maintaining the status quo. In a similar manner, while seeking 
to show how Muslim Turkish women can be equalised with European women in terms 
of reconciling their work and family lives, Europeanising the legislation appeared as a 
window of opportunity. Therefore, the CHP elites have embraced the process. 
 In sum, although different catalyst groups had different reasons for pursuing the 
process of Europeanising German and Turkish WFLR policies, it has been a key goal 
for all. They have successfully taken advantage of the process and used it in tandem with 
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their original goals, norms, values and ideas. Their existence and ability to exploit the 
opportunities that came with the process were expected to extinguish the misfit between 
the domestic WFLR policy framework and the EU WFLR policy framework (Börzel 
and Risse, 2003; Cowles et al., 2001; Duina, 1997). However, even though both 
countries have pursued an ongoing Europeanisation between 2000 and 2017 through an 
intense process of de-familialising their WFLR policies, as illustrated in Chapter 5, 
neither Germany nor Turkey have developed a fully-fledged one in this policy area. Both 
governments continued passing familialised reconciliation laws while passing de-
familialised ones. Turkish and German WFLR frameworks, therefore, continued to 
show both fits and misfits with the EU and made their Europeanisation processes 
ambiguous. It is possible to explain the puzzling aspects of both processes through the 
existence of domestic antagonists whose presence is equally important to that of 
catalysts’ in shaping the whole Europeanisation process. The chapter thus proceeds with 
the illustration of antagonists’ perceptions of and attitudes towards the Europeanisation 
of domestic WFLR policies. 
6.2.2. Antagonists:  
Antagonists have perceived the greater EU influence on the domestic WFLR policies as 
a challenge. In line with their opposing stance, they have supported the status quo and 
successfully decelerated the process. As with catalysts, the reasons why antagonists have 
perceived the process as a challenge and refused to support it differ among them 
according to their sociological, historical and political backgrounds, together with the 
result of their cost-benefit calculations.   
Subsidiarity:  
A number of groups in both countries have been highly uncomfortable about 
Europeanising their own WFLR model, on the grounds of subsidiarity. These include: 
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representatives of the Christian Democrats in Germany, the CDU/CSU; some German 
religious organisations; Turkey’s ruling party, AKP, which identifies itself as a 
‘conservative democratic party’ rather than an Islamic party; Turkey’s extreme 
nationalist party, the MHP; and some Turkish Islamist women’s organisations. Although 
they object for a variety of different reasons, all have perceived EU involvement in such 
a private sphere as a threat to national identity and to the national political and cultural 
order. Therefore, they prefer the related issues to be dealt with at the domestic level, 
which chimes with the principle of subsidiarity (Kalyvas et al., 2010). Three key aspects 
stemming from antagonists’ strong adherence to the subsidiarity principle were: (a) fear 
of assimilation; (b) threat to political competence and (c) fear of adverse effect.    
a) Fear of assimilation: 
As observed by a number of notable scholars, subsidiarity is a key Christian Democratic 
value (Kalyvas et al., 2010; Hale, 2006). The CDU/CSU is described as ‘one of the three 
classic Christian democrat parties’ in the world (Hale, 2006:68), and the AKP, which 
has adopted a relatively more secular and pro-Western political image than its overtly 
Islamist predecessors, has claimed at every opportunity that the AKP is a Muslim 
Democrat party like those Christian Democrats of European countries23 (Çarkoğlu, 
2006; Duran, 2006; Hale, 2006; Tepe, 2006). Accordingly, a number of deputies from 
CDU/CSU, accompanied by representatives of some German religious organisations 
and a number of deputies from the AKP, when interviewed stay loyal to the principle of 
subsidiarity. They see Europeanisation of WFLR policies as a potential source of 
                                               
23 The AKP elite, especially during the first AKP government, have exceptionally prioritized projecting 
their party as a conservative democratic party rather than an Islamic party (Akdoğan, 2006). According 
to Dağı (2006), this was the narrative used by the AKP in order to prove that they are not the continuation 
of Turkey’s strongest religious movement ‘the National Outlook Movement (Milli Gorus Hareketi)’. 
However, after having won the general elections three times in a row and increasing the votes each time, 
the AKP has pursued a radical shift towards overt Islamism (Öniş, 2016) and stopped identifying itself as 
a conservative democratic party. Even the party has not been denying their Islamic nature since 2011, they 
still are highly loyal to the principle of subsidiarity.       
 154 
assimilation and express their fears about it. There is a concern among both the Turkish 
and German antagonists that WFLR policies on child-raising are likely to distance 
children from national norms, values, customs and traditions. For them, EU-induced 
short maternal leaves, obligating mothers to send their children to childcare centres – 
again set up on the basis of EU standards – hold the possibility of a generation moulded 
by European norms and values. 
 This is a greater concern among Turkish antagonists than German as the 
difference between Turkish and EU norms and values is greater than the difference 
between German and EU norms and values. Some CDU/CSU members and religious 
organisations have accepted and respected some commonalities between German and 
EU culture, as they are proud to be European (Lewis and Zitzlsperger, 2010), but they 
have also highlighted the differences in terms of family relations that they prefer to 
preserve. As illustrated in Chapter 4, Germans have preferred to keep the sharp gender 
roles alive. For them, it is appropriate that a woman’s life be centred around the ‘3Ks’ – 
Kirche, Küche, Kinder (church, kitchen, children) – inherited from the Nazi-era 
(Bridenthal, 1973), and a man’s centred on providing a living for the whole family. 
Although the world is gradually moving towards an adult worker family model, some 
deputies from the CDU/CSU, who themselves maintain a lifestyle close to this model, 
do not consider it as backwardness. Instead, they see this as a sign of prosperity. To this 
end, they view Europeanising their WFLR model as distancing from their values for the 
fact that EU-induced reconciliation would change their children’s mind-sets. 
 Some AKP members hold similar views, but express them with stronger 
language. They perceive the adult worker family model as a European value that would 
not fit into Turkey’s structure, as Turks are not necessarily European. For some members 
of the AKP, the institution of the family constitutes the cornerstone of Turkish society. 
Family ties and solidarity among family members are great values that Turkey should 
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not and can never give up. This view, which is well reflected in Turkish family policies, 
leads some comparative welfare state scholars to describe ‘family and kin solidarity’, 
which expects family members to rely on each other for their welfare before searching 
support from the state or labour market (Grütjen, 2008: 127). Deeply believing in the 
idea ‘sow the kindergarten and reap the nursing home’ (TPOL1), they prefer divergence 
over convergence in this specific policy area:     
I mean, at the end of the day, EU membership was an imposition. Honestly, in 
many areas especially regarding family ties and family relations, I don’t belong 
to the EU, I belong to the Middle-East and no matter how hard you try, we never 
will harmonise (TPOL1).  
 Referring to three forms of NI, the attitudes of CDU/CSU in Germany and the 
AKP and the MHP in Turkey can be linked directly with SI but also with HI. The very 
obvious reasons for this fear that leads antagonists to reject Europeanisation is the 
ideological clash with the EU. In line with what SI suggests, the members of the 
CDU/CSU, the AKP and the MHP have not seen the EU way of reconciling work and 
family life as the ‘right thing to do’, nor have they come to internalise the process, 
perhaps due to the wideness of the gap between the approaches towards WFLR policy-
making. Yet, the historical dimension of their attitude is also equally important. It was 
Nazi propaganda that introduced the 3K model to German society in the 1930s 
(Bridenthal, 1973); that remains and shapes the CDU/CSU members’ ideologies. As HI 
indicates, a decision made in the past – even though it was not one that Germans are 
proud of – has affected CDU/CSU members’ decision in a path-dependent fashion.  
 Similarly, the Kemalist state elites’ top-down manner while founding the 
Republic of Turkey in the early 1900s might have led the AKP members to perceive 
Europeanisation as an imposition and trigger greater opposition to the process. As 
mentioned earlier, during the 1920s Ataturk and his followers put an exceptional effort 
into secularising and Westernising Turkey. In the achievement of this aim, any 
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oppositional voice to Turkey’s secularisation and Westernisation project was quickly 
silenced. Since those silenced oppositional voices were the predecessors of today’s AKP 
(Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008), it is justified to relate AKP members’ attitudes to HI, yet 
in a reactionary fashion.   
b) Threat to political competence: 
Some CDU/CSU MPs have regarded the Europeanisation of WFLR policies as a 
constraint on their political competence and an interference into their party programme 
in terms of both budget and agenda-setting.  
 Political parties have a certain agenda for each electoral tenure; either they are 
in power or in opposition (Ware, 1996). Before each electoral tenure starts, political 
parties already know their activities and their costs. A directive introduced at the EU 
level, to be transferred by member states into their domestic legislative frameworks, is 
described by a number of interviewees from the CDU/CSU group as causing a great 
inconvenience to political parties’ internal affairs, particularly with respect to budgeting. 
Any new reconciliation measure, but especially a new target on childcare, is seen by this 
group to create financial problems. Opening even one more centre for children has a 
number of dimensions, each requiring resources. If the five-year party plan does not 
have spare budget for childcare place expansion, then it may bring some serious 
problems: 
We have a problem in the acceptance of the EU when they regulate too much. 
They should keep an eye on the essentials but not on every detail. And I think 
Brussels should not tell me as a German politician how the family politics in 
Berlin has to be made, without taking into account other issues, without knowing 
what we had planned for our own country and in which order we will realise 
those plans… for example, Brussels should not tell me to increase the number of 
kindergartens without knowing is there any teacher shortage or not, or are we 
planning to solve our childcare problem through alternative ways or not 
(GPOL1).  
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 Here the CDU/CSU’s strong adherence to the subsidiarity principle and 
concomitant refusal of Europeanisation goes beyond the ideological level and appears 
at the practical level. In order to prevent an unexpected work overload or monetary 
shortage emerging from the top-down Europeanisation, some members of CDU/CSU 
have preferred domestically-made WFLR policies. From the view of NI, this resonates 
with an RCI perspective, as antagonists’ preferences directly stem from their cost-
benefit calculation. For some CDU/CSU deputies, the cost of Europeanising the German 
WFLR model outweighs its benefits. 
c) Fear of adverse-effect:  
By the same token, some Islamist women’s organisations in Turkey have preferred not 
to endorse the process of Europeanising Turkish WFLR policies due to the EU’s top-
down and enforcing manner. While their relatively more secular catalyst counterparts 
readily welcome the process and benefit from the funding opportunities that came with 
it, Islamist feminists have accused the EU of overlooking the domestic dynamics, while 
expecting its standards to be adopted. For them, the adaptation of the EU standards may 
have adverse effects in Turkey due to political, economic or socio-cultural and historical 
aspects intrinsic to the country, such as the high level of patriarchy or low level of female 
literacy and so on. Therefore, in contrast to their catalyst fellows, who have trusted this 
overlook and found it to be objective, antagonist organisations worry about the same 
approach on the grounds that it might cause bigger problems and worsen the already 
suppressed position of women in Turkey: 
I do not think that the EU process is useful for anything. For example, if you go 
to South East Anatolia where customs are still highly prevalent and say that 
women are no longer looking after their children, instead they are working, you 
would not bring any advent to Turkey. Instead, you fuel the violence against 
women...So, I think we should arrange our own reconciliation model on the basis 
of our own moral laws, values, geographic features and our own inner dynamics 
(TNGO4).  
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This protectionist position of NGOs from the antagonist camp, which cripples the 
Europeanisation process of Turkey, chimes with SI and also contains traces of HI. Both 
the EU and Turkish corresponding actors aim at circumventing women’s suppressed 
position in Turkey. However, the ways in which they do so overtly differ. On the one 
hand, being fond of de-familialised gender policies, the EU seeks to bring economic 
independence to women by easing their labour market participation through relaxing 
their domestic responsibility (Yılmaz, 2009). On the other hand, Islamist women’s 
organisations, also, endeavor to raise women’s unequal position within Turkey but in 
line with Islamist feminist ideology, built on Islam and its teachings (Badran, 2005).  
 The 1980 military coup brought a very apolitical climate to Turkey. Taking the 
advantage of this tranquility, a small number of Islamist women came together in order 
to challenge the status of women in Islam (Diner and Toktaş, 2010). During this time 
(the second half of the 1990s), the current president of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, 
was the mayor of Istanbul. A member of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi – RP), he saw the 
lack of organised feminist women who would advocate for Islamist women’s rights, in 
contrast to Kemalist feminists. To this end, a number of pious women, who are 
connected with male deputies of the RP, were chosen by the RP leadership cadre to be 
educated on how to form a women’s commission or women’s organisation (Arat, 2005). 
It was Erdogan himself, who now does not hesitate to openly state that he does not 
believe in gender equality24, who delivered the first lecture on how to form women’s 
commissions and organisations. This nascent Islamist feminist movement, procurators 
trained by an anti-gender equality mentor and bred up with Islamic teachings, was 
aligned with the traditional gender-based division of labour (ibid). They consider 
                                               
24 Since 2010 onwards, the AKP leadership cadre in general, but President Erdogan in particular, has 
defined women in terms of ‘reproduction, homemaking, and nurturing functions.’ (Eslen-Ziya and Erhart 
2015:474) and he has repeatedly stated that he does not believe in equality between men and women (T24, 
2014).  
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women’s domestic responsibilities and men’s labour market responsibilities as equal 
and complementary tasks (Tekin, 2017), despite one being invisible and one being 
gainful. Therefore, their area of interest excludes the ‘equal share of both domestic work 
and paid work’. Instead, they focus on fighting domestic violence against women, 
deemed to stem from a misinterpretation of Islam that legitimises this violence on the 
grounds of male dominance over females (Diner and Toktaş, 2010). As a result, Islamist 
women’s organisations worry that the EU’s de-familialised policies would not fit into 
Turkish society and might trigger the domestic violence that they have been fighting 
against since their emergence. With regards to this concern, and in line with their 
historically acquired social norms and values, they favour the idea of subsidiarity in 
terms of WFLR.   
Disapproval of EU WFLR policies: 
An analysis of the EU accession processes of the CEEC (Schimmelfenning, 2005) finds 
that candidate countries adapt EU standards only if they approve of those standards. 
Although Schimmelfenning’s observation refers to areas such as democracy, economy 
and human rights, it also has relevance for the Europeanisation of this specific policy 
area. A number of domestic actors in Turkey and in Germany have refused to 
Europeanise their WFLR policies because they lack esteem for the EU WFLR model. 
The various actors disliked different aspects of the corresponding standards, due to their 
position within the society and their sociological, ideological and historical 
backgrounds, as well as their own lifestyles. Antagonists’ disapproval of EU WFLR 
policies could be classified under three main themes: (a) disapproval of the EU’s labour 
market-oriented approach; (b) perceiving the domestic model as better than the EU; and 
(c) conflict of interest.  
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a) Disapproval of EU’s labour market-oriented approach:  
The EU’s labour market-oriented approach in terms of WFLR was disapproved of by 
almost every single member of the antagonist camp interviewed.  
 In the majority of the European welfare states during the transition from 
familialised WFLR policies to de-familialised WFLR policies, women’s organisations 
have been strong advocates (Guenther, 2010). However, in the German context, due to 
the divided nature of the women’s organisations and feminist movement, some women’s 
organisations have supported the status quo. For them, a key aspect of feminist demands 
was the right to be a mother regardless of marital status. This feminist idea takes its roots 
from the ‘protection of motherhood (Mutterschutz)’ (Anthony, 2017). Early German 
feminists formed a union in 1904 in order to demand for extended motherhood rights 
for women. Today, after a century, there are some women’s organisations following the 
Mutterschutz idea and supporting the status quo. To this end, the successors of the union; 
some family organisations and religious organisations, together with some members of 
CDU/CSU in Germany; and the right fringes of the TBMM, the AKP and the MHP, 
together with Islamist-women’s organisations in Turkey, have taken a critical stance to 
the EU’s WFLR policy-paradigm. Concomitantly, they have refused socialisation of that 
approach on the grounds of its unilateral character. For them, the EU is still an economic 
community, whose only aim is economic growth: the EU introduces WFLR measures 
only to increase the number of female employees within the labour market because the 
aimed economic growth cannot be reached without the women’s labour force.  It is 
important to note that conservative parties in Germany have historically emphasised 
economic growth (Rüling, 2010). To this end, it would be expected that they would 
appreciate the labour market-oriented approach of the EU regarding WFLR. However, 
to the contrary, interviewees from the CDU/CSU group highlight the importance of 
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parenting, which resonates with Ruling’s (2008) findings, stating that the CDU/CSU has 
come to acknowledge the role of the family in terms of a child’s education.  
 A number of notable feminist scholars (Caracciolo di Torella and Masselot, 
2010; Stratigaki, 2004; Lewis, 2006; 2009) have questioned the logic of the EU WFLR 
policy-making paradigm and agree with the antagonists’ arguments on the grounds that 
the EU paradigm sometimes overlooks the mothering aspect of WFLR. However, recent 
EU initiatives, in particular the 2010 Parental Leave Directive which seeks to distribute 
domestic work equally between men and women, are likely to prove that the EU is 
considering women’s disproportionate share of domestic work, and to show that 
economic growth is not the one and only aim of the EU. Nevertheless, the German and 
Turkish antagonists have not come to be persuaded by those recent initiatives and have 
stubbornly refused to adopt the EU’s ex-parte paradigm.   
 Through decelerating the process and keeping the WFLR policy-making 
competence at the national level, rather than giving the credit to the EU, German family 
organisations, successors of the Mutterschutz idea and members of the CDU/CSU group 
aim to preserve women’s right to parenting. This has been reflected in CDU/CSU 
official documents under the ‘freedom of choice (Wahlfreiheit)’ argument, which 
became a very common slogan in the second half of the 2000s. Both the German family 
organisations and CDU/CSU group saw the EU’s short paid maternal leave as a threat 
to women’s mothering rights and have refused to Europeanise the German model, 
especially the leave schemes. This attitude of the German antagonists resembles SI and 
HI among the three forms of NI. A very senior politician from the CSU, who is 
responsible for family policy within the CDU/CSU group, stated:  
We can/should decide whether we can go to work right after the birth or we can 
stay at home with the baby three years. We should do whatever we want. We 
don’t order, we don’t say you have to. We give women both of the opportunities 
to make them choose. This is the difference between German government’s 
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approach to family politics and the Brussels’ approach to family politics that 
never will/should become ours (GPOL1).  
Many catalysts have had a sceptical position to this Wahlfreiheit approach and accused 
CDU/CSU of legitimising their conservative ideas by pretending to provide multiple 
options to women. Regardless, the group’s strong loyalty to the argument has led them 
to take an antagonist position throughout the process. 
 German religious organisations, the right camp of the TBMM and some Islamist 
women’s organisations, on the other hand, have adopted stronger language, calling the 
EU’s labour market-oriented approach a threat to the ‘sacredness’ of the family. The 
MHP, in line with its ethnocentric ideology (Avcı, 2013), has also brought the issue of 
nationalism into the discussion and highlighted the importance of not Europeanising 
Turkish WFLR model as it could damage the norms and values intrinsic to Turkish 
families. These actors, who a number of Turkish catalysts call ‘holy family-centrics’ 
(TPOL7, TPOL6, TNGO6, TNGO8), see the family as the guard of prosperity and 
women as the guards of the family. Therefore, for them, women are already doing a very 
important job for the society, one which is as important as the job men are doing. So, in 
the Turkish holy family-centrics’ view, women do not need to be dragged into the labour 
market: in fact, labour market participation is likely to place another burden on women’s 
shoulders, decreasing their efficiency in caring for their families, which eventually will 
devastate the society. A senior politician from the AKP group, in this vein, openly 
expressed the differences between EU’s and AKP’s expectations from women:  
‘…Women and men are equal beings in meaning to creation, but they have 
different abilities. Please note that I’m underlying different abilities, not unequal. 
In fact, for me women are more valuable because they have fertility and 
motherhood features given by God, which is very special and sacred according 
to the Islam religion which I belong to… Therefore, we should let women to 
practise their given specialty rather than attributing a new role to them…’ 
(TPOL3).  
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b) Perceiving the domestic model as better than the EU: 
In addition to disapprobation of EU WFLR policies for its labour market-oriented 
approach, some CDU/CSU members in Germany and some MHP members in Turkey 
see their own WFLR measures as superior to the EU’s and want to keep them in their 
current form. They are very concerned that Europeanising the national model would 
lower the current standards. For them, within a very multicultural union such as the EU, 
harmony could only be achieved at an average level. Asking countries with already 
better standards – such as Scandinavian countries or Germany (in their perception) – to 
adapt EU standards would be unfair. In this respect, the fear of retrenchment has led a 
number of domestic actors to abstain from contributing to the Europeanisation process. 
In other words, even if the EU encourages its member and candidate states to improve 
their measures to a level beyond the EU (EU8), deputies from the CDU/CSU and the 
MHP have felt more comfortable in the absence of any EU involvement in this particular 
policy sphere. An MHP deputy addressing the subject from a historical perspective, for 
example, argued that: 
I mean there might be some fields that EU brought in Turkey but if we look at 
our own essence, if we remember our own successful past, we could have been 
in a way better position, I assume… I mean we had most of the rights regarding 
gender equality way before those EU members, who now seem to be better than 
us. Remember in the battlefield, Khan was accompanied by his wife. Even if the 
Khan dies, his wife used to continue to fight. OK, it might be a bit different than 
paid-employment but that was the condition of the day. Today’s paid 
employment which seems suitable to men was yesterday’s battle and there was 
no such a seeing that battle is suitable for men25… So, I think we have already 
been better than those countries and we just should remember that rather than 
trying to adapt their rules (TPOL5).  
 The AKP members hold very similar opinions. Although they do not believe that 
Turkish WFLR is any better than the EU, they have not seen any difference between 
Turkey and the EU in this regard, either. For them, Turkish WFLR measures have 
                                               
25 Here, the respondent is drawing a simile. She is comparing today’s employment to battle on the 
grounds that men are expected to engage with both.    
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already been converged with the EU and are good enough to alleviate obstacles to 
women’s employment. In other words, Turkish WFLR policies have already de-
familialised, so that there is no need for more effort to be made to Europeanise them. 
Despite the national and international critiques of WFLR policies made under the AKP 
rule, deputies seem highly satisfied with those policies and have refused to accept any 
more EU involvement. A senior deputy from AKP, who used to work as a women’s 
employment policy expert in one of the most active trade unions in Turkey, stated:  
Yes, maybe in the past there were some deficiencies but we had met that deficit 
in the last 15 years of AKP rule. Especially regarding parental leaves, there is no 
difference between us and the EU. Through our main policy documents, we 
wanted to deliver the message that it is not only mothers but both mothers and 
fathers responsible for child-raising…childcare might still be a bit problematic 
but we already included it in our policy goals and aims… So, I think we are 
getting there and we do not need the EU for work and family life reconciliation 
policy-making (TPOL2).  
 Highly satisfied with current Turkish and German models, MPs from CDU/CSU 
in Germany, and MPs from AKP and MHP in Turkey, have closed themselves to 
alternative models. This sense of national superiority lessens the potential for 
socialisation and leaves almost no room for policy learning. SI emphasises the domestic 
values and norms in an analysis of the ways in which the EU norms and values have 
been perceived. As the positive views on domestic standards have impaired potential 
internalisation, it is fair to relate this attitude of corresponding antagonists to SI. 
Additionally, considering German superiority as a historic belief among German 
citizens and politicians (Lewis and Zitzlsperger, 2010), it would not be unjustified to 
link this also with HI in the German context.  
c) Conflict of interest:  
Finally, a conflict of interest appears as an important but non-overlapping factor that 
triggers displeasure with EU WFLR policies, which eventually contributes to vetoing 
the process. Some German employers’ organisations, together with some members of 
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the SPD, called ‘old and conservative’ by a number of younger SPD members (GPOL5), 
and some members of the CDU/CSU express their resistance to the process on the 
grounds that Europeanising German WFLR framework would pose a threat to their self-
interest.  
 These particular members of the SPD and some members of the CDU/CSU 
group are themselves sustaining a conservative lifestyle (Heather and Barkin, n.d.) and 
benefitting from the laws that solidify this style, especially the tax-related ones. As 
mentioned in Chapter 5, Germany employs a very particular tax system that encourages 
either the traditional male breadwinner or at least the one-and-a-half earner family 
model, which has been criticised by the EU. Europeanising German WFLR model would 
mean abolishing this tax law. However, a number of parliamentarians who do not want 
to give up on the advantages of this tax system remain distant to the EU. In that vein, a 
member of the SPD from Bielefeld fraction, who identifies herself as a feminist, argued 
that: 
An overwhelming majority of Christian Democrats are benefitting from these 
laws, why would they change it… And honestly, I think it would be worse to 
look inside the black box and see where my party is standing on this issue. I 
wouldn’t say they all are in favour of changing those laws either. I personally 
know men in our party between the age of 50 and 65, who are quite high in 
number, also enjoying these laws in their personal lives and never mentioning to 
change them or supporting us when we propose to change them (GPOL5).  
 Employers’ organisations, a very powerful actor of the antagonist camp, have 
also refused to welcome and support the process as their losses would be bigger than 
their gains if Germany Europeanised its WFLR policy model, especially parental leave 
schemes. Although they support de-familialised WFLR policies, especially expanded 
childcare provisions, as it serves their purpose in terms of increased female employment 
rates, they stood beside the antagonists on the grounds that giving EU-induced paid 
leaves to fathers as well as mothers would increase their costs. A policy expert from an 
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umbrella employers’ organisation, discussing the impact of the EU on national states, 
recalled: 
We do not really want to see EU putting more and more regulations. Our member 
organisations always demanding for more freedom, which is understandable in 
a sense. For example, OK we understand that parenting is a universal right and 
fathers deserve it too as much as mothers but this has huge impacts on our 
member organisations. They lose a lot of money because of this extended paid 
paternal leave, for example. And of course, our member organisations do not 
really show any respect to that. And at the end of the day, we can only advocate 
for their demands (GNGO10).  
 This decision of employers’ organisations to support the status quo rather than 
Europeanisation clearly resonates with RCI as it was made on the basis of cost-benefit 
calculation, whereas SI also provides a useful perspective by which to regard the 
members of the CDU/CSU and SPD. These politicians have been sustaining a 
conservative lifestyle on the grounds of their ideology, but they also have rationally been 
benefitting from policies encouraging this way of living. Since Europeanisation means 
abolishment of some of those policies, particularly the tax system, the members of the 
CDU/CSU and SPD have refused to support the process as they are afraid to lose those 
advantages. Therefore, their attitudes resonate both with SI and RCI perspectives.  
Vote concerns:  
Alongside individuals’ personal ideological backgrounds, their positions within the 
society and the origins of those positions play an important role in shaping the ways in 
which they perceive Europeanisation. In that sense, some members of the two major 
political parties in Germany, the CDU/CSU and SPD, refused to favour the process 
because they saw being a catalyst as a potential challenge to their own political position 
for two reasons: inner part conflict and the threat of the rising extreme right. 
a) Inner party conflict:   
Wiliarty’s analysis (2010) of the changing paradigm in German gender policy-making 
under Merkel’s CDU, finds that the catch-all nature of the CDU overtook Merkel’s 
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personal efforts to modernise Germany’s conservative gender policies. This same catch-
all nature also has had an impact on the stance of the CDU/CSU to the process of 
Europeanising the WFLR model. Catch-all parties are constructed in a decentralised 
fashion. They contain internal party groups that are represented in the party’s 
administrative and decision-making bodies. In such a decentralised formation, final 
policy-decision is made through negotiation with these internal groups, who have 
different, sometimes even opposing, ideas (Panebianco, 1988; Wiliarty, 2010). As a 
catch-all party, CDU/CSU consists of a number of internal groups, which makes the 
CDU/CSU far from homogeneous. The majority of the CSU and an intra-party group in 
CDU are still in favour of the traditional gendered division of labour. Thus, they hold a 
relatively stronger opposition to Europeanisation, being delineated as ‘right-wing 
fundamentalists’ by Leitner (2010: 464). While their historical support for conservative 
family models has been legitimised in their views on child wellbeing and in arguments 
about children’s education, their stronger support of nationally-made family policy has 
been legitimised in their arguments about the EU’s constraints on freedom of choice. 
For them, the best way of raising a child is to care for them at home until their third 
birthday and then send them to half-day kindergarten until they reach school age. In this 
regard, they saw the EU way of reconciling as forced-labour market participation of 
mothers, which poses a serious threat to mothers’ right to choose. For example, while 
discussing the German reconciliation model, a deputy from CSU recalled: 
Children are our future, Germany owns everything to the education of its 
children, that is how we succeed to stay alive after our difficult times in the 
past… Our mothers are so important too, because they are the cooks of the meal, 
yet you cannot imagine a dish without salt and kindergarten is the salt here, you 
cannot put much but you should not put less either… But EU wants a salty 
dinner… No, we cannot say yes to this (GPOL1).  
 Alongside these right-wing fundamentalists, there are also some deputies within 
the CDU who have been described as ‘true people in the wrong party’ by German 
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progressive women’s organisations. These people are perceived as highly modern in 
terms of WFLR provisions, and in this sense pro-EU. Angela Merkel and the former 
Family/current Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen are the most active ones of those 
‘moderate Realos’, in Leitner’s (2010: 464) words.   
 It is important to note here that these two opposing groups are not just two groups 
within a party with antagonistic opinions; the tension between them is remarkably high. 
Although the tension among these two sister parties has come to be more obvious with 
the CSU’s drastic rejections of Merkel’s refugee policies, it has been there for more than 
a decade now, and emerged from a childcare allowance policy draft. In 2006, the then-
CSU Chief proposed a draft law on childcare allowances, which, through cash benefits, 
encouraged women to stay at home and care for their children. The CDU was highly 
reluctant to pass this highly familialised law, but because the CSU was threatening to 
leave the union unless the law came into force, Merkel had to silence the critical voices 
in the CDU and could only delay the passage until 2012 (Havertz, 2012; Heineman, 
2013). This six year period of dormancy did nothing but contribute to the tension within 
the CDU/CSU. Accordingly, MPs from the CDU have perceived Europeanising the 
German WFLR model as a potential challenge to party harmony and tranquility, and 
stand beside their sister party CSU within the antagonist camp. 
b) Threat of the rising extreme right:  
Due to some socio-political changes, particularly the rise of the extreme right Alternative 
for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland – AFD), in the last couple of years, some 
members of the CDU/CSU and also the SPD have gradually conservatised their 
ideologies, resulting in an anti-EU stance. Since the foundation of the National 
Democratic Party (National-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands – NDPD) in 1964, the 
Bundestag has hosted several extreme right-wing parties. However, none of those could 
make any significant inroads until the emergence of the AFD in 2013, with its terrifying 
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anti-EU, anti-women and anti-globalisation discourse (Langenbacher, 2015). The AFD 
has adopted an extremely conservative position on social issues, especially issues 
regarding family and national identity. They called for Eurozone break-up through the 
‘Euro is ruining Europe. Us too!’ slogan (Langenbacher, 2015; Patton, 2015, 2017). 
They also maintained contacts with far-right populist NGOs working to raise awareness 
of national identity and national sovereignty, such as Berlin Circle (die Berliner 
Gruppe). As a result, the AFD managed to hold seats in ten of Germany’s sixteen länder 
prior to the 2017 general elections, and entered the Parliament for the first time after the 
election (Rothwell et al., 2017).   
 This rapid rise of the AFD alarmed the mainstream political parties both from 
the left and right corners of the Bundestag. To this end, they all felt the need to revise 
their positions on gender issues but especially on those related to female employment 
and European integration, in order to avoid losing votes to the AFD. As the AFD was 
appealing to the conservative voter camp, both parties adopted a relatively more 
conservative stance. As expected, the CDU/CSU conservatised its position more than 
the SPD. While this conservatisation process of the CDU/CSU group encompassed 
familial issues as well, the SPD kept it at the economic level, which has been decried as 
neo-liberalisation by the catalyst women’s organisations, trade unions and SPD 
members, who are displeased about this new image of the SPD. Yet, it led both parties’ 
members to support the status quo and perceive the Europeanisation of German WFLR 
as a challenge. It is important to note that this lessened enthusiasm in terms of European 
integration applies only to this specific policy area. Members of both parties are still 
conscious of the importance of the EU for Germany, and the importance of Germany’s 
leading role within the EU. A senior deputy from the SPD explained the impact of the 
AFD on Germany’s Europeanisation process as: 
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We were more than welcoming the EU involvement on our family politics 
because you know, ours were very, very outdated. So, our family minister Renate 
Schmidt started all those reforms in accordance to the EU… But now, the 
situation is different, now we have the AFD to fight against, in almost all länder. 
That means our citizens prefer their way so we need to be flexible as well. We 
need to do little amendments in order to avoid bigger catastrophe (GPOL7). 
 This attitude of a number of CDU members, especially the party leader, and some 
members of the SPD, assuaging their attempts towards Europeanising the German 
WFLR model in order to secure their own positions, goes beyond the personal 
perceptions of domestic actors on Europeanisation itself and relates to the impacts of 
political climate on Europeanisation. Such an attitude strongly resembles RCI from an 
actor-centred perspective, as the decision of the actor to be an antagonist is made on the 
basis of their benefit-maximisation calculus with respect to securing votes. According 
to Sarah Elise Wiliarty (2010:37) ‘the goal of the CDU is certainly to win elections and 
gain the executive office’. In a similar vein, as Patton (2015) puts forward, the key aim 
of the SPD shifted away from being the oppositional coalition partner and towards 
becoming the majority government. In the achievement of these goals, the CDU needed 
to compromise with the CSU, and both the SPD and the CDU needed to prevent AFD 
from capturing their votes – which in a way meant less Europeanisation in the WFLR 
field. For both parties, refusal to Europeanise the German model has produced a positive 
outcome, which solidifies the RCI argument mentioned in Chapter 2. 
Loss of trust in the EU:  
Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2005) stress the importance of credibility in both the 
accession and Europeanisation processes.  They argue that trusting the EU in a certain 
policy area and perceiving EU as a credible body will lead to increased integration. In 
line with Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, the right corner of the TBMM, as well as a 
salient number of Islamist women’s organisations in Turkey, lost their trust in the EU 
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for two different reasons: (a) EU’s hypocrisy towards Turkey in terms of membership 
and (b) a lack of support from the EU when needed.   
a) EU’s hypocrisy towards Turkey in terms of membership:  
Although the MHP has never been a big supporter of the process and has always held a 
sceptical view on EU’s attitudes towards Turkey, the AKP, especially during its first and 
second tenures in power, was a pro-EU party. As expected from an extreme right-wing 
party, Turkey’s overt nationalist party – which is cited as Europe’s radical right’s 
duplicate (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995) – the MHP has historically stood aloof from 
the EU, despite new MHP leader Devlet Bahceli’s efforts in changing MHP’s image 
from extreme-right wing to centrist (Avcı, 2013). On the grounds of nationalism and 
ethnocentrism, in order to (re)produce Turkish history and culture, the MHP has 
historically held a Eurosceptic view (Landau, 1982; Öniş, 2003). It is also argued that, 
from 1997 and onwards, MHP became much more moderate in terms of its views on the 
EU membership (Avcı, 2013). MHP’s contributions to Turkey’s path to the EU were 
noticeable even though the Cyprus issue and the Kurdish opening being the key two 
issues, there were few concerns that were immensely difficult for MHP to compromise 
with (Avcı, 2004). Yet, the interminable delay of membership has led the party to 
consider these reforms as waste and lose those tiny bits of trust, as reflected in party’s 
official documents: 
Turkey shares… a story of disappointment filled with blackmail, ultimatums, 
preconditions, unfair demands and pressure (MHP, 2007). 
Similar language is used when it comes to Europeanising the Turkish WFLR model. The 
party members accuse the EU of being hypocritical and applying double standards. They 
believe that Turkey’s efforts and reforms have not been recognised by the EU just 
because Turkey is a Muslim country. To this end, they perceive the EU as a Christian 
union that is ‘othering’ non-Christian countries (Cizre, 2008). All these negative views 
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of the EU eventually paved the way for the MHP to give up on the process and veto 
Europeanising any policy field, including the WFLR: 
Well at first, I wondered if… I thought maybe it might be useful but after 
accepting the post-soviet countries or countries, who have lower standards than 
us, like Bulgaria or Greece, I am now certain that their aim is not collecting the 
European countries under the roof of a Union. Instead establishing a Christian 
Unity… This is what bothers us. So, now I do not want to Europeanise anything 
(TPOL4). 
b) Lack of support from the EU when needed: 
By the same token, the AKP and Islamist women’s organisations have gradually lost 
their trust (which was far greater than MHP’s trust) in the EU and begun to use a very 
similar language of disappointment.  
At the time when the AKP formed, Turkey was suffering from the severe post-
coup conditions, known as the 28 February process (Findley, 2010; Dağı, 2006). The 
Turkish Army, whose staff was taught that their first and sacred duty is to defend and 
maintain the Kemalist ideology and its principles at all costs, especially Turkey’s secular 
character (Jenkins, 2006), exerted unprecedented restrictions on any Islamic formation 
that exist in Turkey, including those pious social and economic networks (Sözen, 2006). 
Under these circumstances, the newly emergent AKP saw EU membership and 
membership requirements as a window of opportunity to elude these oppressions. The 
EU’s requirements on the withdrawal of the armed forces from politics, the ensured and 
strengthened freedom to NGOs regardless of their religious orientation, and the EU’s 
areas of interest fit especially well with the AKP’s alleged26 long-term goals and 
demands. Moreover, the AKP hoped to remove the bans on the headscarf and on Imam 
Hatip graduates’ entrance to other faculties than theology through EU pressure around 
freedom of religion (Bogdani, 2011; Dağı, 2006; Usul, 2010). It was also the case that, 
                                               
26 The AKP came to power with a significantly secular narrative stressing human rights, democracy and 
freedom. The Kemalist state-elite in particular, but Turkish Kemalists in general, had always remained 
sceptical towards this secular language and thought the AKP had a hidden Islamist agenda (Akdoğan, 
2006; Findley, 2010; Dağı, 2006; Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008).  
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in adopting a pro-EU discourse, the AKP hoped to obtain votes from Turkey’s business 
elite, who would appreciate the economic opportunities of membership, as well as from 
the secular majority maintaining a Westernised life-style (Çarkoğlu, 2006). Although 
the AKP attained most of these goals by passing the corresponding laws under 
harmonisation packages (Dağı, 2006; Usul, 2010), the EU’s anti-headscarf attitude and 
perception of headscarf wearing as an anti-secular behavior, like the Kemalist elite, has 
disappointed the AKP and diminished their EU enthusiasm, especially when 
accompanied by that elusive membership date:  
Since the 22nd term, we worked on those harmonisation packages until 
midnights but what happened? Chapters been closed! Privileged partnerships 
been proposed. It turned into a snake story27. So, if they say Copenhagen criteria, 
we say Ankara28 criteria especially (!) in an issue as sacred as private as family 
(TPOL1).  
The disappointment caused by the headscarf issue has also been shared by the Islamist 
women’s organisations. A removal of the headscarf ban has been deemed to be the 
reason for these organisations’ emergence in the first place; therefore, these 
organisations appeared in and supported almost every action concerning the headscarf. 
For instance, they stood behind medical student Leyla Sahin, who was suspended from 
university for wearing an Islamic headscarf and subsequently brought her case before 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Sahin, who was represented by one of 
four lawyers in AKP’s establishment committee, received great support from Islamist 
women’s organisations and became a symbol in Turkey in terms of headscarf 
discussions (Hürriyet, 2005). Throughout the trial, Islamist women’s organisations 
expected the case to end in their favour. However, the ECHR decided in the opposite 
way and did not interpret the headscarf ban as a human right abuse (Lüle, 2005). This 
                                               
27 Turkish idiom used to describe messy problems/situations that have no solutions. 
28 The president Recep Tayyip Erdogan uses the term ‘Ankara Criteria’ consistently in order to express 
his disappointment about Turkey’s EU accession process (CNNTurk, 2005). While explaining her 
reluctance to Europeanise the Turkish WFLR model, this interviewee also referred to Erdogan.  
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created a shock effect among headscarf supporters, but especially on Islamist women’s 
organisations, and stirred an anti-EU discourse among them, which is reflected in all 
areas even fourteen years after the closure of the case:  
where was the EU while we were being detracted from our occupations, being 
detracted from doing things that we like, where was the EU when our souls were 
bought? Nowhere! We achieved everything by ourselves within the boundaries 
of this country. So now, thanks very much but we do not want the EU anywhere 
(TNGO5).  
 The aforementioned disappointed domestic actors perceived the EU as a non-
genuine unity on the grounds of nepotism. Although their disappointment did not 
originate directly from WFLR related issues, it had an influence on WFLR: the main 
source of this disappointment was the sense that Turkey could not get what it deserved 
in return from the EU for her efforts, wherein WFLR constituted a major space. 
Therefore, an unfair exchange between the EU and Turkey, accompanied by the sense 
that the EU was not there for Turkish actors when they most needed it, created 
considerable and crucial disappointment among the MHP, the AKP and the Islamist 
women’s organisations, paving the way for them to support the status quo rather than 
the Europeanisation process. In line with what RCI suggests, the MHP, the AKP and 
feminist women’s organisations decided not to Europeanise the Turkish WFLR model 
because according to their cost-benefit calculation, the cost of Europeanisation was far 
greater than its benefits as the EU remained highly insufficient in meeting their 
expectations.   
6.3. Conclusion:   
This chapter has endeavoured to understand whether and to what extent EU standards 
with respect to WFLR policies have been internalised by German and Turkish domestic 
actors, who have contributed to the Europeanisation processes of each country. It has 
aimed to illustrate the level of socialisation pursued at national levels, through an 
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examination of domestic actors’ views and discourses on Europeanising the domestic 
WFLR models. The observations made in this chapter contradict the ‘governance by 
hierarchy’ argument, which expects Europeanising hard-WFLR policies to have an 
impact on domestic policy-making paradigms. These findings also contradict the 
‘facilitated co-ordination’ argument, which expects soft-Europeanisation of WFLR 
policies to create policy learning through the sharing of good practice. These 
contradictions can well be explained through the existence of a salient number of 
antagonists, leading to the dominance of thin learning over other potential soft-
Europeanisation outcomes. Relying on the reasons explained throughout this chapter 
accompanied by modest policy changes, it is argued that both Germany and Turkey 
exhibited a thin learning in this policy field, which refers to a modest policy-paradigm 
change among domestic actors. A number of exogenous and endogenous factors, 
resonating with all three forms of NI, have had an influence on this thin learning. EU’s 
supranational character and generous funding opportunities together with the domestic 
actors’ appeal to ‘European identity’ have contributed to domestic actors’ social 
learning, whereas the subsidiarity principle, disapproval of EU standards, voter concerns 
and distrust of the EU have presented obstacles to the internalisation of EU WFLR. 
Literature on Europeanisation and process tracing has already established (as discussed 
in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) that these factors have influenced the socialisation of 
domestic actors, but a more important question – how this occurs – remains unanswered. 
To this end, NI theory has been applied. Accordingly, as can also be revealed from 
Figure 6.2 below, the perception of WFLR Europeanisation was shaped most by local 
values and norms. However, this does not mean that domestic actors’ views on WFLR, 
female employment, motherhood and their expectations from the EU were the only 
causal mechanisms. The domestic political and cultural history, as well as domestic 
actors’ rational calculations, all contributed to the ways in which Europeanisation was 
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perceived. This might originate from the policy area itself. As the subject matter chiefly 
concerns family-related issues, which have been accepted as private, domestic actors 
have remained reluctant to unbrace their own norms and values. Even if their decisions 
are based on rational calculus or shaped by a historical incident in a path-dependent or 
reactionary fashion, they have not abandoned their social norms and values. This 
observation adds another layer to the actor-oriented theoretical approach; the three 
different forms of New Institutionalism are not mutually exclusive. Two different forms 
can simultaneously be key to explaining a domestic response to Europeanisation.  
Figure 6. 2: Summary of factors influencing domestic actors’ socialisation. 






















Having examined the domestic actors’ stances towards the process of Europeanising the 
domestic WFLR legislative framework, together with their reasons, the thesis proceeds 
with these actors’ contributions that originate from their positions throughout the 
process.   
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CHAPTER 7. POLITICAL EUROPEANISATION:  
This chapter furthers an exploration of domestic actors’ contributions to the process of 
Europeanisation. More specifically, it seeks to explain how the activities of the domestic 
actors tend either to accelerate or decelerate the process. In order to do so, it is organised 
into three sections. The first section explores the tactics and strategies that both catalysts 
and antagonists tapped into in the achievement of their aims. The second section looks 
at the barriers that have been faced by the domestic actors in each country. Finally, the 
chapter concludes by discussing the capacity of each different domestic agent group to 
influence the policy-making process, together with their limits, in order to contribute to 
the view that Europeanisation is a two-fold process, which comprises both the push from 
the EU and the pull by the domestic actors. While the previous chapter found that it was 
the social norms and values that mostly shaped the domestic actors’ perceptions of the 
Europeanisation of WFLR, this chapter contends that it is rational choice 
institutionalism (RCI) that dominates domestic actors’ inputs to the process. Yet, that is 
not to say that domestic actors have become completely rational actors throughout the 
process. Shared norms and values still continue to play a salient role, especially while 
forming collaborations. Domestic actors consciously prefer to collaborate with the 
players that they see as ideologically close to themselves. In other words, it is still 
sociological institutionalism (SI) that forms the collaborations among different domestic 
actors. This finding relates to the key aim of the chapter, which is to explore the 
behaviour, and suggests that domestic actors are likely to leave their social norms and 
values aside to a certain degree and act more rationally in order to reach their initial goal.  
7.1. Strategies and tactics of the domestic actors:  
Each different domestic group related to WFLR policy-making at national level has 
chosen a different strategy while contributing to the process of Europeanising the 
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domestic model. Strategy here refers to the overall plan in order to catalyse or veto the 
process. Although the domestic actors had utilised similar strategies in both countries, 
the ways in which they employed those strategies differed slightly due to the socio-
political conditions of the time. This chapter, differentiates the term ‘strategy’ from the 
term ‘tactic’. Strategy can be defined as the long-term and larger overall plan that is less 
likely to change, whereas tactic translate as different parts of the overall plan that are 
needed for the realisation of the plan (Meyer, 2004; Meyer and Minkoff, 2004). This 
differentiation between strategy and tactic is expected to highlight the impact of inner 
dynamics intrinsic to each country.  
 As mentioned earlier, catalysts and antagonists have employed different 
strategies, and thus different tactics, while accelerating or decelerating the process. This 
difference in terms of strategic and tactical choices is intentional and stems from their 
different stances towards Europeanisation as well as their different positions within the 
societies. As in Chapter 6, this chapter also analyses catalysts’ and antagonists’ 
contributions to the process separately. 
7.1.1. Catalysts:  
Throughout the processes of Europeanising German and Turkish WFLR policies, 
catalysts have utilised three key strategies and various tactics while accelerating the de-
familialisation process. They have exploited certain structural opportunities in line with 
the ways in which they have perceived the process.  
Lobbying:  
Both the German and Turkish catalyst NGOs have engaged in a wide range of lobbying 
activities in order to persuade the national governments to Europeanise their WFLR 
models, which chimes with what Nyland (1995) and Najam (1999) argue. Nyland 
(1995), exploring the roles of NGOs in societies, claims that lobbying is one of the most 
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effective strategies for change. Drawing on Nyland, Najam (1999) points to NGOs as 
the most influential lobbyists. He sees them as policy entrepreneurs, able to shape both 
the agenda for policy-making and the policy outcomes by leading the government 
towards a certain approach (cited in Ketola, 2013). The overlapping goal of all German 
and Turkish NGOs in terms of their lobbying activity has been to de-familialise German 
and Turkish WFLR models. Yet, their lobbying tactics and their partner choices have 
decisively differed. This differentiation stems from their political ideology, number of 
members, size of budget and their working relations with the political actors (working 
relations do not necessarily have to be with the ruling party as these catalysts both in 
Germany and in Turkey usually preferred to collaborate with oppositional parties); 
sometimes the organisation has naturally chosen to use a certain tactic. 
 In both countries, catalyst NGOs start their lobbying activity with 
comprehensive research. This research is usually conducted by medium and large 
organisations who have contacts with universities and international women’s 
organisations. The aim of the research is to gather data from each region of the country, 
as both of the selected countries are highly diverse with respect to WFLR needs and 
practices, then to develop the model and the policy content for which the NGO will 
lobby. As expected, such comprehensive research would be highly costly for an NGO. 
Therefore, the ‘Promotion and Protection of Women’s Rights’, a subprogram funded by 
the EC’s delegation in Turkey that provides grants to women’s organisations concerned 
with female employment in Turkey and the ESF, and which granted more than fifteen 
billion Euros to Germany (ESF, 2018) has been said by a number of interviewees to be 
very useful for Turkish and German women’s organisations conducting research on 
WFLR issues (TNGO6; TNGO8; TNGO11; TNGO14; TNGO16; GNGO2; GNGO8; 
GNGO10).   
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Figure 7. 1:  Summary of Catalysts’ lobbying activities.    
                            


































As can also be seen from Figure 7.1 above, research is the first step of lobbying activity 
and has a particular importance for women’s organisations. The women’s organisations 
conduct the research in order to ground their arguments on a scientific base as they are 
aware of the difficulty of persuading the government to adopt a more Europeanised and 
de-familialised WFLR model. For example, a policy expert from Turkey, who works in 
a very vocal lobbyist women’s organisation, argued: 
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We need to go to them with the facts and different models, so that they can think 
and chose the one closest to their minds. You know convincing AKP is already 
hard. But at least when we go with several options and examples from European 
countries, we present some alternatives and we say ok you are not doing what 
we exactly are asking from you, but at least chose one among these models 
(TNGO6).   
Once the women’s organisations have researched and developed the content that the 
lobbying activity will be based on, they share the findings with other catalysts, so that 
each can set their own lobbying tactic. The most preferred repertoire for lobbying was 
said by interviewees to be a direct approach to MPs on the grounds that it would have 
an immediate effect as the lobbyist group would be directly addressing the person 
responsible for policy-making.  
 Two very important campaigns, for example, one in Turkey and one in Germany, 
used this lobbying tactic, and the campaign participants expressed how the tactic was 
beneficial for them. Prior to the 2015 general elections in Turkey, 31 women’s 
organisations from 16 different cities came together and formed a platform called 
‘Kindergarten is a Right (Kreş Haktır Platformu)’ to lobby the government for 
European-style childcare standards. The campaign followed the aforementioned 
lobbying process. Accordingly, campaign participants regularly visited MPs from 
different parties in order to convince them to include the Europeanised childcare model 
in their official documents. Similarly, prior to the 2017 general elections in Germany, 
an umbrella organisation of 60 nationwide women’s and family organisations, which 
also occasionally collaborate with trade unions, formed the ‘Federal Forum Men 
(Bundesforum Manner)’ in order to achieve European-wide gender-equal parental leave. 
Alongside organising events and lobbying the public for a mindset change, this forum’s 
most important duty was regularly visiting politicians. Similar to Turkish catalysts, 
German catalysts tried to convince the political parties to cover gender-equal parental 
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leave schemes in their documents, which eventually would bring about official 
legislation. 
 These two aforementioned campaigns were organised in a very similar way to 
two highly influential and successful campaigns run by a large number of women’s 
organisations in Turkey in the early 2000s (see Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2013; Anil et al., 
2005; Ketola, 2012), in a path-dependent fashion. Given the success of these campaigns, 
catalyst women’s organizations have preferred to follow their predecessors’ tactics. 
Notable feminist scholars have highlighted the positive impact of well-functioning 
collaborations among Turkish women’s NGOs on the Turkish Civil and Penal Code 
reforms in 2001 and 2004 respectively (Ketola, 2013). Ketola saw this success as a great 
step further in terms of NGO-government relations, as the NGOs are no longer seen as 
anti-governmental rebel formations, but potential sources of information and 
trustworthy partners that might contribute to the policy-making process. However, 
almost a decade and a half later, when the campaign tactic was duplicated, it did not 
bring the same success.  
 The participants of both the Turkish campaign and the German forum mention a 
considerable difference in terms of openness of the political parties to any potential 
meeting with them. In both countries, the left leaning political parties appear to be more 
open to hearing the NGOs’ opinions compared with the right corners of both the 
Bundestag and the TBMM. While this difference stems from parties’ views on 
Europeanised WFLR in both cases, the legacy of the right-left struggles that Turkey 
experienced during the 1960s (Findley, 2010; Ketola, 2013), also contributed to the 
difficulties faced by Turkish lobbyists. As mentioned in Chapter 6, neither the German 
nor Turkish right have appeared as enthusiastic as the German and Turkish left in terms 
of Europeanising the domestic WFLR model. In that respect, and in line with SI, they 
remained reluctant to collaborate with catalyst organisations in the policy-making 
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process. Moreover, Turkey has intensely experienced the leftist movements of the 
1960s. Particular segments of the extreme left and right, openly affiliated with NGOs, 
mostly the feminist and environmentalist ones, became highly militant and threatened 
social harmony. As a result, the women’s organisations created a poor image of 
themselves in the eyes of the rightist governments (Findley, 2010), which has not been 
changed even today. Referring to the Historical institutionalism (HI), this attitude of the 
politicians has made it difficult for Turkish organisations to lobby politicians. To this 
end, most of the lobbyists interviewed under the scope of this research, mentioned the 
ease of reaching deputies from the People’s Democracy Party (Halkların Demokratik 
Partisi- HDP) and the Republican People’s Party’s (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP) in 
Turkey and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands – SPD) and the German Left Party (die Linke) in Germany: 
Well, let’s say there is this topic A, we have all the contact details of all political 
parties. We send them the email at the same time. We stood beside the one, who 
embraces the issue but of course as you could imagine as well, so far it is 
generally even always the HDP, who first embraces our issue and gets back to 
us (TNGO9).  
In like manner, a deputy from CHP stated:  
I am very much in favour of NGOs’ existence, I even believe that their number 
should be increased because we as the party believe that there would not be any 
development in societies wherein no NGO exists. We call them ‘democratic 
nongovernmental organisations’ rather than civil society organisations. 
Accordingly, we try to pay attention to their ideas because we do trust their 
conclusions. They really are working (TPOL7).  
Similarly, chiming with Langenbacher (2015), who argued that German left parties have 
historically been close to women’s movements, a senior deputy from the SPD (arguably 
one of the most NGO-friendly parties in Germany) stated:  
We have a dialogue with NGOs, you know, we have different working groups in 
different fields and our working group here is the employment and social policy, 
so we worked on our party programme, we have a first draft now and we will 
give this first draft to some women’s organisations and they will come here and 
discuss this with our party-leadership. They will give their feedbacks on the 
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proposal that we have made in this draft. So, I mean it is very institutionalised 
(GPOL4).  
 On the other hand, the right, centre right and extreme right parties of both 
countries were not necessarily opposed to the existence of NGOs, but expressed their 
displeasure about being the target of lobbying (TPOL1, TPOL3, TPOL5, GPOL1, 
GPOL2). Referring back to the three forms of New Institutionalism (NI), the political 
parties’ responses to women’s organisations are highly suggestive of SI but also RCI. 
Their perception of women’s organisations – which means whether they perceive the 
organisation as an antagonistic foundation or a trustworthy partner – clearly shaped their 
stance. Parties who were open to the existence of women’s organisations were 
responsive in practice, so that the organisations could lobby the politicians. On the 
contrary, parties who did not consider women’s organisations as source of information 
remained silent, which led to unsuccessful lobbying. Additionally, more so in Germany 
but also in Turkey, political parties see women’s organisations as messengers who would 
convey their citizens’ needs and demands. In order to appeal to the public, political 
parties had to address their electorates’ needs and demands and benefitting from 
women’s organisations at this stage reveals a rational activity this implies a rational 
calculus.  
 Difficulties in reaching some politicians directly led Turkish and German 
catalysts to seek other lobbying tactics in order to de-familialise the national WFLR 
models. The three most common tactics in both countries were informal visits and 
personal relationships; use of various media tools; and activism.  
a) Informal visits and personal relations:  
As mentioned above, due to a lack of any systematisation in terms of NGO governance 
as well as rightist political parties’ reluctance to collaborate with NGOs, representatives 
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of women’s organisations and trade unions have developed various informal methods. 
Annual breakfasts in Germany and regular Eid visits in Turkey were most common: 
I mean it’s a long time, we are not sitting here, we are always trying to do things for 
German women, we try to have these breakfasts with politicians twice a year 
(GNGO7).  
This respondent was from an umbrella organisation and for them it was easier to arrange 
these relatively more institutionalised meetings because they were a big organisation 
representing German women’s organisations in the international arena. In other words, 
they were an accepted organisation. For smaller and local organisations, approaching 
politicians has required more effort. As they do not have pre-organised meetings with 
the MPs, they have tried to take the advantage of every possible occasion, which recalls 
RCI: 
On certain congresses, just as a kind of coffee-break meeting. If we hear in 
advance from our personal contacts that politicians/policy-makers are going to 
an event, we definitely go to that event and try to have a small chat during the 
breaks (GNGO5).  
 On the other hand, in Turkey even big organisations have faced difficulties in 
reaching politicians and have had to lean on more personal relationships or spontaneous 
visits:  
We are 20 years old. So, we have our contacts in each party so through them we 
can learn the schedules of the deputies and we do our regular visits. But these 
visits, they are well-organised, we go with our reports, with our files and we try 
to tell them what we believe… Apart from that if we need the government party, 
we do the Eid visits, which would be appreciated by them (TNGO15).  
These spontaneous visits to politicians strongly resonate with RCI, as they put their 
norms and values aside and act in a results-oriented manner. Take a republican women’s 
organisation located in Ankara as an example. It would not be expected for them to 
emphasise religious practices as they are the civil society branch of Kemalist ideology, 
which seeks to create an obvious distance from Islamic practices. However, this 
organisation left their ideology aside and acted in a way which they rationally thought 
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would bring more efficiency. By the same token, none of the German respondents 
interviewed expressed any particular party name as a lobbying target. 
 Although none of the NGOs mention a particular political party name, they 
underline how they pay greater attention to their personal connections and try to take the 
maximum advantage from their social networks. German catalysts for example, seek 
ways to approach the moderate realos as they have higher hopes of their cooperation, 
on the grounds that they hold similar views towards a Europeanised German WFLR 
model. Turkish catalysts, as well, have tried to benefit from the femocrats for the exact 
same reasons. What was interesting in the Turkish case was the ways in which they have 
approached these facilitator MPs. They have two channels by which to do so: while the 
first one is quite predictable; the second channel was highly unexpected. Ethnicity and 
socio-political ideology play an important role in women’s organisations’ personal 
access to MPs. An umbrella women’s organisation, which does not necessarily have 
Kurdish members but which holds a highly sensitive view on the Kurdish conflict as an 
organisation ideology, emphasised the notion of the ‘mother language’ when 
approaching the HDP, knowing the HDP’s sensitivities around children’s deprivation 
from their own language: 
For example, when we are appealing to HDP, we do not say we need to increase 
the number of the Kindergartens but we say we need Kindergartens, educating 
children in their mother language… We are not lying at all because we also are 
against human rights abuses, especially with respect to Kurds (TNGO6). 
By the very same token, a well-established women’s organisation based in Istanbul 
expresses the importance of being able to find common ground with CHP through the 
shared Kemalist ideology. Most strikingly, in Turkey, catalysts from the trade unions 
happen to be aided by some of their former colleagues, who now are members of the 
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP). Despite the 
ideological cliff between the catalyst organisations and the AKP in terms of WFLR 
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Europeanisation, the fact of being former co-workers appears as a synthesiser buffer, if 
only to a certain degree as the former colleagues have had to adopt the party ideology in 
order to secure their own positions within the party. Yet, they have made some 
exceptions for the sake of having worked together: 
Well, some people we know from the sector now are AKP members. Of course, 
they have changed, I mean they pretend to be changed, and OK, I see their points 
as well but it is horrible. Well anyways, as we have their personal phone numbers 
we can reach them. For example, once we were trying to get an appointment for 
a meeting, we directly called one particular MP…hope you understand what I 
mean as I cannot be more open…’ (TTU1).  
 From a theoretical lens, it can be argued that while German actors’ new tactics 
for reaching politicians resonate with RCI and SI, in the Turkish case, collaborating with 
the former colleagues also recalls HI alongside the RCI and SI.  
b) Different tools of media: 
Almost every single catalyst NGO in both countries used the media as it is cheaper, 
easier and, for Turkish catalysts, safer than other means of lobbying. Each tactic that 
catalyst organisations employ in order to compensate for the difficulties in reaching 
politicians directly requires different collaboration; using different media tools also 
requires different types of collaboration. Here, catalyst organisations need the aid of 
media institutions.  
 Although eventually both Turkish and German catalyst NGOs have formed the 
partnerships they needed, in the process of forming those partnerships, socio-political 
dynamics played an important role. In the Turkish case, the conflict between the 
Islamists and Secularists was as apparent in the media sphere as in any other institutional 
sphere (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2013). Similarly, despite Article 5 of the German Basic 
Law, which covers the freedom of press and free speech, the German media also is 
regulated in a top-down manner (Dick, 2015). To this end, the Turkish catalysts could 
only collaborate with the secularly-oriented media, especially the secularly-oriented 
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print media, whereas the German catalysts have formed partnerships with left-leaning 
and alternative media.  
 This limitation on collaboration clearly shows how the political climate of the 
country can constrain domestic actors’ activities while shaping the Europeanisation 
process. Freedom of the media seems irrelevant to Europeanising the national WFLR 
models. Yet the political ideology of the media institutions in Turkey and the top-down 
manner in Germany has curtailed the NGOs’ actions and compelled them to take norms 
and values into consideration alongside the rational calculus, while making their 
decisions with collaboration partners. In other words, German and Turkish catalysts’ 
choice of media tools in order to address the difficulties faced while directly pressuring 
the politicians strongly chimes with RCI. However, collaborating only with certain 
media organisations rather than all, also resonates with SI as catalysts cannot leave the 
norms and values aside while acting result-oriented. Nevertheless, both German and 
Turkish catalysts benefitted from the tools of media to influence policies in a more 
Europeanised way. The participants of the aforementioned Platform in Turkey and 
Forum in Germany, especially, mentioned that the media gave leverage to the process 
by publishing the press releases they prepared, announcing the public calls for marches, 
rallies or demonstrations and most importantly, spreading their views on Europeanised 
WFLR.  
 A Turkish women’s organisation representative, for example, mentioned the 
positive role of the media in their activities but interestingly, highlighted the safety of 
using media in lobbying:  
We are sharing our views from our websites and also most of the women 
journalists are our friends, so they also cover our issues. We really cannot do 
more than this as thanks to GONGOs as we are not NGO in the eye of the 
government anymore… So, through the media we at least spread our views 
against their views because we cannot go on streets anymore, we cannot go to 
Parliament… This is the safest thing we can do (TNGO12).  
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 The emphasis on the ‘safe nature’ of the media takes the issue beyond the mere 
catalyst contribution to process and relates to internal challenges to NGOs’ freedom of 
action. As discussed in the previous chapters, Turkey has been under a state of 
emergency since July 2016, which has restricted the activities of some NGOs. These 
recent constraints have led Turkish catalyst organisations to rely more on media tools, 
which they still consider relatively safer. This shows how domestic actors adapt 
themselves to the changing conditions of the day while progressing toward the initial 
goal. In other words, while employing the overall lobbying strategy, domestic actors 
have utilised different tactics. Turkey is a less democratic candidate country wherein 
human rights, freedom of NGOs and freedom of media is low, while Germany is a 
democratic founding member state, which already has EU standards in human rights, 
relative NGO freedom and a relatively free media. While German catalysts appear to 
have more freedom in their lobbying activities, Turkish catalysts have been exposed to 
more constraints, which over time has led them to seek different lobbying tactics.     
c) Activism:  
Finally, activism has appeared as another lobbying tactic that benefits catalysts, mostly 
in Turkey but also very rarely in Germany. The adversary trade unions and women’s 
organisations, especially the grassroots ones in Turkey and the ones located in the former 
Eastern German cities, mentioned the positive impact of being active in the streets.  
 It was the recent political climate in Turkey and the legacy of the past in 
Germany that led catalysts to ‘go back to basics’ (GNGO5). This difference between 
Eastern and Western women’s organisations with respect to activism perhaps stems 
from Germany’s feminist movement history. Radical feminism has historically been 
prevalent in the FRG. Accordingly, German radical feminists paid all their attention to 
politics of body and sexuality (Katzenstein, 1987). For them, freeing women from 
maternal activities in general and child-rearing in particular, as through artificial wombs 
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and separate public spaces for men and women, was the most efficient path to women’s 
liberation (Williarty, 2010). To this end, they mostly sought private spheres for women 
(Guenther, 2010) and thus did not consider the street a proper place to mobilise. Some 
former Western organisations have remained loyal to this legacy in a path-dependent 
fashion and do not engage with activism. This is accompanied by the fact that Eastern 
women became the lowest status of German citizens after the Unification; Schaeffer-
Hegel (1992:101) calls them ‘victims of the unification’. For these women, going into 
the streets was a highly appealing option. In this regard, some Eastern organisations still 
follow their predecessors and engage in activism while lobbying the government, which 
implies HI.  
 A number of relevant activism examples can be found in both Turkey and 
Germany. A panel organised by the Kreş Haktır Platformu on the 11th of April 2013 
(TNGO6) could be given as a very important example of lobbying the Turkish 
government for a Europeanised childcare structure. Organised on the 25th of June 2017 
and aimed to change the family model and achieve the implementation of the adult 
worker family model (GNGO5) provides an important example in Germany. Another 
salient difference between Germany and Turkey in terms of activism is the nature of 
collaboration partners. While activist organisations of Germany have mainly 
collaborated with other national grassroots organisations and civil activists, some 
politicians from the leftist camp show a particular interest in activism and appear to be 
more collaborative in Turkey. 
Direct approach to public: 
While catalysing the processes of Europeanising Turkish and German WFLR models, 
the second strategy that catalysts have tapped into is bypassing the government and 














Although this strategy has been used by the German catalysts for a longer time, Turkish 
catalysts also have come to use this since 2010, a date that resonates with the waning 
EU impact on NGOs, solidifying the roles of the NGOs in society. As İçduygu (2011) 
and Ketola (2012) state, Turkey’s European aspirations paved the way for the 
empowerment of NGOs and considerably expanded the functioning of the NGO, 
including women’s organisations and the trade unions. However, with the diminishing 
influence of the EU in Turkey, secular-oriented women’s organisations lost ground for 
lobbying. In order to continue their work, they have steered their activities to the public 
sphere. Ketola (2013) has already pointed to realisation of policies as one of the three 
roles of the NGOs in society. Similar to the role that Ketola cast for the NGO, both 
Turkish and German catalysts engage with raising public awareness on existing 
domestic WFLR policies and the corresponding EU standards, as well as providing some 
WFLR in the absence of state provision, which can be seen from Figure 7.3 below.   
Women’s 
organisations Government Public 
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a) Awareness raising:  
In line with HI, a number of German women’s organisations still follow Germany’s first 
institutionalised feminist group, the Women’s Union. During the post-war era, the 
Women’s Union organised the very first social gatherings and charity events to enlighten 
German women about women’s political and reproductive rights as well as the 
importance of economic independence (Williarty, 2010). On the other hand, secular 
women’s organisations in Turkey, who have gradually been losing ground in terms of 
social dialogue and access to politicians, in line with the RCI sought to find other ways 
to continue their work. Both Turkish and German catalyst NGOs put considerable effort 
























public awareness of the de-familialised WFLR model, women’s legal rights with respect 
to maternity leaves, childcare and working time arrangements as well as the importance 
of fathers’ involvement in parenting. Their awareness raising repertoire have ranged 
from organising international conferences and local and regional workshops; 
establishing bookshops and women’s centres in Universities (in Germany only); 
publishing articles in feminist and national magazines; and preparing flyers, brochures 
and handbooks, as well as putting up posters and talking with individuals on the street.  
 Although the target here is the public, this is not to say that awareness raisers do 
not need the government, because they do, even perhaps more so than when they lobby 
the government. As shown in Figure 7.3 above, raising public awareness requires strong 
cooperation with the local governments for the event venue and transportation facilities, 
which are highly costly for a women’s organisation; such cooperation is also needed to 
get the permits for hanging posters or distributing flyers, brochures and handbooks, 
Cooperation with local women’s organisations is also necessary, in order to mobilise the 
local public and gather information specific to that particular area; and also with 
international women’s organisations, in order to exchange ideas and be aware of 
alternative models. 
b) Providing WFLR services:   
Alongside organising awareness raising events, a number of catalyst organisations from 
both countries also provide WFLR services. However, due to the nature of WFLR 
policies, there is not much to provide apart from childcare services. Accordingly, a 
number of German, and a smaller number of Turkish, women’s organisations try to 
contribute to their Europeanisation processes by operating as a kindergarten. 
Considering the EU standards as a blueprint, these organisations offer affordable, 
sometimes (depending on their ability to get funding) even free, childcare facilities 
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compatible with universal working times in order to enable women’s labour market 
participation. 
 Given that running a kindergarten is a very costly job (GNGO9; TNGO7; 
TNGO10), these organisations need a number of partners. As Turkish organisations do 
not have enough budget, they try to reduce the cost as much as possible. In doing so, the 
first thing they seek is the support of the local governments, who could provide the 
building, which would allow women’s organisations not to pay the rent, electricity, 
water and heating. On the other hand, alongside the local governments, German catalysts 
also referred to the importance of private companies, evangelical organisations and the 
women’s co-ops in delivering WFLR service:  
Well now, compared to 15 years ago, we are in a less needy position. In the past, 
we really needed local government’s partnership especially for practical things 
like the building, the heating, the staff everything. But now, private companies 
and especially women’s coops are so very open to support us on this. If not them, 
then there is also always the evangelical organisations. They have this huge fund 
coming both from the government and the Church, which allow them to rent the 
building for the kindergarten. And I think it is easier to collaborate with these 
new partners because they let us to do our job. With the local governments, they 
try to regulate the opening times, the food we provide, even sometimes the 
curriculum. But with women’s co-ops, especially private companies, they only 
provide us the technical support (GNGO9).  
Germany’s ability to be more flexible than Turkey might be explained through the 
relatively greater awareness of WFLR issues. More and various actors being sensitive 
to WFLR has led to more potential partnerships for the women’s organisations, which 
in turn enables them to run the kindergartens on the basis of the EU standards, especially 
with respect to opening times. In addition to having fewer collaborator options, Turkish 
catalyst organisations have also been facing barriers from increased physical standards. 
Kindergartens run by the women’s organisations have been regarded as private 
kindergartens even though they are more affordable than the market-run kindergartens. 
Accordingly, those accommodating children aged three to five years are regulated by 
the MoE, whereas ones accommodating children below the age three are regulated by 
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the MFSP (İlkkaracan et al., 2015). Both of these ministries have numerous legislated 
standards for the safety of children. These standards include the location of the building, 
indoor and outdoor space, heating, the condition of the floor, the condition of the 
painting of the building and many more (Aran et al., 2016). Although representatives of 
the women’s organisations operating as a kindergarten agree with the corresponding 
ministries on the importance of children’s health and safety, they also expressed their 
doubts about the sincerity of the government in introducing these criteria:   
This is a bit my interpretation of their [government’s] intention as I cannot really 
prove it but I strongly think all these criteria, which are quite impossible to meet, 
is another strategy of the government to push childcare back to familial sphere. 
At the end of the day, here we are trying to provide a neighbourhood kindergarten 
so that children will not take the shuttle with their mother for two hours in the 
morning. They will come here in five minutes while their mothers at work. We 
are doing this with our own resources so how can we find a building with 
whatsoever square meter garden or so. Even if we have more resource than this 
do you think this is feasible given Istanbul’s overcrowded geography 
(TNGO10).   
At the time this interview was conducted, women’s organisations did not have a tactic 
to overcome this problem. Yet they openly expressed their determination to continue 
operating as a kindergarten in order to provide ECEC for the children of disadvantaged 
families, as well as to enable women’s economic liberation:  
As you know these are hard times but we will not give up; yes, maybe we cannot 
provide a garden with pine trees but at least we are providing ECEC to children 
of this neighbourhood, who would never be able to go to a private kindergarten 
and meanwhile we are trying to contribute to mothers’ employment and we will 
continue doing this as the way we have already been doing (TNGO7).  
 From an actor-centred perspective, the organisation’s determination to continue 
to operate as a kindergarten even under the relatively more constrained conditions 
resonates with SI. Although the maintenance and operation costs of operating as a 
kindergarten are greater than its gains, catalyst organisations did not give up on the 
grounds of their strong commitment to the process. 
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 This difference between Germany and Turkey again shows how the 
Europeanisation process is filtered by the domestic dynamics. Although German 
catalysts appeared to be facing lesser difficulties than Turkish catalysts in providing 
WFLR service, this does not mean that German catalysts have not faced any difficulties 
at all. The differing level of enthusiasm of local governments in signing the protocol 
with the women’s organisations appeared to be the biggest obstacle. As was the case in 
regard to lobbying, in both countries, right-leaning local governments remained highly 
reluctant to cooperate with catalyst NGOs when compared to social democratic or leftist 
local governments. Again, in the Turkish case, women’s NGOs have expressed the 
difficulty of signing the protocols with mostly the HDP, but also with the CHP-led local 
governments. A very active respondent from one of the deep-rooted organisation, when 
discussing their collaboration with the local governments during their path-breaking 
campaign, ‘7 is too late’, recalled: 
Due to ‘Deniz’s era29, the AKP and the MHP see us as bugaboos. They have this 
idea that we go to their neighbourhood in order to mobilise the locals and 
threaten their harmony. I mean if harmony is women being forced to stay at home 
and care for the children, care for the elderly, then yes excuse me but we will 
threaten this harmony. Joking aside, there is a huge difference between 
municipalities. You know I mean, while it was really very easy to sign the 
protocol with Kadikoy or Besiktas (two neighbourhoods in Istanbul governed by 
the CHP) municipalities, it was that hard to sign it with let’s say Bahcelievler or 
Bakirkoy (two neighbourhoods in Istanbul governed by the AKP) (TNGO14).   
In a similar vein, a policy expert working in a Bremen women’s organisation mentioned 
the warm relations with the local government, which is led by a coalition between the 
SPD and die Linke: 
Bremen is under SPD-Linke coalition for a very long time and usually they are 
cooperative, I should say. Of course, they have limited resources and cannot 
cover all our needs but especially with respect to childcare, I need to admit that 
we sign the protocol with more or less the amount that we demand (GNGO8).  
                                               
29 Deniz Gezmis is a Marxist-Leninist political-activist, who became a symbol of the left in the late 1960s, 
when Turkey was witnessing the left and right-wing armed conflicts. The respondent referred these left-
right conflicts that Turkey has gone through by using the term ‘Deniz’s era’.  
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 As mentioned in the previous chapter, MPs from the right corners of the 
parliament in both countries do not welcome the EU’s involvement in this sphere. In 
line with their party’s stance, the local governments have avoided facilitating an event 
aiming to Europeanise the domestic model. Referring back to NI theory, it would be 
justified to link this to SI as it clearly stems from actors’ ideologies. In the Turkish case, 
this reluctance recalls HI too, as the respondents recalled the older bad image of the 
NGOs. On the other hand, as already noted above, the leftist governments have always 
been supportive to the feminist movement as they believe in the strength of the NGOs. 
As a result, the CHP and HDP in Turkey; SPD, Greens and the Left party in Germany 
appear to be more cooperative with the women’s organisations, which again resembles 
SI.  
 In addition to the aforementioned right-left difference in terms of local 
governments’ openness to collaboration, which exists in both cases, this chapter further 
finds that local governments in the former GDR cities were more open to these 
partnerships than the local governments in FRG. Despite its repressiveness, the GDR 
gave women’s organisations more opportunity to form partnerships with the local 
governments. Although it was almost impossible to form an opposition group, after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, these women’s organisations and the local governments 
successfully came together and formed a number of alliances. For Guenther (2010), this 
was partly due to their mutual dependencies on each other and partly due to the fact that 
they see women’s emancipation through employment as a key element of socialism. 
Still, after 28 years, in a path-dependent fashion, the cooperation between women’s 
organisations and local governments functions better in the former GDR cities when 
compared to cities located in the former FRG region:  
Well, to be honest with you, for us municipalities are more important because 
things we get from them have a quicker impact. We get concrete things – we get 
free place, we get free transport and we physically use them. But local 
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governments are not any easier than Berlin. Here it is CDU/CSU and they really 
are not any supportive. But go to Leipzig, even in a CDU/CSU-led region you 
will hear a complete different story… It has been 30 years now that the wall went 
off but if you are working in a social sector, you still feel that East and West are 
not same (GNGO6). 
 Under these constrained conditions, in order to work together with the local 
governments and take the maximum advantage from them, the catalyst organisations in 
both countries have developed three new tactics, which are highly rational and quite 
creative: (i) forming partnerships with private companies; (ii) initiating women’s centres 
in universities; and (iii) organising events in mosques.  
i) Forming partnerships with private companies:  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, this is a very recent strategy. It is only since 2010 
that private companies in both countries have come to be more sensitive around social 
responsibility projects. Catalyst organisations, who saw this as a great window of 
opportunity, verged towards these private companies to form partnerships.  
 In Turkey and Germany, some particular companies prioritised Europeanisation 
in their social responsibility projects. One of the former Prime Ministers, Turgut Özal, 
aimed at weakening the state’s control over the economy and creating new entrepreneurs 
in small, formerly neglected and pious towns of Anatolia through a number of economic 
and political reforms during the 1980s. This at the end resulted in an ideologically 
polarised market in Turkey (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014). A number of religious 
provincials have come to own large companies in Turkey’s big cities, who have known 
as the ‘Anatolian Tigers’ (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008). In some respects, Germany also 
has an ideologically segregated labour market. Some big companies, mostly engaged 
with non-manufacturing sectors, exist beside manufactural companies dominated by the 
male working culture (GA1; GA2, GNGO8). While the former hold more modernised 
views on gendered division of labour and appear more sensitive to women’s 
employment rights, the latter favour male employees and prefer not to be sensitive to 
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the work and family life conflict of women. Unsurprisingly, the Anatolian Tigers of 
Turkey and the male-dominated companies of Germany did not take part in social 
responsibility projects involving WFLR. Therefore, secularly-oriented companies in 
Turkey; non-manufacturing sectors in Germany; and some international companies, who 
are openly blamed by the media for the destruction of nature and are thus seeking ways 
to change their public image, appeared as potential co-operators of catalyst 
organisations. To this end, catalyst organisations asked for their help in publishing their 
flyers, handbooks and brochures as publishing those materials is an additional cost for 
the organisations, especially if it is a small and local one. Moreover, in the search for 
required venues for events, as well as for operating as a kindergarten, the buildings of 
these large companies appeared to provide an opportunity. 
 From an actor-centred perspective, the attitudes of both catalyst organisations 
and private companies, especially those aiming to remould their public image, strongly 
resonates with RCI as it clearly exhibits a win-win situation. As the formation of 
partnership was also based on shared social norms and values with respect to 
Europeanised WFLR models, it would be plausible to link this to SI as well. 
ii) Initiating women’s centres in universities:  
Another tactic of the catalyst organisations, when compensating for the local 
governments’ non-cooperation, is initiating women’s centres in universities, then 
working together with those centres. It is important to note that only German catalyst 
organisations have utilised this tactic. 
 In Germany, women’s organisations have gradually begun to support feminist 
students’ demands for the establishment of women’s centres in universities. These 
women centres differed from gender and women’s studies departments in terms of their 
functions. They did not have an academic orientation and they did not aim for academic 
research on women’s and gender issues. Instead, the raison d’etre of these student-run 
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centres was to create awareness around women’s rights, including WFLR among 
students.  
 While supporting the formation of these centres, women’s organisations in return 
hoped to pass some of the workload to them, and also expected these centres to reduce 
the cost of awareness-raising events. In line with women’s organisations’ hopes, these 
women’s centres used university facilities to print campaign posters, flyers, brochures 
and handbooks. They also contributed to the distribution of these materials. This mutual 
support implies both SI and RCI on the grounds of shared norms and values but also 
shared goals. 
iii) Organising events in mosques: 
As evidenced by notable Turkish studies scholars, Turkey has rapidly come to practise 
an Islamic way of life, which led journalist Ece Temelkuran (2016: 16) to refer to the 
current situation as the ‘Dubaisation of Turkey’. Regulations on tightening alcohol sales 
(States news service, 2013); the removal of the headscarf ban (Findley, 2010); and the 
considerable increase in the number of Imam Hatip Schools and Quran courses (Cornell, 
2015) clearly show that Turkey is going back to Islamist practices, from which Kemalist 
elite radically disconnected Turkey.  
 Under the conditions of the new Turkey, some Turkish women’s organisations 
have employed a very unpredictable and striking tactic. Although this met some 
criticism from overtly Kemalist organisations, a number of catalyst organisations began 
to organise awareness-raising and educational events in mosques during Quran courses 
in pious neighbourhoods:  
We keep on running our consciousness-raising campaigns. There is no nuisance 
there. But we did something, which is not us at all. We changed the venues to 
Mosques. Why? Because the new conditions… Turkey is not secular anymore. 
Apart from those few saved neighbourhoods, Turkey is Saudi Arabia. So, we 
need to organise events to influence – even a bit – women living in those areas. 
Even if we arrange an event on street, there is no way the fathers or husbands of 
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those women that we target would let them come. But if it is a mosque, they are 
softer. Because why? Mosque is a mosque, a house of worship. So, it is safe, 
women would go with their female friends and they would not offend the 
neighbourhood dignity (TNGO9).  
 This new strategy of Turkish catalyst organisations clearly resonates with RCI. 
Women’s organisations which have stood against and actively raised their voices against 
any kind of regulation which might impair the secular character of Turkey, put their 
social norms and values aside just to Europeanise the Turkish WFLR model. Organising 
an event in a mosque requires a constant exchange, mostly with the Directorate of 
Religious Affairs and also other religious governmental and nongovernmental 
institutions. Although, these women’s organisations would not have any relationship 
with these institutions under normal circumstances, they have regarded the gains of 
maintaining their activities as greater than the losses of forming those relationships, and 
so successfully continue their events in mosques.  
Cross-party alliances:  
The last strategy of catalysts appears to be happening at the political level. Alongside 
individual efforts, such as bringing the WFLR issue to the table in Parliamentary 
meetings, covering the issue in party programs and elections manifestos and establishing 
working groups within the parties, the catalyst MPs (who mainly come from the 
opposition parties) believe in the strength of cross-party alliances. 
 Although Germany has been said to have a better working democracy compared 
to Turkey (Hale, 2006), Turkish opposition parties have managed to come together and 
form alliances far more easily than German opposition parties. This might be explained 
through the more monopolistic position of the AKP compared to CDU/CSU. Given the 
current political climate in Turkey, wherein AKP holds 317 of the total seats, which is 
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more than the total seats for the opposition parties30 (seçim sonuçları, 2015), catalyst 
MPs have left their socio-political ideologies behind and worked together in order to 
Europeanise the Turkish model. Conversely, within the German Parliament, where the 
difference between the seats of each mainstream party is less than in Turkey31, catalyst 
MPs cannot form these alliances even though they express the importance of working 
together. Along with the less monopolistic position of the CDU/CSU, a number of 
ideological reasons contribute to the failure of German catalyst MPs. German catalyst 
MPs remain less effective in putting aside their social norms and values to work together 
for a more Europeanised WFLR model when compared to Turkey, wherein women’s 
issues including WFLR have been mentioned as the easiest topic to bring about these 
alliances: 
Women’s rights issue is one the very few issues that oppositional parties can 
come together and speak from the same mouth (TPOL9).  
An alliance between the CHP and the HDP can be given as a very striking example. It 
would not be an exaggeration to say that the HDP and the CHP have nothing in common 
apart from their leftist views on the role of the state in providing the welfare of its 
citizens (Findley, 2010). As mentioned several times in this thesis, the CHP is the overt 
guardian of Kemalist ideology, which is dedicated to building a ‘Turkish nation’. 
Notable Turkish historians have referred to these efforts of the CHP as ‘Turkification’ 
and ‘social engineering’ (Ergil, 2000; Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008). As could be 
ascertained from the name, this Turkification overlooks Kurdish citizens. Accordingly, 
an alliance between the CHP and the HDP would be unexpected. However, when it 
comes to women’s rights issues, even the HDP and the CHP manage to meet on common 
ground:  
                                               
30 CHP: 134; HDP: 59; MHP: 40.  
31 Left Party: 69; SPD: 153; AFD: 94; Greens: 67; FDP: 80 and CDU/CSU: 246 (Retrieved from: 
https://www.ft.com/content/e7c7d918-a17e-11e7-b797-b61809486fe2).  
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I totally believe the strength of oppositional parties’ unification and with respect 
to women’s issues is we form these unifications even with the CHP, which we 
usually can never harmonise (TPOL10).    
This attitude of the Turkish catalyst MPs from the oppositional parties, superimposing 
the bigger aim of having a stronger voice against AKP’s familialised WFLR policy-
paradigm over their own social norms and values, could clearly be explained with 
reference to RCI. The reform of the Civil Servant Code, which brought a ten-day paid 
leave to fathers working in the public service, is one example of such successful cross-
party alliances. A number of interviewees, from both the CHP and HDP, mention the 
positive impact of being together and voting for the same policy outcome during reform.  
Although they also have a consensus on the urgent need to amend Article 88 of 
the Labour Law, they could not succeed yet. When discussing the reasons for this delay 
of this amendment, the lack of support from the female AKP members appeared as an 
important factor. Although it would be quite interesting to see deputies from the AKP 
in these cross-party alliances, due to their opposite views on Europeanising Turkey’s 
WFLR model, the majority of the MPs interviewed, as well as a considerable number of 
NGO representatives, pointed out that these opposing ideas are not the genuine ideas of 
some female AKP deputies. Instead, they are the party ideology imposed on the party 
members, which chimes with Sultan Tepe’s (2006) findings. According to Tepe, AKP 
has serious problems with respect to collective decision-making. Some particular 
members of the party, close to the leadership cadre, have more autonomy in decision-
making compared to other members. These relatively more autonomous members are 
mainly men and convince the dissident members, especially the female ones, to abandon 
their own ideas and inhibit them from acting autonomously. Resonating with Tepe, a 
representative from a catalyst trade union recalled: 
Well, I know her, we worked together for I do not know how many years. She 
has the exact same opinions with us. She worked so hard to increase female 
employment in Turkey and better women’s positions within the labour market. 
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But now, since she has been part of the AKP, we even could not understand how 
she did that but anyways, since she became an MP, she is giving all those horrible 
bench speeches. But I am telling you it is not herself speaking there, it is the 
party. She is not speaking from her mouth, she is speaking from the party mouth 
(TTU1). 
This imposed party image has kept female AKP members from this potential alliance, 
which in the end has had a prosaic impact on catalysts’ efforts to accelerate the 
Europeanisation process. 
 On the other hand, within the German Parliament, it was only the MPs from the 
Greens and the SPD who from time to time could come together and form these 
unofficial cross-party alliances. The first attempts to Europeanise the German WFLR 
model were made under the Red-Green government. The MPs of the Greens and the 
SPD, being highly satisfied with those reforms, maintained their partnership unofficially 
after losing the office to CDU/CSU, in a path-dependent fashion. This act of transferring 
the utilised strategy to ensuing years on the grounds of its success clearly resonates with 
HI. However, this harmony has not been realised among other parties of the German 
catalyst camp, even though they have openly supported the process of Europeanising 
the German model. They have struggled to collaborate due to a number of reasons 
extraneous to WFLR. MPs from different parties interviewed under the scope of this 
thesis have openly criticised other MPs and expressed their lack of interest in 
collaborating. 
a) Critiques of the SPD:  
Among all the parties, the SPD has received the most criticism, especially from die 
Linke. First and foremost, the SPD has been accused of becoming more and more rightist 
and neo-liberal. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, being the biggest representative of 
the social democracy in Germany, the SPD has always been in favour of a social state. 
More than this, the SPD has adopted a ‘workers’ party’ image and aligns with the 
working class. However, over time the SPD has alienated itself from this image and has 
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increasingly come to protect the interests of the middle and upper-middle classes. The 
majority of the interviewees mention Chancellor Schroder’s predisposition to third-
wave politics as a key reason for this ideological change. This also resonates with the 
observations of a political scientist at the University of Gottingen, Matthias Micus. 
Micus (2016), while delineating the party ideologies in Germany before the 2017 general 
elections, posits that, for SPD today, the meaning of ‘left’ has shifted away from 
protecting the economic conditions of the working class in Germany (Delckier, 2016). 
In line with Micus, an MP from die Linke stated:  
Honestly when we talk about the gender-politics, we cannot see much difference 
between the SPD and other so-called centre-right parties anymore. Like if you 
ask me today’s SPD and CDU, I cannot tell you any different things because 
now they are so close and tangled. Yes, the SPD used to be much better in helping 
the weak links, the weak strata in society but now they are much better in 
destroying them, 100.000 people have been hit by the new social security system 
that the SPD brought (GPOL10).  
 This alleged neo-liberalisation of the SPD has an explicit and an implicit impact 
on the Europeanisation process. Prior to the 2009 general elections, the SPD started 
implementing a number of austerity policies under the ‘Agenda2010’, which are still in 
place today. The aim of the Agenda2010 was to introduce cuts to social spending on the 
grounds that the number of people relied on the welfare system has rapidly increased, 
which eventually has discouraged the productivity of Germany (Rippert, 2013). 
Agenda2010 was followed by the Agenda2020, which did nothing but intensify the 
provisions of Agenda2010. The combination of SPD’s Agenda2010 and Agenda2020 
has created a secondary labour market associated with low-paid and part-time jobs. In 
the immediate aftermath of implementation of the Agenda2010, the number of people 
working part-time reached 5.5 million in 2005 in Germany, while the number of people 
earning less than €7 per hour reached 4.1 million in 2007 (ILO, 2013). Given the parental 
leave scheme of Germany, which pays only 67 per cent of the monthly income during 
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the leave, Germany has maintained its misfit with the EU, rather than narrowing it. 
Additionally, this new image of the SPD led other opposition parties from the catalyst 
camp to avoid collaboration with the SPD as they could not find a common ground; this 
in turn lowered the voice of the opposition parties trying to persuade the CDU/CSU on 
a Europeanised WFLR model.  
 The second reason for the catalyst MPs’ reluctance to form cross-party alliances 
with the SPD was the heterogeneity within the party. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, some members of the SPD are deemed to be old and conservative (GPOL5), 
sustaining their own daily lives on the basis of the gendered division of labour, which 
has been nourished by capitalism and patriarchy (Kandiyoti, 1988). In that sense, these 
members of the SPD skip over patriarchal and capitalist relations while discussing how 
to reform the WFLR policies. This refusal to see ‘the whole picture’ riled the catalyst 
MPs from other parties in general, but the MPs from die Linke in particular, resulting in 
the failure of cross-party alliance formation: 
Yes, maybe the ‘SPD’ also wants better-off family politics, maybe they also want 
better work-family balance policies but they are not as brave as us to be vocal 
about the reform needs. For example, they can never say out loud that we need 
a system change, why, because SPD is polyphonic. The right corners of the SPD, 
that you can find many of them here in Bremen, are not progressive. They are 
progressive in opposite direction and because they are quite powerful in the 
party, they can lead the younger generation in the party. For example, SPD is 
here in Bremen in for 72 years now and we are their coalition partner for the last 
10 years, I have never seen them taking the childcare as an important issue. I 
mean the SPD is as macho as almost all other parties. For them women’s issues 
are gedungs, which means unnecessary, unimportant things (GPOL10).  
b) Critiques of die Grüne: 
The Green Party has been accused of increasing their focus on ‘interesting’ (GPOL5) 
topics such as tax and social justice alongside their bread and butter topics: environment 
and climate change. It has also been argued that even if the Greens focus on family 
politics, they bypass the still unresolved problems concerning women’s work and family 
life conflict and prefer to focus on LGBTI individuals’ familial problems. Although the 
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catalyst MPs have never underestimated the issues regarding LGBTI families, they 
underline the Green Party’s exaggerated concern on these issues, which hardens 
collaboration with the Greens.  
 Additionally, during the 1980s, Germany witnessed a ‘pedosexual movement’, 
lobbying for the de-criminalisation of consensual paedophilia (Lagenbacher, 2015). The 
Greens back then appeared on national and international media as supporters of the 
movement (Rogers, 2014). This paved the way for the Greens to be condemned by other 
political parties, who wanted to appear sensitive to ethics and children’s rights as well 
as children’s physical and mental health. To this end, the catalyst MPs preferred to avoid 
forming alliances with the Greens, especially until 2014, when the new party leader 
Simone Peter publicly apologised on behalf of his predecessors. In that sense, an MP, 
who identifies herself as socialist feminist from die Linke argued that:    
Well, I need to admit that apart from the members of the Greens determined with 
saving the planet, there are members who are as progressive as us but in the past 
Greens was involved in a paedophilia debate that tarnished their image so much. 
In order to be not affected from that many parties including us, especially us as 
we already are highly extreme and marginalised, avoided working with the 
greens for a while (GPOL9).  
The legacy of the 1980s, even after twenty years appeared as a barrier to catalysts’ 
actions in a reactionary fashion, which among the three forms of NI, clearly chimes with 
the HI. 
c) Critiques of die Linke: 
Die Linke, which has been critical of almost every single party from the German catalyst 
camp, was also been the subject of criticism from other catalyst MPs. Although the 
catalyst MPs and the NGO representatives interviewed under the scope of this research 
very much appreciated die Linke’s efforts in modernising the German WFLR 
legislation, the fact that die Linke takes its roots from the GDR restrained them from 
forming partnerships with die Linke.  
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 The party was founded in 2007 through the unification of the Party of 
Democratic Socialism (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus – PDS) and the Labour 
and Social Justice – The Electoral Alternative (Arbeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit – Die 
Wahlalternative – WASG). Although it was this combination that gave die Linke its 
socialist approach and made the party highly sensitive to WFLR issues, the very same 
combination also alienated die Linke within the Bundestag (Lagenbacher, 2015) as the 
PDS is the legal successor of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische 
Einheitspartei Deutschlands – SED) of the GDR. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
Germans are not proud of their divided years. They especially disregard the socialist 
character of the GDR, which left no room for any alternative ideas or lifestyles under 
Soviet rule (Lewis and Zitzlsperger, 2010). To this end, die Linke has been disliked on 
the grounds that it recalls the unpleasant past of Germany. Although this would seem 
irrelevant to WFLR, it has strongly affected the decisions of catalyst MPs from other 
oppositional parties regarding collaboration. For instance, an MEP from the SPD stated 
that: 
Well, the Left is ok, I mean while all the parties even the Greens now are 
questioning how progressive we can be due to the emergence of the AFD, the 
Left party is never doubting that. But they also are a bit conservative in a way. I 
mean they are very very reactionary. And half of the members of the Left are 
from the SED you know the nation party from the GDR. So, I think they are a 
bit dangerous sometimes because they are too extreme. It is very difficult with 
them (GPOL6). 
This attitude of the catalyst MPs from other parties towards die Linke, which resonates 
with HI, goes beyond merely WFLR and chimes with the broader political history of 
Germany and parties’ views on the divided years. This perhaps adds another layer of 
analysis to HI as it exemplifies a situation wherein path dependency combines two 
highly different areas to each other. 
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 All in all, although German and Turkish catalysts have had their own ways of 
contributing to the policy change, they have managed to come together when necessary 
and form what has been described as the ‘velvet triangle’ (Woodward, 2004) referring 
to the cooperation of women’s organisations, academics and female-friendly parliament 
members. Despite the aforementioned efforts of the catalysts in accelerating the 
Europeanisation process, accompanied by a high level of adaptational pressure coming 
from the EU, as already illustrated in Chapter 5, neither Germany nor Turkey exhibits 
‘transformation’, both countries continued showing misfit with the EU. This continued 
misfit stems from the contributions of the antagonists to the process; this chapter will 
address this next.  
7.1.2. Antagonists:  
In both countries, antagonists have had a relatively more powerful position within the 
society, as they were the members of the ruling parties, and NGOs affiliated with the 
ruling party in the case of Turkey. This relatively greater power has enabled antagonists 
to be more successful in shaping the process; compared to catalysts, they are not required 
to seek out as many strategies in the achievement of their aims. 
Capitalising on the government position: 
In the ideal democracy, policy-making involves a number of actors. The party 
institutions are engaged with researching the public needs and demands prior to making 
the law. In better-operating democracies, this goes deeper and NGOs also participate in 
this research process (Hofmeister and Grabow, 2011). However, neither Germany nor 
Turkey generally developed WFLR policies in line with this ideal. While their processes 
of policy-making differ, both Turkish and German antagonists have capitalised on their 
ruling-party position. In so doing, the German government has employed one single 
tactic, whereas the Turkish government has employed two. 
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a) Rapid passage of the laws:  
The antagonist ruling parties of both countries appeared to be bypassing the negotiation 
process and passing laws rapidly. Although this was more the case in Turkey, due to the 
state of emergency, German antagonists also apply the same tactic to a certain degree. 
Rapid passage is arguably highly useful in making new laws, as it leaves no room for 
any alternative ideas. Given that the antagonists support a non-Europeanised WFLR 
model, it is in their interest to pass legislation rapidly without negotiating with 
oppositional parties, who mostly acted as a catalyst in the Europeanisation process of 
this specific policy area. 
 The 2015 Family and Dynamic Population Structure Protection Plan in Turkey 
and the 2012 Homecare Allowance Law in Germany could be given as perfect examples 
of how both governments legalised a familialised initiative. The Plan involved a number 
of ambiguous notions, which Turkish catalysts tried to avoid. Additionally, prior to 
passage of the Plan, the catalysts tried to convince the government to make the Plan 
address the kindergarten issue through obliging local municipalities to provide 
childcare. However, the final version of the Plan, which was passed overnight, lacked 
all the inputs of the catalysts and echoed the antagonists’ policy paradigm:  
There is no negotiation in Turkey anymore, there is no dialogue mechanisms in 
our country anymore. Besides, the process is highly strange now. When there is 
a policy proposal, heaven knows why, it passes all the related commissions 
immediately. I mean the proposal turns into a law over a night, we cannot keep 
up with the pace. Like, what I know is when there is a proposal, there should be 
at least 10 days to work on it, to make the amendments, to hear the objections 
etc. Because policy-making, I mean law-making, they are serious stuff. But we 
never have that time anymore… And even if we have for example, last year when 
the family package was on the agenda, we were discussing perfect we were there 
at least invited this time. So, we pressured for the Kindergarten issue, you know 
the one obliges municipalities to provide a kindergarten and we thought we 
agreed on this but they excluded it, it is not in the package you know (TTU1).   
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By the very same token, the 2012 Homecare Allowance Law was passed in spite of all 
the objections of the German catalysts. Although it took seven years of negotiation 
process, the legalisation of the decision was quick:    
Yes, we and other oppositional parties, we were highly against this law, because 
obviously it is a backlash. Like it is just the opposite of what we have been 
working since the beginning. Of course, we objected but then they remained 
silent for a while and passed it without our consent (GPOL8).  
 The rapid passage of the laws has successfully silenced the oppositional voices 
and allowed the antagonists’ own ideas to dominate the content of the law. From an 
actor-centred perspective, rapidly passing the laws strongly chimes with RCI. 
Antagonists, in order to preserve the domestic WFLR model, have successfully taken 
the advantage of their powerful positions within the society and passed a number of 
familialised WFLR policies. This is a very clear example of the tension between the 
Europeanised WFLR model and antagonists’ understandings of women’s employment 
and motherhood. For them, the gains even of diverging with democratic ideals are 
greater than Europeanising the domestic model.  
b) Turning social dialogue to good account: 
The second tactic affiliated with the capitalising on government position strategy 
appears only in the Turkish case. In Turkey, wherein the AKP government dominates 
the political sphere by holding 317 of the 596 total seats in Turkish Parliament as well 
as through the appointment of particular individuals affiliated with the party as ministers 
(Sözen, 2006), the government appears to be co-opting the social dialogue.      
 Although Turkey has deep-rooted ‘tripartite’ institutions, which are meant to 
ensure the social dialogue, they historically have operated inefficiently (ILO, n.d.). 
Additionally, since the 2011 elections their functioning has been impaired, coinciding 
with the start of AKP’s monopolistic attitude. Ideally, social dialogue is the exchange of 
ideas between the social partners and the government for the good of the society in pre-
 212 
policy-making process (Zihnioğlu, 2013). In Turkey, however, the representatives of the 
social partners in social dialogue appear to have been limited to GONGOs. When 
discussing the operation of the social dialogue with both antagonists and catalysts, a few 
overlapping social partner names were given as representatives of the NGO in those 
social dialogue meetings. These names are seen to belong to those GONGOs and reflect 
the AKP ideology, rather than the civil society, due to their close affiliation with the 
party: 
Of course, there are trade unions and trade unions. You know, obviously trade 
unions that they see distant from themselves such as us can never be involved in 
the process. The government is perfectly carrying out this social dialogue with 
those trade unions that they feel closer. You understand me, those ones, which 
would never ever oppose the government (TTU1).  
 As the key representative of the antagonist camp, in addition to inviting NGOs 
selectively, the AKP misled the social dialogue. A number of catalyst women’s 
organisations and trade union representatives stated that they have been seeing their 
signatures under policy documents which they are completely against. By pretending as 
though there is consensus on a policy proposal from both sides of the social dialogue, 
the antagonists have contributed to the passage of a familialised law:  
I have been telling you since the beginning of this interview, nothing, none of 
the mechanisms are working here. First, we are deleted from the picture, if we 
still manage to be on the picture, if we manage to attend any of those meetings 
of course, we reject the proposal because no need to mention that they are 
awfully Islamist and the whole holy motherhood issue. But then when they 
publish the report, once we see it, we see XXX32 has participated. It was 
approved by the XXX. Well, brother, OK we participated but we objected. We 
did not agree (TTU1). 
Given that it was during the EU accession process that social dialogue mechanisms were 
strengthened in Turkey (Ketola, 2013; Zihnioğlu, 2013), it is likely that antagonists have 
successfully taken the advantage of the Europeanisation process and used it in tandem 
                                               
32 The respondent has mentioned the name of the institution that she belongs to. However, as this thesis 
stated that all the interviews will be anonymous, rather than the name of the institution, ‘XXX’ has been 
put. 
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with their own goals. Referring back to the three forms of NI, the ability to use the 
Europeanisation process itself in order to create a de-Europeanised model, could be 
described as RCI.  
Avoiding responsibility:       
The second strategy in preserving the status quo appears to be avoiding political 
responsibility with respect to WFLR policy-making. In so doing, both Turkish and 
German antagonists utilised two tactics: (a) not responding to catalyst NGOs and (b) 
leaving the WFLR issue under other institutions’ competence.   
a) Not responding to catalyst NGOs: 
Due to increased international attention paid to de-familialised WFLR in general, but to 
childcare in particular, over the last three decades, antagonists from both countries have 
come to acknowledge the fact that an overt refusal would be highly costly for their own 
positions within the societies. Being the ruling party in a climate where the majority of 
women are struggling to balance their work and family lives, antagonist MPs had to 
emphasise the WFLR issue for the continuation of their power. However, the 
conservative mind-set of these antagonists has constrained them from genuinely de-
familialising the WFLR model. To this end, rather than rejecting the lobbyists, 
antagonists have preferred to remain silent and postpone action as much as possible. A 
number of catalyst MPs from both countries, as well as catalyst lobbyists, have 
mentioned that they have never heard an immediate rejection from the government 
during the consultation process of a law. Yet they also added that they have not seen 
action. While discussing the current CSO-government relations in Turkey, the project 
coordinator of a catalyst women’s organisation located in Istanbul mentioned that:     
Well, if you could ever reach AKP deputies, you would never hear a straight no. 
Because MPs would never act as they are disagreeing with you especially in such 
a ‘neutral’ – in inverted commas – as it would be really costly for them. But then 
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would they ever take an action. No. It would be too naive to expect that. While 
we were developing our community-based kindergarten model a number of 
ministers came, we went on investigative visits, they saw the kindergartens and 
everything. They really liked it, they said yes, we need to extend this model and 
so on. But then it has been ten years now that we had this conversation, what has 
changed? Nothing! How many of those kindergartens… we could build maybe 
five or six with our own resources (TNGO10).  
In a similar vein a representative of a women’s organisation mostly engaged with 
lobbying and activism stated:  
The reason why we went back to streets is because the promises made to us are 
not being kept. Yes, we participated into God knows how many meetings with 
the MPs, but here the situation is obvious. They have not done anything that they 
have promised. But maybe they will start keeping their promises next year, at 
the end of the day it is the election year. You know (GNGO5).  
Relying on this attitude of antagonists, it is likely that a greater emphasis placed by the 
EU on WFLR issues and an increased adaptational pressure coming from the EU, 
inspired an interest at the domestic levels and softened the antagonists’ strong 
oppositional ideas. However, in line with Anna Van der Vleuten (2007), who argues that 
the state is the biggest authority in terms of responding to those EU pressures, this 
interest towards WFLR could last only so long. The antagonist governments of both 
countries rationally found ways to maintain their familialised policy paradigm, wherein 
not responding to catalyst NGOs appeared as an effective tactic. 
b) Leaving the WFLR issue under other institutions’ competence:  
Second, both Turkish and German antagonists have preferred to elude responsibility for 
WFLR policy-making. While German actors have remained in favour of Germany’s 
historical multi-actored childcare arrangement, Turkish actors continuously conferred 
the responsibility to different institutions. 
 As discussed in Chapter 5, it is Article 88 of the Labour Code, as well as the 
Article 14 of the 2005 Municipal Code in the Turkish case, and the ways in which the 
TAG and its revised versions were formulated in the German case, that openly freed the 
Turkish and German governments from taking the responsibility for childcare provision. 
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Although the lack of central government involvement in childcare was highly criticised 
by the EU, both Turkish and German antagonists believed in the positive impacts of de-
centralised and localised childcare arrangements. In that sense, a senior politician from 
the CDU/CSU group argued:  
We have a law that we are highly in favour of that says Kindergarten is under 
the responsibility of länder, not the federal government. Therefore, instead of 
trying to change the Basic Law and abolishing the federal nature of Germany 
like some other parties do, we need to accept the responsibility and competence 
of the länder and encourage them to work with enterprises or cooperatives. 
Because we as the CDU/CSU believe that we cannot do everything by law; it 
would be authoritarian and we are a democratic state (GPOL1). 
 However, catalyst actors have had difficulty in believing in the sincerity of the 
antagonists and have openly expressed their scepticism. For catalysts, the reason behind 
antagonists leaving the childcare provision under other institutions’ competence does 
not stem from the benefits of localised childcare arrangements. Instead, it is directly 
related to their reluctance in adopting a Europeanised childcare infrastructure, which 
necessitates a comprehensive and affordable childcare network provided by the national 
governments:    
In order to make things sustainable, there has to be a government policy. I think 
sustainability is the biggest problem in Turkey anyways. Because the 
government distributes the responsibility among various actors. Private 
companies are involved, local governments are involved, NGO is involved. This 
much number of stakeholders means this much different opinions. I mean you 
go and convince the regarding person, once you managed to sign the protocol 
then the person changes. Eh back to basics, the whole story from the beginning 
all over again. Therefore, we need a certain and written government policy, that 
whoever comes needs to follow. But will we ever get that of course, no! Because 
this version suits the government’s book. As they never favoured easing 
women’s labour market participation, they perfectly passed it to private sector 
or to the local governments (TNGO6).  
Referring back to the three forms of NI theory, it is plausible to argue that this strategy 
of antagonists implies a combination of RCI and SI. Both Turkish and German 
antagonists have come to face the fact that they can no longer overlook the WFLR issues; 
their importance and urgency have been acknowledged both at the national and 
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international levels. However, they could allow the actions to be taken only to the extent 
that their conservative ideology permitted. To this end, both the German and Turkish 
antagonists rationally preferred to avoid responsibility either by remaining silent or by 
appointing other institutions.    
Gaining the public consent:   
The final strategy utilised by both German and Turkish antagonists (on the political 
level) has to do with appealing to the public for their sympathy. This strategy has been 
tapped into after the decision regarding the passage of the law is made in order to 
accustom the public to the new law. To this end, both the Turkish and German antagonist 
MPs centred their attention on legitimising the new law by using a relatively more liberal 
language. German antagonists have legitimised the existence of their familialised laws 
through the Wahlfreiheit argument that has been discussed in Chapter 6, whereas 
Turkish antagonists have given fancy names to those new laws. 
The principle of freedom of choice is a much-contested argument in WFLR 
policy-making. It has been argued as a universal right for parents (mostly mothers) to be 
able to choose between continuing their career after the child-birth and staying at home 
to raise their own child (Hakim, 2002). For the realisation of genuine freedom of choice, 
the governments have to provide both the comprehensive and affordable childcare 
infrastructure and the home-care allowances simultaneously (Nyby et al., 2017). 
However, in the German case, the Wahlfreiheit argument appeared to be inadequate and 
token. The German antagonists, mostly the CDU/CSU group, have appealed to this 
argument while refusing to Europeanise the domestic WFLR, particularly while 
introducing the 2012 Homecare Allowance law. Through the relatively liberal and 
progressive tone of the argument, the makers of this policy endeavoured to gain the 
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public consent and aimed the continuation of the familialised paradigm behind the 
WFLR policy-making: 
Choice, it is choice that differentiates us from the GDR, wherein women were 
forced to work. Also, a strong government, thinking about its citizens should 
provide options. So, we will never give up on Wahlfreiheit… Never… (GPOL1).  
 Similarly, Turkish antagonists also legitimised their policy-making paradigm in 
order to prove their modern image. However, rather than using one single argument, 
they preferred giving various names to policies regarding WFLR. Two recent initiatives, 
the Family and Dynamic Population Structure Protection Plan and the Grandmother 
allowances. could be given as clear examples of this strategy. As illustrated in Chapter 
5, the alleged aims of these documents were higher numbers of women active in the 
work sphere, and improved conditions. However, a closer examination of the provisions 
indicates a lack of paradigm-change in both the AKP and the Nationalist Movement 
Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – MHP), the overt supporters of these initiatives. Such 
initiatives induce women to interrupt their careers and push them back into the familial 
sphere, which highly opposes the EU logic of WFLR policy-making. Yet, it is important 
to note that in such a sensitive area, by stressing the importance of family and familial 
relations, the AKP and the MHP managed to spark public sentiment:    
Unfortunately, in Turkey the mind-set is based on ‘pretending’ rather than taking 
real actions. Look at this grandmother allowance project. The government 
announced it as a great solution to childcare problem. But I mean, come on, what 
are you solving with paying 430TL to grandmothers? The solution is allocating 
real money to childcare infrastructure expansion, not giving pocket money to 
grandmothers. But, no the government plays the family card very well with their 
perfect narrative and everybody believes them. Grandmothers think well, we 
have already been raising our grandchildren, now, God save them, they are 
paying us for that. So, what now? Erdogan the hero again! He solved the 
historical childcare problem. But I understand if you go to field, you see the 
poverty. It is at maximum so people need even these little amounts. You call it 
vote-concerns, you call it intelligence but this ‘pretending’ is dangerous, But I 
cannot go any further (TNGO8). 
 In gaining the public sympathy, antagonists greatly need the aid of the media. As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, the media in general, but the print media in particular, 
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is far from homogeneous in both of the selected countries. Therefore, the antagonists 
have collaborated with the Islamic media in Turkey, most of which have business 
contracts with the government, and the rightist media in Germany, which are deemed to 
echo the government tone (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2013; Skiba, 2015). All in all, a number 
of antagonists both from Turkey and Germany have mentioned the positive role of the 
partnerships that they could form with media institutions in informing the public about 
the new laws and expressing their logic behind those laws. 
 From an actor-centred perspective, it makes sense to link this last tactic of 
antagonists to both RCI and SI. Antagonists from both countries were highly aware of 
the fact that they need the public’s consent for the continuation of familialised WFLR 
policy-making as well as for their implementation. To this end, they have rationally 
worked to gain the public sympathy which required a number of collaborations. A closer 
examination of the process of forming those partnerships indicates that they have been 
made on the basis of shared norms and values, which chimes with SI. Additionally, it is 
also plausible to relate German antagonists’ appeal to the freedom of choice argument 
to HI, because another of their reasons for supporting a home-based childcare was to 
make a radical break with the socialist/communist past of the GDR. The CDU/CSU 
members preferred to obliterate the traces of the divided years of Germany on the 
grounds of feeling guilt. Thus, in line with the HI yet in a reactionary fashion, they have 
maintained familialised WFLR policy-making.   
7.2. Barriers faced by domestic actors:  
Throughout the processes of Europeanising German and Turkish WFLR models, both 
the catalysts and antagonists, alongside the immediate difficulties emerged in the 
establishment of partnerships, have come to face an additional number of barriers 
leading to reduced impact of their efforts on the process. These barriers, like the 
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strategies used, showed some differences between catalysts and antagonists. Therefore, 
they have been discussed separately and the chapter proceeds with the catalysts. 
7.2.1. Catalysts:  
In the achievement of a Europeanised WFLR model, both Turkish and German catalysts 
have faced a number of barriers. It is highly important to note that these barriers mostly 
were of relevance to WFLR and none of them were in common. Therefore, this section 
discussing the barriers faced by catalysts is structured differently than the previous 
section. Given that these barriers are country-specific, the section is structured on the 
basis of countries, rather than themes. 
Turkey:   
Turkish catalysts have faced three major barriers. These are the Syrian War; the 
constitutional referendum; and the legacy of Ataturk’s reforms and his Kemalist 
ideology. It is important to note that none of them has any direct impact on WFLR 
policy-making. However, catalysts mentioned each of them as an important challenge, 
which considerably slowed catalyst efforts at Europeanisation. The indirect impact of 
these country-specific incidents is worth discussing because they clearly show how the 
Europeanisation pattern of a country is shaped by the domestic dynamics of the day and 
solidify the main argument of this thesis: Europeanisation is an uneven, reciprocal and 
context-dependent process. 
a) The Syrian war:  
Since 2011, there has been an ongoing armed conflict in Syria, which has had a number 
of severe impacts all around the world. Like any other war, the Syrian war has created 
wretched conditions. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights’ latest 
data, 33,425 Syrians have lost their lives since the start of the war (Syriarhr, 2017). On 
top of these impacts, more than five million people have fled from their country and 
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sought asylum and humanity from other countries, the ‘refugee crisis’. Due to Syria’s 
geographical location, it is Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey who have had to welcome the 
majority of those Syrian refugees, who did not even have access to adequate drinking 
water (BBC, 2016). Under these circumstances, the Turkish government implemented 
an ‘open door policy’ and Turkey has welcomed 3,523,981 war victims (UNHR, 2018).  
 Although the majority of Turkish population, out of humanity, have supported 
the refugees, it was the Turkish NGOs who ‘took the first initiative to establish a safe 
haven for those fleeing from an oppressive regime’, in the words of Shady Zahed (2017). 
To this end, Turkish NGOs quickly came together and provided a wide variety of 
supports, ranging from establishing Temporary Education Centres to providing sexual 
health services to war victims. Although this was the attitude that would be expected 
from a neighbouring country’s civil society, a number of women’s organisation 
representatives interviewed reported that it impaired their Europeanisation activities in 
Turkey. Neither the Turkish government nor the Turkish NGOs were prepared to 
welcome such a large number of refugees, and international aid organisations were also 
caught off-guard, as Zahed (2017) observes. In the absence of the physical resources to 
revive Syrian refugees, the action had to be made by a number of Turkish grassroots 
groups and various NGOs, even those not necessarily affiliated with formal 
humanitarian bodies. In that sense, Turkish NGOs working in various fields, including 
LGBTI rights, women’s rights, children’s rights and many more, have come to be 
assisting Syrian refugees in Turkey. This in the end withheld catalyst women’s 
organisations from maintaining their own agenda. Due to the overwhelming job of 
providing for the social re-inclusion of Syrian refugees, women’s organisations which 
originally engaged with female employment have had to shift their focus, resulting in 
the disruption of the female employment activities: 
 221 
You know the registered number of Syrians living in Turkey now is more than 4 
million and with the unregistered ones, I assume it easily is around 6 to 7 million. 
Ehh, since Erdogan is doing nothing other than corrupting the funding coming 
from the EU, it is us again showing solidarity to them and sorting this situation 
out. So, I need to admit that other subjects including WFLR have been sidelined. 
Particularly our organisation, we still are focusing on female employment and 
only collaborating with the refugees, so for us this whole refugee issue I need to 
say left us alone. We cannot find the support that we need from other 
organisations because they are crazy busy, you know. So, I am not blaming them 
but the government (TNGO14).  
This unintentional focus shift among Turkish catalyst organisations served as a barrier, 
threatening to shelve the Europeanisation of the Turkish WFLR model.   
 Additionally, as mentioned by a number of interviewees, there are several 
women’s organisations which have gradually begun to use the severe conditions of the 
refugees to their own advantage. In the ensuing years since Turkey’s absorption of a 
massive number of Syrians, many international funding donors have offered funding 
opportunities to Turkish CSOs which provide material assistance to Syrian refugees or 
advocate for their rights (such as equal access to education, health and the labour 
market). While the main donor appears to be the EU, who have contracted €1.4 billion 
to be used for meeting the basic needs of the most vulnerable refugees under the 
Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN), a social assistance scheme (EC, 2018), the UN 
and various other international organisations have also agreed to support Turkish CSOs 
in this humanitarian job. Accordingly, some Turkish women’s organisations are 
purposely focusing on refugees, even if humanitarian aid has never been their central 
focus, just for the sake of the increased funding opportunities.  
 Shifting focus as a response to an additional funding-channel has been highly 
criticised by some other women’s organisations, who have remained loyal to their 
original activities. They object to the ‘sectorising’ and ‘marketising’ of the CSOs 
(TNGO8) and argued that it is slowing progress: 
Now, for example, the new trend is these international bodies investing in the 
southern regions. At the beginning it was the humanitarian aid and of course, it 
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was ok, I understand we had to look after those people. We needed to feed them, 
we needed to cure them and everything. But now things have changed. It has 
completely turned into a market. All these international organisations are coming 
here to invest in the refugees, for their re-inclusion, because they know that these 
people will end up in their countries and of course, they prefer them in a better 
shape. And our NGOs here, they are cooperating with these international 
organisations because it is a great source of income. Civil society lost its spirit 
now. That is what I would say. It is sectorising day by day…’ (TNGO8).  
 A similar attitude towards the NGOs is documented by Ketola (2013). During 
the early 2000s, in response to expanded project funding, a number of Turkish NGOs 
began to provide project preparation assistance; Ketola calls them ‘Broker NGOs’ 
(2013:146). The ability of Turkish NGOs to adopt new roles according to changing 
conditions and new opportunities shows how NGOs can become distant from the 
normative aspects of being an NGO and make decisions on the basis of utility 
maximisation. Referring back to three forms of NI, this intentional focus shift clearly 
recalls RCI, whereas the unintentional one strongly resonates with SI. This is because 
women’s organisations have perceived more gain in emphasizing aid to refugees than in 
maintaining their original area of interest. On the other hand, the unintentional shift in 
the foci of the women’s organisations relates to their understanding of being a 
representative of civil society. They have refocused on an issue which requires urgent 
action as the ‘right thing to do’, thus they have acted on the basis of their social norms 
and values, which fits the definition of SI.  
b) The constitutional referendum: 
Alongside the so-called refugee crisis, the recent political climate in Turkey also has 
constrained Turkish catalysts’ efforts to Europeanise. As mentioned in Chapter 1 (see 
Footnote 2), on the 15th of July in 2016, a faction within the Turkish Armed Forces 
attempted to take over the government. After the failure of the coup, the Turkish 
government announced that Turkey would hold a constitutional referendum on the 16th 
April in 2017; the referendum would decide whether to amend the Turkish constitution 
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on the basis of new proposals made mostly by the AKP and MHP (Economist, 2017). 
Like the Syrian war, although the referendum was not of explicit relevance to the process 
of Europeanising Turkish WFLR model, it successfully restrained catalysts’ activities. 
 The proposed amendments to the Turkish constitution posed a great challenge to 
the democratic and secular character of the Turkish Republic. They included the 
abolishment of the office of the Prime Minister; replacement of the existing 
parliamentary system of government with an executive presidency and a presidential 
system; and increased authority to the president in terms of appointments to the Supreme 
Board of Judges and Prosecutors (Hacaoglu and Kozok, 2017). Turkish CSOs, including 
the women’s organisations, dropped everything and gave an incredible amount of 
attention to anti-referendum campaigns. As was the case in aiding Syrian refugees, here 
again catalyst women’s organisations had to have a focus shift. Organisations meant to 
be working for advanced WFLR policies or increased female employment turned to 
raising public awareness on how the constitution change would impair women’s already 
suppressed positions in Turkey. Although this referendum was argued to be a matter of 
life and death, and the contribution of the NGOs was very important, it has also sidelined 
WFLR Europeanisation. 
c) Legacy of Ataturk’s reforms and his Kemalist ideology: 
The final barrier to Turkish catalysts, chiming with the HI, is Ataturk’s set of reforms 
and his Kemalist ideology that introduced ‘State Feminism’ to Turkey.  
 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, modernising and Westernising Turkey was 
the cornerstone of Kemalist ideology. Women’s rights issues have occupied an 
incredible space in this modernising and Westernising process (Ketola, 2013). In the 
provision of a number of rights to women, the Kemalist elite leap-frogged a particular 
group sustaining their lives in line with religious practices (Findley, 2010). Today, the 
feminist members of those pious groups have come to be the founders and 
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representatives of the so-called GONGOs. Holding that past grudge, these GONGOs, 
who today represent the CSO in social dialogue meetings, did not hesitate to overlook 
the catalyst women’s organisations. GONGOs, who are very close to the government 
and hold the potential to shape government decisions with respect to content and passage 
of the laws, preferred not to collaborate with the catalyst organisations. Given that they 
believe in familialised WFLR, they hesitate to convey the catalysts’ messages to the 
government on the occasions that catalyst organisations are not invited to the table, 
Turkey remains highly de-Europeanised in this specific policy area: 
Well, very easy, we are not invited to any social dialogue meeting any more… 
since they have their own CSOs, whom I call ‘democratic mass organisations’, 
we are completely deleted from the picture. But of course, we did not give up, 
this time we tried to somehow appeal to these democratic mass organisations 
hoping that maybe we can persuade them so that they can lobby the government 
but nothing! Nothing, they hate us, still even if they have their headscarf, right 
now they still are bringing the same old story and saying since you left us alone, 
since you ignored us, since you tortured our souls whatever, now we are not 
helping you… but joking aside, this costs a lot to us (TNGO6). 
The very early years of the Turkish Republic appeared as a great barrier to catalysts a 
century later, which clearly suggests an HI argument in a reactionary fashion.   
Germany:  
In the Europeanisation process of German WFLR, catalysts have faced two key barriers. 
These were the backlash regarding gender equality issues at the EU; and the SPD’s role 
in the Grand Coalition33. Unlike the Turkish case, the barriers faced by German catalysts 
(particularly the first one) are relevant to the WFLR policy area itself. As further 
discussed below, this is likely to stem from a relatively more stable political climate in 
Germany, as Europeanisation is a process filtered by domestic political dynamics. 
a) Gender equality backlash at the EU:  
                                               
33 Grand Coalition refers to the ruling coalition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD in the German 
Bundestag.  
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As discussed in Chapter 4, by the second half of the 2000s, WFLR policies were no 
longer an EU priority that is, until 2014, when they were reprioritised. Yet, meanwhile, 
the number of corresponding initiatives has been reduced. This creates a great barrier to 
German catalysts as the external pressure has diminished. There has been less scrutiny 
by the EU and German antagonists have taken maximum advantage of this, passing a 
number of familialised WFLR policies. The 2012 Homecare Allowance Law, which 
provided monthly €150 to parents (mostly to mothers), who do not put their children 
into crèches and care for them at home until the child turns into three, is an example of 
this. Although the law has been criticised by the EU in the ensuing years, German 
antagonists have successfully discouraged German mothers from paid employment 
under this climate:     
In 1990s, things were all very good. But since then I must say things have been 
stilled completely at the EU. And I think it was part of the broader context of 
backlash and gender equality in Europe there is a stagnation at the moment. And 
nothing is really going forward and this includes reconciliation as well as you 
already know. This brought kind of a freedom to Germany and we saw a bigger 
backlash than the backlash at the EU. Opposition parties and civil society lost 
the solid ground that they used to base their arguments on and the result is a 
couple of laws passed, which we now trying to abolish (GNGO7).     
 One aim of this thesis is to compare the ways in which Europeanisation operates 
in a member and in a candidate state. So far, the differences between Germany and 
Turkey in terms of their relation with the EU did not play a major role in the operation 
of Europeanisation. As both countries showed a salient misfit with the EU, they both 
received a similar level of adaptational pressure. Yet, the negative impact of the backlash 
at the EU on German catalysts’ actions shows how the EU has a more immediate impact 
on its member states, through its sanctions in the cases of non-adaptation. This chimes 
with the governance by hierarchy argument, which refers to member states’ obligation 
to download the EU initiatives into their own legislative frameworks. Relatively less 
emphasis on WFLR at the EU level resonated in the German context and significantly 
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decelerated Germany’s Europeanisation process. It concomitantly appeared as an 
important barrier to German catalysts both from the governmental and nongovernmental 
levels. 
b) The SPD’s role in the Grand Coalition:  
Last but not least, the SPD being the small partner in the Grand Coalition and thus being 
less powerful than the CDU/CSU in decision-making, appears to be another factor 
constraining the German catalysts – both the SPD itself and other catalyst actors34. 
 Despite the aforementioned traditional voices within the SPD, who are in favour 
of a familialised WFLR model, the SPD as a party is in favour of de-familialised WFLR 
and thus supports the process of Europeanising the German model. To this end, members 
of the party have supported the NGOs, developed a number of alternative Europeanised 
WFLR models with the NGOs and carried them to the Bundestag as a policy proposal. 
However, those models initiated by the SPD have often been attacked by their antagonist 
coalition partner CDU/CSU:  
We have done everything we can with the conservatives within the coalition… 
so, I think the enemy is within the government... They either stop things or delay 
their passage… The coalition is not equal, they are stronger than us. I mean, they 
have more seats so when they say no then it is a no (GPOL7).  
 The belated passage of the Wage Transparency Act (Entgelttransparenzgesetz) 
provides a recent example of how the SPD is stopped by the CDU. The very progressive 
family minister Manuela Schwesig from SPD, who is determined to increase fathers’ 
involvement in childcare, found the gender pay gap to be the biggest reason for unequal 
distribution of parental leave. She believed that if fathers and mothers had the same 
income, fathers would be more eager to take parental leave and engage more with 
                                               
34 It is important to note that in the aftermath of the 2017 general elections in Germany, the SPD leader 
Martin Schulz had strongly been against to renewing the coalition agreement. Yet, during most of the 
process of Europeanising German WFLR model (2005-2017), the SPD was the coalition partner, which 
highly impaired catalysts’ actions.   
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childcare. Accordingly, she wanted to pass an Act which would provide employees the 
right to know what colleagues in similar jobs are paid. Although Ms. Schwesig had been 
working on this law since the summer of 2015, the Act would come into force only in 
January 2018 (GA1, GA2). This delay in the passage of the law stems from the 
CDU/CSU group’s reluctance: 
This latest law was again an SPD initiative. OK, it is fine now, the law just passed 
but I mean, it should not take three years for a law as useful as this to pass. Of 
course, it has been cut by the CDU in the negotiation process within the coalition 
and I strongly believe they would never allow us to pass this law if Schulz was 
not this clear in the coalition discussions. Merkel was kind of hopeless so that 
she convinced her party to pass this law (GPOL7).  
 This approach – delaying the passage of the law – is one of the most common 
strategies used by the antagonists of both countries. Here, an antagonist strategy 
appeared to be a barrier on catalysts and saliently assuaged their actions. In line with 
what process tracing has suggested, the actions of each actor groups have had an 
opposing impact on the other one.  
 All in all, throughout the process of Europeanising the domestic models, German 
and Turkish catalysts have faced various barriers resulting in passage of familialised 
WFLR measures and continuous misfit with the EU standards. While, surprisingly, the 
barriers faced by German catalysts have brought an immediate de-Europeanisation – 
exemplified with the 2012 Homecare Allowance Law – the barriers faced by Turkish 
catalysts restrained their actions and concomitantly slowed the Europeanisation process 
down. Although being far fewer in number and far less effective, antagonists also face 
a number of barriers when working for the status quo, to which the chapter now turns. 
7.2.2. Antagonists:  
The antagonists in both countries appeared to be more powerful compared to catalysts. 
Yet that is not to say that they have not faced any barriers in decelerating the processes 
of Europeanising German and Turkish WFLR models – like the catalysts, antagonists 
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have also faced a number of barriers. While the progressive voices within the antagonist 
political parties appear to be a key barrier faced by both Turkish and German 
antagonists, Turkish antagonists have also had to overcome the relatively relaxed 
climate within the Islamist circles in Turkey in the aftermath of the 2007 general 
elections.  
Progressive voices within the antagonist parties: 
As discussed in Chapter 6, political parties from the antagonist camp in Germany are far 
from homogenous. This is also the case for the key agents of the Turkish antagonist 
camp. The CDU/CSU, the AKP and the MHP harbour a number of MPs who are 
relatively more open to an Europeanised WFLR model. Although fewer in Turkey than 
in Germany, the existence of these MPs, who are more open to Europeanisation of 
domestic WFL, has successfully fettered antagonists. 
 The former Family Minister and current Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen; 
the Chancellor Angela Merkel in Germany; the former Family Minister and current 
Gaziantep35 Mayor Fatma Sahin; and MHP deputy Deniz Depboylu, who also is a 
current board member of the Committee on Equality of Opportunity for Women and 
Men, are mentioned by a number of interview partners to have relatively more modern 
and Europeanised views on WFLR than the other members of their parties.  
A combination of the interviews conducted under the scope of this thesis and the 
related literature has evidenced that the CDU/CSU underwent a modernisation process 
under Merkel (Williarty, 2010). Merkel’s open-minded personality, perhaps originating 
from her childhood in the former GDR (GA1), accompanied by the equally open-minded 
and strong family minister Ursula von der Leyen, empowered the progressive CDU 
cadre: 
                                               
35 A city located in the western part of Turkey's South Eastern Anatolia Region. 
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There are many contradictions in Germany. For example, the strongest family 
ministers were always from the CDU and also Merkel, she is also in the wrong 
party. They put CDU/CSU in a bit ambivalent position in terms of their views 
on gender. I know Ursula von der Leyen personally, I worked with her in Berlin, 
when she was the family minister. She was a very strong person, she even 
managed to convince the Bavarian politicians with her way of arguing and giving 
speeches. But she also had the support of Merkel. This was crucial too. Third 
argument, she was very close to feminist organisations and trade unions. So, she 
had the support of both Merkel and CSO. With all these, she did a lot, I would 
say. Sometimes even more than so-called leftist parties (GA1).  
 This empowered intra-party group, also backed by the catalyst oppositional 
parties and the NGOs, have taken considerable steps in Europeanising the German 
WFLR model, which has impaired antagonists’ plans. These include first and foremost 
the establishment of the European Alliance for Families, which was directly von der 
Leyen’s initiative; the seven-year delay in the passage of the 2012 Homecare Allowance 
Law; the new maternity leave scheme introduced in 2007; additional funding through 
the Day-care Facility Expansion Act of 2007; and the Child Promotion Act, which came 
into power in 2008.  
 By the very same token, the reform of the Civil Servant Code in 2011 and the 
10th Development Plan, which brought the first paid paternity leave to male public 
sector workers and increased the target for pre-school enrolment rate, respectively, have 
been credited to Fatma Sahin’s efforts while she was serving her term as Family 
Minister. Moreover, the representatives of various women’s organisations have 
mentioned the convenience of approaching the AKP either for interpellation or lobbying 
during Sahin’s tenure. On the other hand, due to the low number of seats that the MHP 
owns in the TBMM, Deniz Depboylu could only contribute to other oppositional parties’ 
and NGOs’ activities, rather than bringing about legislative changes:  
Believe it or not, it is not the whole AKP that supports the holy motherhood. 
Yes, the significant majority is in favour of stay-home mothers, whom I call the 
‘holy family-supporters’, but there are also some few, who are maybe not in 
favour of equal distribution of care and work but are OK with the idea of women 
in the labour market. Fatma Sahin, whom was exiled to Gaziantep now, she was 
amazing. During her Family Ministry, we were able to talk to the AKP, those 
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visits to our kindergarten model were all thanks to Fatma Sahin. She was very 
interesting, she was very good with women’s organisations and everything. Also, 
there is a very intelligent and very modern woman in the MHP. She is also trying 
to collaborate with us as much as possible (TNGO9). 
 This lack of systematisation, which increases the importance of individuals’ 
opinions in decision-making, is one of the major difficulties that catalysts have faced in 
both countries while accelerating the Europeanisation processes. Yet, this time, the very 
same non-systematisation benefitted the catalysts but impaired the antagonists. A 
number of individuals from the political parties of the antagonist camp have held 
different ideas than their antagonist colleagues, more similar to those of catalysts. Their 
relatively less strong stance against Europeanising the domestic WFLR models, 
eventually led them to be involved in a number of activities that would accelerate the 
process rather than decelerating it, which resonates with SI. In the absence of shared 
norms and values with other antagonists, these MPs are more open to Europeanisation, 
even though they belong to the cornerstone antagonist parties and refused to take part in 
actions aiming to maintain the status quo with respect to WFLR.    
The relatively relaxed climate within the Islamist circles in Turkey: 
The 2007 general elections brought success to the AKP one more time as the party 
increased its votes from 34.4% to 46.5%, which was deemed to bring a relatively more 
relaxed climate to the Islamist circles in Turkey (TNGO4, TNGO5).  
 A number of interviewees from the GONGOs criticised their colleagues for 
losing their enthusiasm, which perhaps did not directly contribute to the Europeanisation 
process, but indirectly did so by benefitting the catalysts. While the GONGOs were 
enjoying the rights given to Islamist women, the catalyst women’s organisations 
continued their activities, which eventually constrained the antagonists by creating some 
difficulties for collaboration. As collaboration is sine qua non for NGOs, GONGOs who 
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lost the support of their counterparts had to decrease the number and extent of their 
activities, while the catalysts continued full blast:  
When Islamists came to power, we faced a dash actually. Because when the 
Kemalist regime, in inverted commas, was in power, Islamist circles, in order to 
bring themselves into being, were collaborating way better than this. Especially 
until the resolution of this headscarf issue, we were way stronger, way braver 
and way more hardworking than this. But now, everybody is in this weird relaxed 
attitude. Others, who are not relaxed, they kept their hands off the civil society 
and started practising their own profession, which they were not able to before 
the headscarf freedom. So, here we need partners, we need volunteers and we 
need enthusiasm (TNGO5).      
 From an actor-centred perspective, it is possible to link this attitude of Islamist 
women to RCI. Under relatively more restricted circumstances, a higher number of 
Islamist people engaged with NGOs and worked for their freedom. After gaining a 
number of rights and witnessing the AKP’s second electoral victory, a party which they 
see as their own political voice, the number of these people and the level of their 
enthusiasm has considerably reduced. It is plausible to argue that this allowed the 
catalyst NGOs to be more effective, and thus assuaged the process of vetoing 
Europeanisation.   
7.3. Conclusion:  
This chapter has sought to illustrate the contributions of the domestic actors to the 
process of Europeanising the national WFLR models, together with the barriers that they 
have faced while catalysing or vetoing the process. Analysis of domestic actors’ roles 
throughout the process reveals that catalysts and antagonists have tapped into different 
strategies, formed different collaborations and faced different barriers in either 
catalysing or vetoing the process. Furthermore, this chapter also found a difference in 
terms of the employment of strategy among countries, which has been referred to as 
tactics. Due to domestic socio-political dynamics, German domestic actors and Turkish 
domestic actors employed the similar strategy in a significantly different way. This 
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eventually shows how the Europeanisation process of a country is shaped in practice by 
the existence of domestic actors and the time present conditions of a country.     
 Although the ways in which domestic actors perceived the Europeanisation of 
WFLR was mostly shaped by SI, RCI dominated their inputs to the process. Yet that is 
not to say that domestic actors acted completely rationally, because their shared norms 
and values played a salient role in the formation of partnerships. This solidifies the 
observation made in the previous chapter that the three different forms of NI are not 
exclusive. They might simultaneously appear as the motivation of an actor. This finding, 
accompanied by the findings of the previous chapter, demonstrates that theories which 
explain the Europeanisation process from an actor-centred perspective might consider a 
new form of NI or might develop an interpretation of the existing forms to an extent that 
would take this finding into account. In other words, the three forms of NI are highly 
intertwined. Domestic actors’ historical roots play an important role in the formation of 
their social norms and values. Moreover, even if domestic actors are aiming at utility 
maximisation, they continue to take their social norms and values into account. 
Therefore, a new form of NI or a different interpretation of the existing forms might 
refer to simultaneous existence of these three forms, which at the end could be useful in 
explaining this tangled situation.    
 The initial aim of explaining the process from an actor-centred perspective was 
to uncover the most important factor behind the Europeanisation pattern. This chapter 
has found that in both countries it was the antagonists that faced fewer barriers compared 
to catalysts and they could easily overcome those barriers. This in the end appeared to 
have a bigger influence on the policy outcome, which perhaps explains the contradictory 
Europeanisation processes that both Turkey and Germany underwent. It is plausible to 
link this larger influence of the antagonists to their more powerful position in terms of 
decision-making, compared to catalysts. This finding adds another layer to the actor-
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centred theoretical framework: that, alongside the existence and number of catalysts or 
the antagonists, their positions (whether they are from the ruling party, working in an 
NGO close to the ruling party or are from the oppositional parties) within the societies 
greatly matter in shaping the outcome of the Europeanisation process. 
 Having explained the ways in which domestic actors have perceived and 
contributed to the process of Europeanising the national WFLR models, the following 
chapter will turn to the last phase of the Europeanisation process, and the extent to which 
the EU model of reconciling work and family lives has been practised by the German 
and Turkish citizens. 
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CHAPTER 8. SOCIETAL EUROPEANISATION:  
Having explained the WFLR policy development in Turkey and Germany under the EU 
influence, this final empirical chapter turns to assess the implementation of those 
policies. More precisely, it questions why and to what extent the EU model of 
reconciling work and family lives has been practised by German and Turkish public. 
 The chapter, begins with a discussion of the changing WFLR trends in the 
selected countries between 2000 and 2017. After presenting the current WFLR trends in 
each country, the chapter proceeds with the illustration of the reasons behind those daily 
work and family life reconciliation practices. It is important to highlight here that even 
though each Europeanised WFLR experience at the domestic level is a contribution to 
the process, individuals who practise the European trend are not referred to as ‘catalysts’ 
in this chapter. By the same token, individuals who preserved the national trends in terms 
of WFLR have not been considered as antagonists. Instead, they practise the EU 
reconciliation trend or maintain the domestic trend, highly related with the potential 
social learning. A number of notable Europeanisation scholars have already put forward 
that if domestic societal actors have been socialised throughout the process, they have 
come to practise the EU model (Diez et al., 2005). Relying on the literature on soft-
Europeanisation (see page: 40), individuals who have combined their work and family 
lives in de-familialised ways, in this chapter are called the ‘thick learners’ and the ones 
who have remained committed to the previous domestic model are called the ‘thin 
learners’. Having explained the main rationale behind domestic actors’ WFLR trends, 
the chapter concludes by discussing the level of execution of EU norms and values 
regarding WFLR practices at domestic levels.    
 Observations made in this study have revealed that, in both countries, a number 
of thick learner families co-exist with other thin learner families. Due to the actor-
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centred approach of the thesis, particular attention has been given to reasons behind 
these domestic practices, rather than focusing on the statistics. In so doing, neither the 
EU, nor the EU’s greater involvement in this specific policy area, has appeared as a push 
factor. Instead, the economic necessity of women’s active labour market participation, 
their career aspirations, parents’ good education desires for their children, and changing 
fatherhood trends have encouraged German and Turkish citizens to Europeanise their 
WFLR habits. On the other hand, existing generous familialised incentives, fear of 
assimilation, domestic societal actors’ disapprobation of existing WFLR services, the 
high gender pay-gap, fear of stigmatisation, and women’s status ambitions have 
appeared to be discouraging societal actors from Europeanising their daily practices. As 
discussed below, domestic societal actors mostly make their decisions on how to 
reconcile their work and family lives on the basis of rational cost-benefit calculations, 
which once again highlights the importance of domestic socio-political and socio-
economic dynamics on the Europeanisation outcome.  
8.1. Work and family life reconciliation trends at domestic levels: 
Both countries have appeared to be highly heterogeneous in terms of WFLR patterns. A 
voluminous body of research has demonstrated that there are major disparities among 
individuals in each country with respect to their WFLR practices (Hansen and Hawkes, 
2009; Kakıcı et al., 2007; Schöber and Stahl, 2014; Unterhofer and Wrohlich, 2017). In 
both countries, although the number of families who have come to be practising a 
relatively more Europeanised model of WFLR has increased over the last decade, the 
number of families maintaining the traditional pattern also remained significantly high. 
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 The official statistics evidenced a 9 percent increase in women’s labour market 
participation in Turkey and a 4.3 percent increase in Germany over the last decade36. 
These ascendant numbers regarding women’s employment, together with the increase 
in the number of families using non-familial public childcare facilities37 and the increase 
in the number of fathers taking relatively longer parental leaves (only in Germany) 
demonstrate a societal Europeanisation fringe in each country. However, simultaneous 
strong consensus on the argument ‘women should first focus on their family and then 
their career’ (GA1, GA2, GNGO7, GNGO2) in Germany and on the argument ‘men 
make houses, women make homes’ (TA1, TNGO7, TNGO9) in Turkey dilutes the de-
familialisation impact of the Europeanisation process at the societal level and leads to 
the aforementioned disparities. The current WFLR practices, therefore are highly 
tangled in both countries, to the extent that it is almost impossible to make a sharp 
distinction between families who have aligned their WFLR routines with the EU and 
families who have not. Given the complexity of the situation, there has been a large body 
of literature focusing on WFLR practices in general; fathers’ parental leave usage trends; 
families’ childcare preferences; and the division of labour within households in 
particular (Geisler and Kreyenfeld, 2011; Ray et al., 2010; Günay and Bener, 2011; 
Gündüz-Hosgör and Smits, 2006; Tanaka, 2005). Analysts found that age, education and 
                                               
36 Female employment rate increased from 23.3% in 2005 to 32.3% in 2017 in Turkey (Retrieved from: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS?locations=TR) and from 50.7% in 2005 to 
55% in 2017 (Retrieved from: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS?locations=DE).     
37 The childcare enrolment rate in Germany increased from 6.5% for children below age 3 in 2005 to 
18.3% in 2016 and increased from 22.1% for children between ages 3 and 6 in 2006 to 44.8% in 2016 
(Retrieved from: https://github.com/gut-leben-in- 
deutschland/bericht/blob/master/content/04/02/preschool.csv). On the other hand, it only increased from 
just below 10% for children between ages 3 and 5 in 2006 to 33.3% in 2016 (Retrieved from: 
http://www.egitimpedia.com/turkiyede-erken-cocukluk-egitimi/) and increased from just above 20% for 
children between ages 4 and 5 to 43.5% in 2016 in Turkey. Yet there is a lack of official statistics for 
Turkish children below age 3 (Retrieved from: http://www.egitimreformugirisimi.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/ERG_EİR_2015-16.pdf).    
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marital status are the key determinants in shaping the WFLR practices in both countries 
(Geisler and Kreyenfeld, 2011; Günay and Bener, 2011; Schöber, 2014).  
 While older parents still prefer to reconcile their work and family lives on a 
traditional basis, most of the younger couples practise a dual-earner/dual-worker family 
model. Younger couples are more likely to use non-familial care, compared to older 
generations in both countries (Günay and Bener, 2011; Schöber and Spiess, 2015). In a 
similar vein, Geisler and Kreyenfeld’s research on German fathers’ parental leave usage 
found that younger fathers have gradually started to take longer parental leaves, which 
contributes to their involvement in childcare. Although there is a huge gap in the 
literature on Turkish fathers’ use of parental leave, a number of interview partners from 
women’s organisations argue that even if Turkish fathers have gradually begun to take 
more part in their children’s lives, they still do not consider taking parental leaves. 
 Moreover, Schöber (2014) and Uraz et al. (2010) have pointed to education as 
an important determinant in individuals’ decisions about the ways in which they 
combine their work lives with their family lives. In both countries, parents with 
university degrees share both the employment and household responsibilities more 
equally in comparison to parents without university degrees. While university graduated 
mothers appeared to be returning to their positions quicker than non-university 
graduated mothers, German fathers holding a university diploma appeared to be taking 
longer parental leaves. The likelihood of sending children into day-care places is also 
higher among university graduated parents than the parents without university degree. 
 Finally, in both countries, research has shown that single parents (be it mothers 
or fathers) are the ones who have the most need of the EU way of work and family life 
reconciliation (Günay and Bener, 2011; Schöber and Stahl, 2014). Building on the 
previous research, this study further argues that, alongside the aforementioned factors, 
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a number of rationally-, sociologically- and historically-driven reasons have also played 
important roles in domestic societal actors’ WFLR decisions. 
8.2. Main reasons behind societal actors’ WFLR practices: 
Practising the EU standards in terms of WFLR has been considered the last step of the 
process of Europeanising the domestic model, which happens after the relevant laws 
have been transferred into the domestic legislation. Since this very last step of the 
process concerns the daily practices in Turkey and Germany, its actors are German and 
Turkish citizens who have a work and a family life to be combined. 
 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, these societal actors, who have a work and 
a family life that needs to be reconciled on a daily basis, are not the direct contributors 
of the process. That is to say that the ways in which they reconcile their work and family 
lives do not have an accelerating or decelerating impact on the process of Europeanising 
the domestic model. Therefore, domestic actors of the societal Europeanisation process 
have been categorised as thick learners and thin learners, wherein the former group 
refers to individuals who have aligned their WFLR routines with the EU, and the latter 
to individuals who have preferred to maintain the domestic model.  
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Figure 8.1: Key reasons behind domestic societal actors’ WFLR practices.   
 As can be seen from 
Figure 8.1. on the left, 
individuals from each 
group had different 
reasons for practising or 
not practising the EU 
standards at the national 
level. This chapter 
analyses WFLR habits of 
the thick learners and thin 
learners separately.  
 
8.2.1. WFLR practices of thick learners:   
Although it is hard to link the Europeanised WFLR habits of the thick learners directly 
to the EU, a significant number of families in both countries have come to be living 
under the de-familialised WFLR practices. Notable academics specialising in gender 
equality and women’s employment, together with a number of women’s organisation 
representatives engaged with research rather than advocacy or WFLR service provision, 
and interviewed under the scope of this research, have pointed to four key reasons behind 
German and Turkish citizens’ more Europeanised WFLR practices.   
Necessity for Europeanised WFLR: 
The first reason why a number of German and Turkish citizens have come to practise 
























the increased necessity for non-familial care arrangements. In the first quarter of the 
twentieth century, the number of people who do not necessarily choose but need to 
maintain European-wise childcare practices has increased more in Germany but also in 
Turkey due to a consolidation of several overlapping but also differing factors. 
a) Economic necessity:  
A significant number of interviewees mention that the difficulty of sustaining a living 
on a single wage has contributed to internalisation of the EU way of WFLR in both de-
industrialised Germany and Turkey.  
 Although the economists cite the German economy as one of the strongest in 
Europe, an increasing gap between income and prices, stemming from a wage restraint 
in the last decade, has also been noted (Economist, 2014). In a similar vein, the 
stubbornly increasing inflation in Turkey (Nichols and Sugur, 1996), has created severe 
conditions for Turkish families trying to make their livings through one income. 
Therefore, in both countries, a number of families need to employ dual earner or at least 
one-and-a-half earner family models for their survival. Women’s engagement with full-
time employment, or even part-time employment, on the other hand, meant that they 
would not be able to be the full-time child-minders any more. This in the end induced 
families to seek non-familial care alternatives. While German families have turned their 
faces to public day-care centres, Turkish women took some other alternatives into 
account and relied on close relatives, close neighbours and also close friends alongside 
the public day-care option. Solidarity has always been, and probably will always will 
be, the cornerstone of the Turkish family system (Duben, 1982). While material or 
emotional support within the families has been the foremost principle of the Turkish 
family contract (Kavas and Gündüz-Hosgör, 2013), the German understanding of family 
lacks this principle (Lewis and Zitzlsperger, 2010). Therefore, it is plausible to argue 
that the economic necessity for more women in the labour market encouraged the 
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German citizens to combine their work lives with their family lives in an EU manner, as 
compared to Turkish citizens. While discussing the current female employment trends 
in Germany, a policy expert from one of the biggest think tanks argued: 
The minimum income has not raised in the last 20 years in Germany. But the 
prices of the goods have been increasing day by day. Therefore, in Germany the 
model where men are working and women are staying at home is not applicable 
anymore. I mean people cannot survive with that model anymore. So, it is kind 
of a pressure I would say rather than a choice. Women are under economic 
pressure to work. And to work they need to sort out the childcare issue. So, now 
many more women are sending their kids to Kindergartens compared to 10/15 
years ago (GNGO11).  
b) Familial necessity:  
In addition to economic necessity, a growing number of lone parent families also 
contribute to the societal Europeanisation processes of both countries in terms of care 
arrangements. In the last two decades, both countries have exhibited an ongoing increase 
in divorce rates, from 0.46 per thousand during 1990s to 1.7 in 2015 in Turkey and from 
1.9 per thousand during 1990s to 2 in 2015 in Germany (DeStatis, 2018; Kavas and 
Gündüz-Hosgör, 2013). These ascendant statistics went in tandem with the increase in 
lone parenthood. Single parents have become a significant component of both Turkish 
and German family compositions as well as the thick learner camp of their 
Europeanisation processes. 
 Since single parents do not have the partners to feature the paid employment and 
unpaid domestic work divide, they need to take care of both spheres by themselves. In 
other words, single parents are responsible for both home-making and earning a living. 
According to a number of Turkish and German women’s organisation representatives, 
this double burden of familial and occupational responsibilities has encouraged mostly 
German but also Turkish citizens to rely on public day-care places, which resonates with 
the EU WFLR practices and thus contributes to the societal Europeanisation processes 
of both countries. A Turkish NGO representative, for example, stated:  
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In today’s Turkey, the number of parents left alone with their kids for any reason, 
be it divorce, or be it separated or be it never married, is extremely high when 
compared to Turkey of 15 years ago. And these people regardless of their sexes 
need to work. And in order to work they need to sort out their childcare problem. 
Usually they have three options. First if they lucky, if somehow they have close 
ties with their elderly or if they live in the same city, the grandparents look after 
the kids so that single parents can go to work. If this is not the case, then the 
close friends… If they have close friends living close by or if they have good 
connections with the neighbours then they leave their kids with these people and 
manage to go to work again. But there are also a considerable number of single 
parents, who do not have any of these people that they can be aided in terms of 
childcare. And yes, these people are the ones, who desperately need and highly 
use public day-care places…’ (TNGO14).  
Similarly, a notable academic from Germany mentioned:  
Kindergarten demand is considerably increasing over the last ten years in every 
single länder because now in Germany there are so many different family types. 
In the past it was a simple traditional family, a mother, a father and two children 
but now we have so many single parents. Especially they are the ones highly 
demanding for affordable and also reliable Kindergartens because they don’t 
have anybody to leave their children but they also need to work to survive (GA2).  
 According to key academics and women’s organisation representatives, a 
number of families in both countries are no longer able to maintain their lives on the 
basis of work/care dualism. An increased gap between the wages and living costs, as 
well as the lack of partners to share either the labour market or family responsibilities, 
encouraged some German and Turkish citizens to practise the EU-wise WFLR, 
especially in terms of childcare arrangements. In other words, these individuals, who 
have come to be reconciling their work and family lives in de-familialised arrangements, 
have successfully contributed to their countries’ Europeanisation processes at societal 
level. However, this transition in German and Turkish people’s daily practices did not 
stem from the EU influence. Instead recent demographical and economic changes 
intrinsic to Turkey and Germany persuaded people to Europeanise their WFLR habits. 
Referring back to three forms of New Institutionalism (NI), it is likely to link these 
behaviours of thick learners from both countries directly to rational choice 
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institutionalism (RCI). For Turkish and German thick learners, under the conditions of 
new Turkey and Germany, being in the labour market was sine quo non. Therefore, they 
considered the gains of practising de-familialised childcare arrangements to be greater 
than continuing to reconcile their work and family lives on the basis of the familialised 
domestic model based on familial care arrangements.  
Women’s career aspirations:  
Both in Turkey and in Germany, women have historically been expected to be the 
cornerstone of the family and facilitate the functioning of the family. This social 
expectation, in return, was well-accepted and internalised by women. Historically, both 
the German and Turkish women have prioritised home-making and centred their lives 
on their familial duties. They have made numerous sacrifices in order to fulfil their 
home-making responsibilities including giving up on their education or career. 
However, since the early 1980s in Germany and early 2000s in Turkey, in spite of a 
significant number of obstacles surrounding women’s entrance to higher education, in 
both countries stemming from a stubbornly patriarchal family structure, the number of 
women in higher education is on the rise (Acar, 2006; Read and Kehm, 2016). 
 These university educated urban women, who constitute a very small segment 
of Turkish society and a relatively bigger (but still rather small) segment of German 
society38, in return, wanted to reap the benefit of their higher education by building a 
stable, secure and a lifelong career for themselves. In the pursuit of this desire, the 
career-oriented minor groups in both countries practise the EU WFLR with respect to 
both care and leave arrangements: 
                                               
38 As of 2015, only 0.47 and 0.45 per cent of the total number of individuals in tertiary education was 
women in Germany and Turkey respectively (Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/images/8/8b/Number_of_tertiary_education_students_by_level_and_sex%2C_2015_%28thou
sands%29_YB17.png).    
 244 
Now we do have a change in the perception of female education. Let’s say in 
Germany, now, we have more women who have more and longer education. So, 
girls in higher education is rising, rising and rising. And these many women with 
better education are looking for high-quality jobs. They are no more OK with 
part-time jobs which would pay them some sort of pocket-money. They are 
ambitious now, they are competitive. They would no more quit their jobs to raise 
their kids. This is no more the German reality. And the society’s started to accept 
this paradigm change. I mean of course, the number of these ambition women is 
still very low compared to common image and their acceptance is very slow. 
And these women, whom we expect to be role model to others, are going back 
to their work right after their maternity leaves end, they share the paternal leave 
equally with their partners and they do not see any harm in sending their kids to 
kindergarten at age 1 (GA3). 
As the senior university research fellow mentions above, a very small number of women 
from the middle and upper-middle parts of the socio-economic pyramid in relatively 
more modernised regions of Germany, but also Turkey, now realise the EU way of 
WFLR in their daily lives. 
 From an actor-centred perspective, this behaviour of Turkish and German thick 
learners resonates directly with RCI on the grounds of utility maximising calculus, but 
also recalls sociological institutionalism (SI) due to shared values with the EU. Yet, it 
is important to note that neither the cost-benefit calculation nor the shared values 
concern the issue of contributing to the process of Europeanising the domestic WFLR 
model. German and Turkish women experiencing a more European way of 
reconciliation in order to secure a high position within the labour market is of relevance 
to adaptational pressure coming from the EU. Once again, an internal factor, which has 
nothing to do with the EU influence on German and Turkish WFLR models, led German 
and Turkish women to adapt their daily reconciliation habits to match the EU. These 
spontaneous Europeanisation fringes in both countries took the issue beyond the mere 
domestic impact of the EU. They epitomise the main argument of this thesis – that the 
Europeanisation process has been rendered by the social, political and economic 
dynamics as well as the existence of domestic actors. This perhaps adds another layer 
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of analysis to actor-centred Europeanisation as it exemplifies a situation wherein 
Europeanisation occurs unconsciously.    
For children’s self-development:  
When seeking to understand why EU-wise WFLR have begun to be practised in Turkey 
and Germany, children’s social investment appeared as a significant driving force in 
both countries. While a number of families saw investing in their children as a potential 
source of upward social mobility, some relatively younger German families paid a 
particular attention to their children’s development in order to prove their parenting 
skills to other parents.  
a) Upward social mobility:  
Both Turkish and German cultures have historically seen children as the society’s future 
and thus, emphasised childcare (Bozçağa, 2013; Ostner, 2010). Both cultures have 
historically done this through assigning childcare particularly to mothers or at least to 
somebody from the family. However, according to key academics and women’s 
organisation representatives interviewed under the scope of this thesis, this strong faith 
in the familial care has met a gradual demise among a small number of Turkish and 
German families.  
 When discussing the current WFLR in trends in Germany and Turkey, notable 
ECEC scholars and women’s organisation representatives engaged with research have 
argued that a number of working-class families have come to acknowledge the 
importance of non-familial childcare in ending the poverty cycle (GA1; GA3; GNGO11; 
TA2, TNGO9). These people living not below, but on the edge of, the poverty line have 
come to see their children as a window of opportunity in terms of upward social 
mobility. Therefore, they prefer to send their children to Kindergartens at the possible 
earliest age. Although this did not necessarily stem from their aim of contributing to the 
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societal Europeanisation processes of their countries, eventually they have come to 
accelerate the process by featuring the EU care arrangements at the national levels. They 
regard sending their children into Kindergarten as an ‘investment’ (GA1). For them, the 
earlier their children start being educated, the more likely it is that they will find 
prestigious and better-paid jobs. These expectations of Turkish and German thick 
learners chime with the literature on ECEC, highlighting the importance of ECEC in 
tackling the poverty (Caracciolo di Torella and Masselot 2010; Drew et al., 1998).  
 Referring to the three forms of NI, it is possible to link Turkish thick learners’ 
behaviours with both RCI and SI, whereas German thick learners’ resonate only with 
RCI. In both cases, actors preferred EU care arrangements on the grounds of upward 
social mobility expectations. That is to say that, they considered sending their children 
to Kindergartens more gainful than practising the domestic model. In addition to this 
cost-benefit calculation, the social norms and values also played a role in the Turkish 
case because it is a very important and deep-rooted Turkish tradition that parents try to 
do the best for their children at all costs. The importance attributed to Turkish parents’ 
sacrifice might perhaps be proven by Turkish sayings such as ‘have not eaten but fed, 
have not dressed but clothed.’ To this end, parents who want the best for their children 
also have combined their work lives with their family lives on the basis of EU standards. 
b) Parenting skills:  
In addition to this rational decision-making behind practising EU care arrangements, a 
very German characteristic – ambitiousness – has also compelled a number of families 
to align their childcare trends with the EU. It was argued during the interviews by 
German academics that young couples who have recently had children are highly child-
centric. Although parents in general would want to see their children doing well in life, 
according to a notable university professor’s research on parenthood and parenting, 
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young couples pay exceptional attention to their children’s self-development in order to 
win an invisible ‘competition’ on parenting:  
I think now the importance of ECEC has been acknowledged by the parents, 
especially by the young ones. Now, they are racing each other to send their kids 
to the top Kindergartens because they are trying to raise the best kid. Now, there 
is this sort of invisible social pressure on young couples. They feel the need to 
prove that they are the best parents to their counterparts. Therefore, they are 
sending their children to Kitas since the age 1 and when the kid is a bit older they 
start taking additional courses like piano or additional language and so on (GA3).  
 This behaviour of young German thick learners also chimes with both SI and 
RCI. First and foremost, it reflects SI as they practise EU standards on the grounds of 
their success. This does not necessarily mean that German actors have perceived EU 
standards as better than the German standards. Rather, what German actors perceived as 
the better way was already what the EU was asking from Germany. Therefore, it would 
be plausible to argue that the young German thick learners’ decisions indicate SI as they 
have been made on the basis of shared norms and values. Second, this also resonates 
with RCI. German actors saw EU care arrangements as the most useful and gainful way 
to achieve their aim of being the best parents.    
New fatherhood trends: 
There is some evidence from research in Germany (Kottwitz et al., 2016) and in Turkey 
(Beşpınar, 2016) that the child-related behaviour of both men and women has been 
changing. Likewise, a number of interviewees from both countries have mentioned how 
men and women are becoming alike in terms of work- and care-related characteristics. 
According to some German and Turkish academics and women’s organisation experts, 
perhaps being influenced by the recent intense awareness raising events on fatherhood, 
a number of relatively younger and more educated fathers, mostly living in urbanised 
big cities, have come to share the care responsibilities more equally with their partners. 
According to a German professor of parenthood and parenting, there is an ongoing 
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mind-set change among the younger, more educated, urbanised German fathers, which 
has also been observed by Beşpınar (2016) in Turkey. To this end, an increased number 
of fathers, more in Germany, but – even if very rarely – also in Turkey, have started to 
interpret the meanings of fatherhood and masculinity differently than their own fathers. 
 While in the past a strong father image was constructed around providing 
economic support and the disciplinary control (Bertoia and Drakich, 1993), this is not 
the case anymore. The dominance of this traditional fatherhood image has been 
challenged by the emergence of new ideas on fatherhood. In today’s world, fathers who 
have been there for their partners and children since the very outset of the pregnancy 
have come to be seen as good and strong fathers. In that sense, a small number of fathers 
from both countries have started spending more time with their children and even taking 
parental leaves, which also allows women to be more active in the labour market: 
Honestly, people from the West especially have made a huge step because there 
is now really a big change going on. There is this real change of mind. People 
do not have those old ideas anymore that children should be raised by their 
mother and financed by their father. Now, people started to believe that a 
healthier and a happier child is the one who is raised in Kindergarten with the 
emotional support of both parents (GA3).  
 Although there is no evidence proving the EU’s role in this mind-set change, 
there is a mind-set change. A small but growing number of German and Turkish families 
have come to feature a relatively more Europeanised share of parental leaves. From the 
lens of NI, this resonates strongly with the SI as the domestic societal actors have come 
to see the EU standards as the right things to do. Yet again, this socialisation did not 
necessarily stem directly from the Europeanisation process itself. 
 In sum, pioneered by the relatively younger and relatively more educated 
individuals living in the more urbanised regions of both countries, a number of domestic 
societal actors demonstrate a thick learning. In other words, throughout the process of 
Europeanising the domestic WFLR, they have come to reconcile their work and family 
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lives in a relatively more Europeanised fashion. However, similar to discursive and 
political Europeanisation processes, the societal Europeanisation processes of both 
countries, as well, have been assuaged by the existence of a significant number of people 
featuring a thin learning, hence, maintaining the national WFLR practices. The chapter 
proceeds with the illustration of the reasons behind thin learners’ preferences of 
maintaining the national practices. 
8.2.2. WFLR practices of thin learners: 
While a number of people have gradually been Europeanising their daily WFLR 
behaviours, a considerable number of people in both countries, have either consciously 
or unconsciously remained unsocialised. Hence, they have continued combining their 
work lives with their family lives on the familialised traditional basis. Similar to the 
thick learners, thin learners also make their decisions with respect to their daily WFLR 
routines, mostly on the basis of cost-benefit calculations but also their social norms and 
values. There were six key reasons behind thin learners’ familalised WFLR practices. 
Benefitting from the familialised WFLR measures:   
Despite the high level of adaptational pressure for de-familialised WFLR policies 
coming from the EU, a number of significantly familialised incentives encouraging the 
traditional gendered work/care dualism remained in force in both countries. As detailed 
in Chapter 5, these incentives included the taxation system and Homecare Allowance 
Law in Germany; and the Back to Family and Home-based Childcare projects in Turkey. 
A significant number of German and Turkish societal actors, in order to benefit from 
these familialised incentives, refused to Europeanise their WFLR arrangements. It is 
important to note that this was not a direct reaction to the idea of Europeanising the 
WFLR trends. Both German and Turkish thin learners continued to practise the domestic 
model on the grounds of their generosity in terms of cash payments.   
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 Since 1958, Germany has employed a taxation system favouring heterosexual 
married couples. This so-called Ehegattensplitting calculates the mean of the taxable 
income of both spouses and applies the tax rate to the resulting amount. This taxation 
system is most efficient among the one-and-a-half earner as well as the male 
breadwinner family models (Haase et al., 2016; Steiner and Wrohlich, 2008). According 
to German social policy scholars, policy experts and women’s organisation 
representatives interviewed under the scope of this research, the majority of the German 
population benefit from this taxation system even though it favours the unequal 
distribution of paid employment and unpaid domestic work. To this end, in order to 
reduce the amount of the income tax to be paid, couples prefer to practise a model 
wherein fathers work full-time and mothers work part-time or do not work at all. Since 
the mother is already staying home or working part-time, she also cares for the kids so 
that the couple is able to reduce or avoid Kindergarten expenses: 
I think clever economic politics is to bring women into the labour market, not 
having a tax splitting law like this. I think this law is against economic growth 
because it’s against female employment. But it’s again a struggle between the 
culture and what is needed. And as a result, we have this ehegattensplitting since 
decades that everybody uses. I cannot tell you the actual numbers but there are 
maybe millions of families living happily ever after with the presence of this law. 
They get married, woman quits her job or switches to part-time. She cares for 
the kids, perfect, no childcare fee, no struggle to find the right kindergarten plus 
lower tax to pay (GNGO10).  
 All in all, this very German taxation system once again appeared as a factor 
jeopardising the process of Europeanising, this time at the societal level. As discussed 
in Chapter 6, a number of German politicians (mostly from the CDU/CSU group but 
also from the SPD) benefit from this law and prefer to preserve the domestic model in 
order not to abolish this law. In a similar manner, a considerable number of German 
couples maintained the national WFLR practices in order to take the maximum 
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advantage from the taxation system, which at the end assuaged the societal 
Europeanisation process. 
 In a like manner, the existence of the Homecare Allowance Law in Germany, 
the Back to Family and Home-based Childcare projects in Turkey have successfully 
increased the number of thin learners. A significant number of women both in Turkey 
and Germany found those purportedly generous cash payments logical and attractive in 
the short run. Several interviewees from both countries have mentioned that in the 
absence of affordable and sufficient day-care places, many women prefer to withdraw 
from the labour market and care for their children by themselves. Although they think 
this withdrawal is temporary and plan to return to their jobs once their children reach 
mandatory school age, it ends up being permanent. This mismatch between the plans 
and the reality stems from the fact that the more time they spend at home, the less 
attractive they become for the employers: 
Women get into hot water when they give birth because in Turkey today raising 
a child is something really expensive. Imagine the minimum income is 1400TL 
while the kindergarten fees range between 1000 and 2000. Then once the child 
gets older these expenses get higher too. Under these circumstances couples start 
thinking over and over and at the end they decide that the woman would quit her 
job for couple of years and look after the child. By the way here I am not talking 
about the conservative crew, this is very much the reality of an ordinary middle-
class Turkish family. Anyways, they say OK, the woman will quit the job until 
the child starts primary school. Since the government is paying for this OK why 
not. Nobody cares how wrong this decision is, how bad long-term consequences 
this decision has. They are just trying to save the day (TNGO10).  
Again, it would be unjustified to argue that domestic societal-actors continued to 
practise the national WFLR model in order to sabotage the process. Yet the temptation 
of the generous cash benefits accompanied with the high day-care fees resulted in non-
socialisation so that a significant number of individuals have resulted in not employing 
the EU model. 
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 Referring back to three forms of NI, it can be argued that domestic societal 
actors’ preference for the national model over the EU model, on the grounds of the 
economic benefits, clearly resonates with RCI. Both German and Turkish couples 
clearly consider the gains of familialised incentives bigger than the gains of practising 
the EU WFLR and thus keep the national model alive. This benefit-maximisation 
calculus resulting in favour of the domestic model’s implementation perhaps solidifies 
Turkish antagonists’ concerns as discussed in Chapter 6. A number of Islamist women’s 
organisations from the antagonist camp were highly worried about the fact that the EU 
was overlooking the domestic dynamics while expecting its standards to be downloaded 
and implemented. Although what Turkish antagonist organisations meant were the 
cultural codes, here, the EU’s top-down manner have had a clear impact on societal 
Europeanisation. In other words, the fact that the social policy structure of societies and 
existing welfare states not being fully ready to off-set the EU’s requirements clearly 
slowed the societal Europeanisation down. Here, the incomplete policy Europeanisation 
worked in tandem with an incomplete societal Europeanisation, which perhaps adds 
another layer of layer of analysis to Europeanization literature by showing how two 
different Europeanisation levels are interconnected.  
Gender pay gap:  
When seeking to understand the reasons behind the thin learners’ non-Europeanised 
WFLR practices, the stubbornly remaining wage gap between men and women in both 
countries appeared as another salient theme. According to recent statistics, the gender 
pay gaps in both countries are considerable and larger than the EU average39. Although 
the literature on female employment found women’s care responsibilities and the 
                                               
39 According to the latest Eurostat statistics, the difference between women’s and men’s earnings is 21 
and 16 per cent in Germany and in Turkey respectively, while the EU average is 16 per cent (Retrieved 
from: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:UnadjustedGPG_Figure1.PNG).  
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unequal division of labour at home as one of the most important factors contributing to 
this gap (Acar, 2006; Kızılırmak, 2008; Moghadam, 1997; Selezneva and Van Kerm, 
2016; Ucal et al., 2015), a number of interviewees from both countries mention the 
opposite.  
 One of the most repeated reasons for German women’s disproportionate take-up 
of parental leave – and for both German and Turkish women’s giving up their careers 
for childcare – is their low wages. Although the German parental leave addresses both 
men and women, in order to avoid any income loss, fathers take only those two months 
which would be cancelled in the cases of non-use:  
Well, I would say a change is on. If we were talking about Germany 15 years 
ago, I would not even imagine a man taking parental leave. But now, the number 
of fathers using those daddy-months have been increasing day by day. And I 
strongly believe if we had lower gender pay gap the numbers would be even 
higher (GA4).  
While this non-transferable two-month benefit encourages fathers to take up parental 
leave, the simultaneous gender pay gap, on the other hand, restrains fathers from taking 
longer leaves, which eventually contributes to maintenance of the domestic trends rather 
than socialisation of the EU WFLR trends.   
 In a similar vein, economic concerns cause a number of families to practise the 
familialised domestic model in terms of childcare arrangements. Mostly, the cost-benefit 
calculation of couples results in women’s withdrawal from the labour market. Rather 
than paying the day-care fee, which is almost equal to women’s wages (even higher in 
some cases), women opted to quit their jobs and care for their children themselves, 
which would also allow them to receive the childcare benefits. A Turkish women’s 
organisation representative delineated this situation through a very common Turkish 
idiom:  
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The game is not worth the candle40… well, you know the number of public 
Kindergartens, very low and the quality? Highly negotiable. Then what is the 
alternative? Childminder, which is very costly or private Kindergarten, which is 
as costly as the childminder. So, what is the result? Low Kindergarten enrolment 
and high female unemployment rates (TNGO8).  
 Here again, it was not the idea of Europeanising their daily WFLR habits that 
caused the domestic societal actors to act in this way. They preserved the national model 
in their everyday lives in order to maximise the household income and provide a better 
future for their children, yet in so doing they have successfully assuaged the societal 
Europeanisation processes of both countries. Resonating with the RCI, this behaviour 
of both Turkish and German thin learners contributes to the aforementioned argument 
that implementing the EU standards in terms of WFLR does not depend only on the idea 
of Europeanising the daily habits. It requires domestic infrastructures to be ready to off-
set the EU standards as well, especially economically.   
Service-related reasons:  
The difficulty of sustaining a living on a single income and the growing number of single 
parent households have caused a number of Turkish and German families to 
Europeanise their daily childcare arrangements. In the same way, the insufficient 
number of day-care places, and the considerably high fees of those places as well as 
their incompatible working hours with families’ work schedules, led other Turkish and 
German families to practice the national model. 
a) The insufficient number and high fees of day-care places:  
The consolidation of the data collected under the scope of this research and official 
statistics (İlkkaracan et al, 2015; Schöber and Spiess, 2015) show that the number of 
day-care places in both countries is far below the supply-demand equilibrium.  
                                               
40 ‘The game is not worth the candle’ is a very common Turkish idiom, which is used to delineate 
situations where the cost of the action is considerably bigger than the potential gain.  
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 According to German women’s organisation representatives, the number of day-
care places in Germany is significantly low, so German women start searching for a day-
care place to enrol their children even when they are pregnant, especially in crowded 
länder like Berlin or Nordrhein-Westfallen. At the end, this mismatch between demand 
and supply leads parents to search for alternative childcare options. Quitting their jobs 
appeared a common option for mothers: 
It’s not that women say no, I won’t work, but I’ll care. It’s kind of destiny. What 
can they do when there’s not enough place of course, they care by themselves. 
We know that people try so many ways. For example, most parents end up 
writing to twenty institutions and asking for a space like a cover letter or for 
example, here in Berlin many people went to Court because they couldn’t get a 
spot in any day care centres (GNGO2).   
 Again, it would be unjustified to link this non-socialisation in terms of childcare 
habits directly to German and Turkish societal actors’ reluctance to Europeanise their 
WFLR practices. Yet, at the end, the insufficient number of day-care places in both 
countries leads families to maintain the national trend and successfully sabotages the 
societal Europeanisation process. Since the demand for a day-care place is much higher 
than the supply in both countries, the fees are high, which discourages parents from 
registering their children in day-care. Given the wage difference between the mothers 
and fathers, mothers once again give up on their careers, at least for a couple of years, 
and return home in order to compensate for the lack of affordable public day-care places. 
Here again, it is not that German and Turkish parents have decided to continue practising 
the national model, but that conditions in both countries have pushed them to do so.    
b) Incompatible operating hours of the day-care places:  
In addition to insufficient numbers and the concomitant high fees, the opening hours of 
the day-care places also play an important role in the non-Europeanisation of German 
and Turkish families’ childcare habits. In Turkey, the majority of day-care places 
function on a part-time basis, with the single exception of private ones (Ağırdağ et al., 
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2015), which is not a commonly preferred option anyway. Similarly, German day-care 
places either function part-time or close their doors for a couple of hours during lunch 
(Internations, n.d.). In other words, German day-care places do not take responsibility 
for children’s lunches. Mothers or fathers have to pick their children up, feed and return 
children to the day-care place after lunch. Therefore, in neither Turkey nor Germany 
could parents focus on their own daily grindstones (be it their jobs or any daily activities) 
with their minds at peace.  
 Given the already expensive fees and the difficulty of finding a place, according 
to a number of German and Turkish academics and women’s organisation 
representatives, parents who cannot consign their children full-time to day-care places, 
prefer not to send their children to a day-care place at all: 
What is another problem in almost every länder is the opening and closing hours 
of childcare institutions. Like sometimes they would close at 2pm in the 
afternoon, and they send kids home for lunch, like these kinds of regulations they 
have. And then what sort of job are you supposed to do between 9 and 2, hours 
are actually quite difficult, most of the childcare places are open only from 8 to 
4, which means you need to leave your job at 3pm because it takes an hour to 
travel to childcare place but you can’t do this. I mean your job would not allow 
you to leave at 3pm or let’s say 3.30pm every day to pick up your child. So, from 
8 to 4 is not useful at all for parents. So, instead of putting themselves into this 
busy schedule everyday what they do, mothers quit and care themselves so that 
they don’t pay the fees for a place, which is not really handy (GNGO2).    
 Once again, rational cost-benefit calculation by both German and Turkish 
parents constrained them from Europeanising their WFLR habits. Since the domestic 
infrastructure was not ready to supply the Europeanised care arrangements, a number of 
families had to maintain the national trends, which strongly implies the RCI perspective 
as the main driving force of thin earners’ decisions was utility-maximization.     
Fear of assimilation:  
In addition to all the aforementioned utility-maximization related reasons, a number of 
ideology-driven reasons are expressed by Turkish and German academics and NGO 
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representatives to be restraining Turkish and German citizens from Europeanising their 
WFLR habits. As mentioned in Chapter 6, a number of politicians and NGO 
representatives from the antagonist camps of both Turkey and Germany perceive 
Europeanising the national WFLR model as a potential source of assimilation. To this 
end, in order to raise a generation moulded with the Turkish and German norms, values, 
customs and traditions, they refused to Europeanise the Turkish and German models. 
 In a similar vein, interviewees suggested that a significant number of families in 
both countries hesitate to send their children to day-care places and prefer to look after 
the children by themselves at least until the third birthday of the child. It is also argued 
by German and Turkish academics and the NGO representatives that this hesitancy 
stems from a belief that children would not be able to learn and process Turkish and 
German norms, values, customs and traditions in a crowded place like a day-care centre 
as well as they would learn at home from their mothers: 
There is also the trust issue. Some parents do not believe in the quality of the 
day-care places, they do not believe in the sufficiency of the child-minders, the 
teachers working in day-care places. They say it is not the day-care place that 
would be able to teach my kid the German traditions. You know, Germans 
prioritise these kinds of issues. Like German history, the German traditions, 
these things are important for German people and they obviously want their 
children to learn them as well. Therefore, mothers take up this role and stays at 
home with their kids a couple of years after the birth and teach the German norms 
to their children (GA1).  
 It is important to note that Turkish academics and NGO representatives cited this 
fear of assimilation more than the German academics and NGO representatives. This 
could be because of religious-related concerns. As has been mentioned several times in 
this thesis, Turkey is a very fragmented country in terms of the daily practice of Islam. 
It houses a number of highly pious people sustaining their lives on Islam and its 
teachings, together with a number of highly secularised people deliberately avoiding the 
Islamic teachings and practices. Although the tension between these two opposing 
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groups is quite high and they have almost nothing in common, not sending their children 
to a day-care place for religion-related reasons appears to be one of the few areas where 
these two antagonist groups could find a common ground. 
 According to rights-based women’s organisations from the Turkish catalyst 
camp, a number of secular families, who would be expected to Europeanise their daily 
WFLR habits, hesitate to register their children in day-care places and prefer to maintain 
the national WFLR model by caring for their children at home. That is because these 
secular families do not trust the day-care places’ curricula. As mentioned in Chapter 7, 
since 2010, Turkey has rapidly moving away from its Westernisation project towards an 
Islamic way of life, which has been reflected in the national school curricula as well. 
Although the religious culture and moral knowledge course became a mandatory course 
in Kindergartens and primary schools only in 2017 (Artigercek, 2017), women’s 
organisation representatives interviewed under the scope of this study mention that some 
Kindergartens had already been teaching Islam for the last five to seven years. Secular 
parents, who perceive this as ‘brainwashing’ (TNGO6; TNGO12; TNGO14) and do not 
want their children to learn Islam at that age, therefore, maintain the national familialised 
model. Accordingly, the mother quits her job and stays at home with the child while the 
father continues his career, unless they are coming from the upper middle and upper 
classes, who are able to seek private solutions such as a child-minder or private crèches.  
 On the other hand, a number of faith-based women’s organisation 
representatives mentioned how worried the religious parents – who were believing in 
natality (fıtrat) and sustaining their lives according to its teachings, which assign 
domestic work, especially childcare, to women – were about sending their children to 
day-care places. For them, caring for the family, and particularly for children, is a very 
important duty assigned to women by God (Tongar, 2015). They dedicate themselves to 
raising their children and thus relaying the Islamic knowledge to them. Therefore, in 
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order to fulfil their motherhood duties, they continue to practise national work and 
family life reconciliation habits. Even the increasing religious motives within the 
Kindergarten curricula are not sufficient to convince them to Europeanise their WFLR 
practices by enrolling their children into a day-care place:   
Well, parents are worried about what their children are learning in 
Kindergartens. You know, we have the cultural codes, we have the religious 
codes, and you can never be sure whether those codes are taught in Kindergartens 
or not. Well, now there are cameras and everything, you can of course check but 
I mean instead of dealing with all those, mothers just take a couple of years off 
from work and take care of their children. Because you know we have to teach 
our kids to start a meal with Besmele41, we have to teach our kids not to leave 
food in the plate and the Islamic circle thinks these things should be taught at 
home at the children’s early ages…’ (TNGO1).    
This protectionist positions of both Turkish and German parents, as well as Turkish 
religious parents’ efforts to fulfil the motherhood duties assigned them by Islam, paves 
the way for maintenance of national WFLR practices. This behaviour, which in the end 
cripples the societal Europeanisation processes of both countries, strongly chimes with 
SI on the grounds that domestic societal actors do not consider the EU practices the 
‘right things to do’, hence they continue the national ones.  
Social pressure:  
Socially constructed guilt feeling is another significant factor preventing German and 
Turkish parents from Europeanising their WFLR practices. While both Turkish and 
German mothers prefer to maintain the domestic WFLR practices due to social 
stigmatisation of employed mothers, fathers’ concerns stemmed from patriarchy- and 
masculinity-related stigmatisation.    
                                               
41 A Turkish prayer, usually prayed before the meals. 
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a) Social pressure on mothers:  
According to a number of German and Turkish interviewees, the legacy of Nazi 
propaganda addressing women in Germany and the resurrection of patriarchal doctrines 
under the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP)  
government in Turkey have successfully created a tense polarisation between employed 
mothers and housewife mothers, wherein the former group have been stigmatised and 
felt excluded. 
 While coming to power, Adolf Hitler had one big goal in mind: to realise the 
Blood and Soil (Blut und Boden) ideology (Grebe, 2009; Roberts, 2016). In Nazi 
Germany (1933-1945), in the light of the Blut und Boden ideology, Hitler and his 
political NSDAP emphasised the idea of creating the ‘high and noble Aryan race’ that 
would live in territories historically belonging to Germany (Blamires and Jackson, 
2006). And it was the motherhood role attributed to women that headlined the 
achievement of this goal. Hitler and some other senior ministers from the Nazi 
government believed that it is the family that provides the nations’ strength and 
continuation and it is the woman who is the cornerstone of family. For them, women 
had three missions: be beautiful; bring beautiful children into the world and raise those 
children. Accordingly, throughout the history of the Nazi Germany, motherhood was 
highly romanticised and glorified (Haste, 2001). From the women’s perspective, Cate 
Haste (2001) argues that the majority of them were highly pleased about being house-
bound so that Hitler’s party got half of its votes from women. Yet, a small group of 
women, displeased about being discharged from the public sphere, also existed. As 
expected, this minor group were not welcomed by the society and considered as 
rabenmutter. Although modern Germany has always been ashamed of the Nazi-era and 
paid particular attention to making a radical break with this severe period, this concept 
of rabenmutter somehow survives today. 
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  A number of NGO representatives interviewed under the scope of this thesis 
argue that the rabenmutter concept has successfully discouraged domestic societal 
actors from Europeanising their WFLR routines. It is argued that a significant number 
of German women maintain the national WFLR trends, or at least limit themselves in 
terms of Europeanising their practices, in order not to be stigmatised as rabenmutter by 
their peers:  
Mothers always compare themselves with others. It is always about the norms 
especially here in Germany, wherein the historical norms are still exist. You 
know the concept rabenmutter, right? It is still a frequently used concept. So, 
women always try very hard to avoid the social critique. They care for their 
children by themselves to avoid the social pressure. If they do not have other 
option, if they really need to send their children to a kindergarten, then they try 
not to be the last one to pick the child up because that is another reason for 
criticism. Or even if they want to and even if they have the legal right to return 
to their jobs one and a half months after the birth, they try to prolong the 
maternity leave. So, what we found from our research is the social pressure is 
highly strong both among mothers and fathers (GNGO10).  
 From an actor-centred perspective, this self-limitation strongly resonates with 
Historical Institutionalism (HI) as a concept from the 1930s has come to influence 
domestic societal actors’ decisions. In addition to HI, it is also plausible to link this 
behaviour of thin learners to RCI as mothers perceive the costs of social exclusion as 
greater than the gains of Europeanising their WFLR habits and thus prefer not to, even 
if they personally want to. 
 In a similar vein, Turkish academics and NGO representatives argue that the 
growing dominance of the Islamic practices and discourse over secular practices and 
discourse in Turkey has influenced Turkish thin learners’ decisions. As mentioned 
several times in this thesis, the longer the AKP holds the monopolistic power, the more 
overt its Islamic aspects become (Findley, 2010; Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008). To this 
end, since 2008, the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and a number of 
governing party politicians have openly showed that they support women’s motherhood 
roles through the ‘three children’ and ‘holy motherhood’ slogans (Korkut and Eslen-
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Ziya, 2011). With the use of these most repeated two slogans, the governing party 
politicians prioritised women’s mothering duties and encouraged women to have 
children. In other words, rather than changing the laws and policies, through a socially 
constructed narrative, the governing party aims at pushing women back into the familial 
sphere. In return, a number of Turkish women suffer pangs of conscience just because 
they registered their children into day-care places, and even unregister them:  
They are playing to people’s conscience. All those statements, three children, 
three children. They are all planed. And I assure you, the plan is again as always 
working. I know so many women are withdrawing their kids from Kindergarten 
just because they feel the guilt. At the end, this was what the AKP was aiming 
for and once again they are getting what they wanted to (TA1).   
 Discursive governance argument states that political language, especially the 
slogans and strategic metaphors within the language, is one of the most influential 
instruments in imposing a certain ideology on public (Korkut et al., 2015; Korkut and 
Eslen-Ziya, 2016). In line with this argument, the top-down constructed guilt feeling 
successfully influenced Turkish women’s decisions and slowed the societal 
Europeanisation process down. Referring back to the three forms of NI, the ways in 
which Turkish women receive the politicians’ messages and allow them to shape their 
decisions strongly resonates with SI. Since domestic societal-actors have not come to 
consider the EU model work and family life reconciliation as the ‘right thing to do’, they 
have felt guilty and continued practising the domestic model rather than Europeanising 
their habits.  
b) Social pressure on fathers:  
In addition to social pressure on Turkish and German mothers, Turkish and German 
fathers have also been mentioned by the interviewees to be subject to at least an equal 
level of peer-pressure at the workplace, resulting in non-Europeanised WFLR trends. As 
detailed in Chapter 7, neither the German nor the Turkish labour market exemplifies a 
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working climate wherein the EU WFLR practices could be practised, especially for 
fathers on the grounds of masculinity and patriarchy, respectively.  
 Although German fathers have the legal right to ask for at least for two months 
of parental leave, they do not feel confident in negotiating this within the highly male-
dominated working culture of Germany. According to a notable professor, German 
fathers, especially the ones working in the manufacturing sector, remain very timid in 
asking time-off from their bosses for care-related reasons because they are worried about 
being subject to mobbing by their colleagues. Although Germany is moving forward in 
terms of breaking the taboos with respect to traditional male and traditional female roles, 
it is still the rare case where a father takes a long leave. In order to avoid any kind of 
sexist jokes or mobbing, German fathers prefer not to take up the parental leave lawfully 
given to them: 
It is very much about the workplace culture because it is very new to big 
industrial companies that fathers have the legal right to parental leave. I mean 
fathers would like to take some time off to care for their children. I mean, it is 
still quite a new norm so the companies are not really ready to this mind-set 
change. I mean the minds of the companies have not changed yet. So, bosses 
would not appreciate it. Also, the colleagues, who have not digested this new 
norm yet either, will start making jokes you know those male jokes, which are 
quite famous in Germany. So, the father, who genuinely wants to take the leave, 
also ends up not taking the leave, because the climate is not ready (GA3).  
 In a similar vein, according to Turkish academics and women’s organisation 
representatives, Turkish fathers, who have only a ten day long official parental leave do 
not feel comfortable in asking any more days off from work. The highly religious 
Turkish labour market, dominated by the Anatolian Tigers, operates on the basis of 
Islamic teachings, which assigns a career role to women and a breadwinner role to men. 
The majority, who have never experienced any other alternative, would not even think 
about asking for additional parental leave, whereas a small group who appear to be more 
sensitive to parenting cannot find the courage to bring the issue to the table, on the 
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grounds of dignity. Therefore, the pious Turkish labour market as well has constrained 
Turkish families from sharing the domestic work and paid work equally: 
Actually, the number of participants of our ‘father support program’ has always 
been above our expectations. Fathers regardless of their socio-economic and 
socio-cultural backgrounds, seemed interested in taking part in their children’s 
lives. But what they were saying was they cannot go and ask their bosses for 
some time off from work for childcare. They say, nobody would understand them 
and they would lose all their esteem, which they did not seem keen (TNGO14). 
 As can be seen, in both countries there has been a change at micro-levels. A 
number of mothers and fathers have mentioned preferring the EU WFLR practices over 
the national practices. However, the lack of mind-set change in the broader context 
causes a number of Turkish and German fathers to maintain the national practices in 
order to preserve their statuses within their workplaces. From the actor-centred 
perspective, this strongly implies RCI, as the decision is solely made on the utility-
maximization calculus despite the shared norms and values. In other words, even the 
domestic societal-actors have come to consider the EU WFLR trends as ‘the right things 
to do’, they have not practised them in their daily lives. That arises from the current 
Turkish and German labour market structures. Turkish and German fathers perceive the 
losses of practising the EU model within the religious Turkish and male dominated 
German labour markets as greater than the gains.  
Womanhood:     
Finally, women’s status needs emerge as an important but not overlapping theme. 
German interviewees argue that in Germany a significant number of women, who have 
accepted and internalised the motherhood identity which the male dominated society 
ascribed to them (Roberts, 1995), remain loyal to the national WFLR trends on the 
grounds of status determination. A voluminous body of research has already proved the 
close link between fertility, motherhood and womanhood (Mason, 1984; Özbay, 1993; 
Whyte, 1978). It is argued that in conservative societies, wherein the male stream norms 
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and patriarchal values are quite visible (Ökten, 2009; Özbay, 1993), or in societies where 
the fertility rates are low (Krapf, 2014; Kreyenfeld and Konietzka, 2017), giving birth 
in general, but giving birth to a boy in particular, contributes to women’s status. Given 
the fact that Germany features both aforementioned conditions, German women want to 
preserve their motherhood identities.  
 According to a number of German academics, German women refuse to share 
the unpaid domestic work with their partners in order to maintain their powerful position 
within the familial sphere. In other words, since women are the full-time carers, they 
also are the full-time decision-makers in issues regarding children and household. Since 
they are enjoying this situation, they do not want to Europeanise their WFLR practices; 
they believe that fathers’ involvement in domestic work would go in tandem with their 
involvement in decision-making. Therefore, in order not to share the power of decision-
making with respect to familial issues, they maintained the national model: 
It is something like womanhood or motherhood or kind of privilege or honour 
for them. Because of course, it is also about power and gender relations. Like 
they believe if I go to work very early after my birth, of course I would gain 
some power by going to work and earning money but also I would lose some 
power in the family this time. Because then the father would have more sayings 
on children like which school we should send them, or what clothes they would 
wear and so on. So, I think both sexes are recently changing but not much 
because it is not necessarily something they like (GA3).  
From the NI perspective, German women not Europeanising their WFLR practices in 
order to maintain their dominant position within the familial sphere strongly chimes with 
RCI. Since Germany has not been fully Europeanised in this specific policy area yet and 
is still in a transition period, the domestic cultural codes are still highly prevalent. To 
this end, the combination of low fertility rates and the high patriarchal motives intrinsic 
to Germany has increased the value of motherhood. Under these domestic 
circumstances, according to German academics and NGO representatives, German 
women have found serving their motherhood duties more gainful then being active in 
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the labour market, which in the end discourages them from Europeanising their WFLR 
routines.  
8.3. Conclusion:  
This last analysis chapter endeavoured to illustrate the implementation of the German 
and Turkish WFLR laws introduced under the EU influence. In other words, it sought 
to explore why and to what extent Turkish and German citizens have come to practise 
the EU WFLR.  
 Observations made in this chapter revealed that, in both countries, a number of 
families who have started to Europeanise their WFLR habits coexist with another 
number of families who have been perpetuating the domestic habits for various practical 
and ideological reasons. As discussed throughout this chapter and summarised in Figure 
8.1 above, the reasons behind both thick and thin learners’ decisions were related to 
domestic country specific dynamics. It was found that even the changes in thick learners’ 
daily WFLR routines were not a direct outcome of Europeanisation process itself. But 
still, it would be quite plausible to argue that a socialisation process has occurred in both 
countries, even though it was en passant and triggered by the country specific economic 
and cultural dynamics. Theories that explain the societal Europeanisation might consider 
involving a dimension which explains incidentally Europeanised member and candidate 
states as well. 
 The findings of this chapter further contend that, similarly to the reasons behind 
domestic actors’ strategies that are mentioned in Chapter 7, it is again the RCI that 
dominates domestic societal actors’ daily practices in terms of WFLR, which can also 
be seen from Figure 8.2 below. In other words, domestic societal actors’ decisions on 
how to reconcile their work and family lives are influenced predominantly by their 
rational cost-benefit calculations. When making their decisions on how to reconcile their 
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work and family lives, both German and Turkish societal actors have put their economic 
concerns and their children’s future in front of their norms and values and tried to take 
the maximum advantage of the existing conditions. 
Figure 8.2: Summary of reasons behind domestic societal actors’ WFLR practices.  
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This finding suggests that, under today’s economic difficulties, wherein people have 
been subject to bad straits, societal Europeanisation goes beyond domestic actors’ mere 
views on the idea of ‘Europeanising their WFLR habits’ and involves the practicality 
issue too.  
 All in all, the findings of this chapter suggest that due to different reasons, 
resonating all three forms of NI theory but mostly the RCI, a salient number of thick 
learners with their relatively more Europeanised WFLR practices have contributed to 
the Europeanisation process of their countries at the societal level, whereas another 
salient number of thin learners have successfully decelerated the process through their 
national WFLR habits. This simultaneous presence of two opposing WFLR trends only 
contributes to the contradictoriness of the overall Europeanisation process in both 










CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION:  
This research explored the Europeanisation patterns of German and Turkish WFLR 
policies. In so doing, the four empirical chapters of this thesis have illustrated the 
Europeanisation pattern of each country at policy, discursive, political and societal 
levels. The thesis has discussed how Turkey’s and Germany’s Europeanisation 
processes have been influenced by the German and Turkish actors. This final chapter 
draws together the main theoretical and empirical findings of the thesis and discusses 
their implication for theory, policy process and research. The chapter, therefore, is 
organised into four sections. It begins by restating the research objectives and the 
theoretical tools applied in the achievement of those objectives. The second section maps 
the main findings into the main research questions. The third section focuses on the 
implications of the research in terms of both theory and policy process. It aims at 
elaborating how New Institutionalism (NI) was combined with Europeanisation, and 
how it contributed explaining the Europeanisation pattern of Turkey and Germany. 
Finally, the thesis concludes by showing the future directions for further research. 
9.1. Restating the research objectives and research tools: 
With the EU requiring a stronger convergence from its member and candidate states in 
the policy area of WFLR, the member and candidate states have found themselves in a 
process of change. This Europeanisation process asked Turkey and Germany to adapt a 
set of EU-induced WFLR policies into their national legislation. Alongside the policy 
adaptation, Turkey and Germany were also required to implement those policies. 
However, as has been reiterated throughout this thesis, Europeanisation is an interactive 
process and filtered by the existence of domestic actors. Theoretically speaking, this 
high level of adaptational pressure coming from the EU did not necessarily bring a 
convergence either to Turkey or to Germany. In other words, neither Turkey nor 
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Germany have fully been Europeanised. The attitudes of Turkish and German actors 
relevant to WFLR policy process towards Europeanising the Turkish and German 
models, as well as their contributions to the process, have had a significant impact on 
the potential policy change, whereas the daily WFLR habits of Turkish and German 
citizens who have a work and a family life to be reconciled have influenced the 
implementation of the corresponding policies. 
 The purpose of this thesis has been to trace the Europeanisation processes of 
Turkey and Germany within this specific policy field, with a particular focus on the 
intervening domestic actors as any legislative piece is argued to be a conscious 
preference of a certain ideology (Tsebelis, 2002). For a complete and careful illustration 
of such an uneven and actor-centred issue, this thesis drew on two crucial aspects: (a) 
Europeanisation and (b) NI and in so doing developed its own theoretical framework. 
The term Europeanisation has been applied when explaining the EU influence on 
German and Turkish reconciliation models, whereas NI theory has been applied when 
explaining Turkey’s and Germany’s responses to and within the process of 
Europeanising the domestic models.  
 As also detailed in Chapter 2, throughout this thesis Europeanisation has been 
accepted as a two-way process, which includes both the bottom-up and top-down 
dimensions. That is to say that first the member states go through a process of 
endeavouring to shape the EU WFLR policy package in line with their own policy 
preferences. The main rationale behind this endeavour is to minimise the potential future 
misfit and hence, the adaptation costs. This phase of the process is the bottom-up 
dimension and refers to a negotiation process between MEPs and EU. In this study, this 
was valid only for Germany as Turkey is a candidate state. In that sense, this thesis has 
analysed how and to what extent German MEPs have influenced the EU WFLR policies.  
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 Moreover, it was further argued that, once the decision is made at the EU level, 
the EU starts asking its member and also candidate states in this instance to transfer the 
corresponding policies into their domestic legislative frameworks. This is the second 
phase of the Europeanisation process – the top-down dimension – which applies both to 
Turkey and Germany. 
 While exploring the transmission of EU WFLR policies into German and 
Turkish contexts, this thesis first focused on the legislative changes. The Policy 
Europeanisation chapter (Chapter 5), sought to understand whether and to what extent 
Germany and Turkey have come to converge their domestic legislation with the EU. 
Given that the EU did not require only the policy adaptation but also the policy 
paradigm, the analysis relied on Esping-Andersen’s three welfare pillar 
conceptualisation and the familialisation/de-familialisation distinction. In other words, 
the policies made under the EU influence have been examined on the basis of whether 
and to what extent they support women’s labour market participation through reducing 
their domestic responsibilities. Since this thesis holds an actor-centred perspective, the 
theoretical framework developed in the scope of this thesis has centred on the illustration 
of domestic actors. The Discursive Europeanisation chapter (Chapter 6), categorised the 
corresponding domestic actors as catalysts and antagonists and revealed the ways in 
which they have perceived Europeanising the domestic model. As each domestic actor 
would behave in line with the ways in which Europeanisation is perceived, the Political 
Europeanisation chapter (Chapter 7) explored domestic actors’ contributions to the 
process both while catalysing and vetoing the process. Finally, this thesis accepted 
implementation of the downloaded policies also as part of the Europeanisation process. 
For this reason, it involved the domestic WFLR trends into the analysis, which is 
illustrated in the Societal Europeanisation chapter (Chapter 8). 
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 The theoretical framework developed throughout this thesis has approached 
Europeanisation as a two-fold and interactive process, which includes the endeavours of 
uploading the national policy preferences to the EU level and downloading the EU 
WFLR policies to the domestic level, as well as the implementation of the downloaded 
policies. In doing so, it combined Europeanisation with NI and analysed the 
Europeanisation patterns of the selected countries from the three forms of NI. 
9.2. Main research findings: 
By examining the German and Turkish Europeanisation processes from a NI lens, this 
research has found that, at the time when the EU emphasized de-familialised WFLR 
policy-making, both countries were still employing the traditional male breadwinner 
family model. This was reflected in their legislative frameworks in the shape of a highly 
familialised model. This familialised WFLR model in the end caused a high level of 
adaptational pressure coming from the EU and a concomitant legislative reform process. 
A closer examination of the legislative changes pursued between 2000 and 2017 in 
Turkey and Germany under EU influence indicated an incomplete and a contradictory 
Europeanisation process.  
 In response to the adaptational pressure coming from the EU, both countries have 
put an effort into de-familialising their WFLR policies. Yet, they also continued passing 
familialised reconciliation laws and kept several familialising policies in place instead 
of abolishing them, which resulted in a highly puzzling Europeanisation process in each 
country. In order to solve this puzzle, the main research enquiry was supported by five 
additional sub-research questions that were already presented in Chapter 1. This section 




How, why and to what extent has Germany influenced the EU WFLR policies?         
The fact that Germany is a member state provides her the opportunity to influence the 
content of the EU WFLR policies. This potential raised a two-fold question: to what 
extent and, more importantly, how and why Germany has uploaded her domestic policy 
preference regarding WFLR to the EU level. The answer to this two-fold question is also 
two-fold. 
 First of all, as Chapter 5 found, the German paradigm towards WFLR policy-
making could hardly be seen within the EU model. Both the hard and soft EU laws with 
respect to WFLR increasingly aimed at encouraging women’s labour market 
participation through alleviating their disproportionate share of familial responsibilities. 
In contrast, the German WFLR model has long aimed at enabling women to care for 
their families through reducing their labour market responsibilities. Therefore, it could 
be argued that although Germany has succeeded in uploading its own policy preferences 
to the EU level in a number of other policy areas, she remains inefficient in reflecting 
her WFLR policy paradigm to the EU. Referring back to the potential bottom-up 
Europeanisation patterns, this thesis contends that Germany has exhibited ‘fence-sitting’ 
in this specific policy area. 
 Secondly, as each legislative decision is actor-driven, Chapter 5 sought to 
illustrate the reasons behind Germany’s bottom-up Europeanisation pattern from a NI 
perspective. The most notable bottom-up Europeanisation scholar, Börzel, has already 
pointed to a number of important factors that affect the success of member states in terms 
of uploading their own policy-preferences to the EU. Two key factors were member 
states’ financial contributions to the EU budget and the number of their MEPs. The 
relevance of these factors in the German context appeared to be well worth reviewing 
because the reasons behind Germany’s failure in shaping the EU model highly 
contradicted the literature. The evidence presented in Chapter 5 suggested that instead 
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of the financial contributions to the EU budget and the number of the MEPs, what 
mattered more were the political consensus among the political consensus among the 
MEPs, the European Parliament Groups and the European Parliament Committees to 
which they belong, as well as their personal views on the idea of an EU level WFLR 
model. This is what, ultimately, constrained Germany from shaping the EU policy 
package. 
 As Germany could not succeed in uploading her policy preferences to the EU 
level, she could not minimise the adaptational pressure either and thus had gone through 
a top-down Europeanisation process similar to Turkey. This raised another sub-research 
question, which addressed the issue from another dimension, with which the chapter 
proceeds.     
How and to what extent has the EU influenced the domestic WFLR policies in 
Germany and Turkey? 
The highly familialised WFLR models of both countries have led them to exhibit a high 
level of misfit with the EU. In line with the goodness of fit argument, they both received 
a high level of adaptational pressure in this specific policy area. Relying on the 
combination of the policy analysis and nine in-depth interviews with EU officials, the 
thesis found that, regardless of Germany being a founding member and Turkey a 
candidate state, the EU required them both to de-familialise their legislation. In other 
words, the EU expected both Turkey and Germany to reform their WFLR policies in 
ways that would ease women’s labour market participation by reducing their 
disproportionate share of domestic tasks through transferring them to the state or at least 
to the market. 
 In response to this pressure, both governments did take some steps. It would be 
plausible to argue that each country has gone through an intense reform process. Both 
the German and Turkish governments have introduced a number of laws and bylaws 
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with respect to parental leaves, childcare provisions and working time arrangements. 
First and foremost, they have successfully transferred the EU standards on working time 
arrangements into their national legislative frameworks, and hence have managed to 
align themselves with the EU. However, the transmission of EU standards appeared 
problematic when it came to leave schemes and childcare provisions. That is because 
while passing de-familialised parental leave and childcare laws under the EU influence, 
they both continued passing familialised ones and kept the already existing ones in force 
rather than abolishing them. In other words, the overall picture regarding the 
amendments within the legislations indicated a social policy transformation in both 
countries that has led to an upgrading and widening in WFLR policies. Yet, it would be 
unjustified to argue that it was a fully-fledged transformation in terms of both speed and 
content, which in turn, resulted in an incomplete, contradictory and puzzling 
Europeanisation process in each country.  
 Although Germany has downloaded the EU directives on parental and maternal 
leaves, it was a highly belated transmission. In a like manner, Germany has also 
remained very slow in meeting the Barcelona targets. This slowness in responding 
amendments could perhaps be linked to German political elites’ reluctance in terms of 
de-familialising the German model. On the other hand, the trajectory of Turkey’s 
Europeanisation process also contains various ebbs and flows. Turkey did not have 
official deadlines for adopting the EU legislation. For this reason, it is hard to say 
whether Turkey delayed in downloading the corresponding laws or not. However, it 
appeared that there has been a significant difference in terms of the pace of the reforms. 
While the period from the 1999 Helsinki Summit to 2007 saw a greater commitment to 
fulfilling the requirements, the period from 2007 onwards exhibited a gradual 
retardation. With respect to the content of the reforms, both countries continued to 
preserve their misfit with the EU. Chapter 5 has gathered the puzzling notions within 
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the reforms under three main categories: (a) disincentives for female employment; (b) 
incentives for the reproduction of women’s motherhood roles and (c) lack of state 
responsibility in terms of facilitating the implementation of the de-familialised laws. 
 Relying on Tesebelis (2002), who states that any kind of policy-decision is a 
conscious preference of a certain ideology, this research further concentrated on the 
actors responsible for WFLR policy-making at the domestic levels. Accordingly, it 
questioned their views on the idea of Europeanising the domestic model as well as their 
contributions to the process and the barriers they have faced while contributing to the 
process, each of which stands as two additional sub-research questions. 
How have German and Turkish domestic actors responded to the Europeanisation 
of German and Turkish WFLR policies?  
Being the core analysis of this study, this question involved two dimensions: First, it 
questioned how German and Turkish domestic actors perceived the relatively greater 
EU involvement. Second, it sought to reveal the main motivations behind these actors’ 
perceptions. 
 By taking its lead from Europeanisation literature, Chapter 6 divided the 
domestic actors related to WFLR policy-making into two groups: the catalysts, who are 
in favour of Europeanising the domestic model and tried to accelerate the process and 
the antagonists, who preferred to support the status quo and aimed to decelerate the 
process. The findings of the chapter revealed that the left-leaning political parties, 
progressive women’s organisations and trade unions in both countries have successfully 
internalised EU WFLR policy-making paradigms and have come to use a similar policy 
language with the EU. Thus, they have acted as catalysts. Whereas, the right corner of 
both parliaments together with Islamist women’s organisations in Turkey and radical 
feminist women’s organisations in Germany remained non-socialised. Rather than 
adopting the EU paradigm, they have preferred to stay committed to the domestic 
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paradigm and became part of the antagonist camp. German religious, family and 
employers’ organisations also preferred to join the antagonist camp. 
 The Europeanisation and process tracing literature have successfully determined 
how to identify the domestic actors’ positions throughout the process, yet they remain 
insufficient in answering the second question raised in Chapter 6. Therefore, while 
exploring domestic actors’ views on Europeanisation of the domestic WFLR model, NI 
theory, which emphasises the domestic actors’ motivations, has been applied. From a 
NI perspective, the chapter found a number of both exogenous and endogenous factors 
resonating with all three forms of NI that have influenced domestic actors’ decisions on 
contributing to the process as a catalyst or as an antagonist. EU’s supranational 
character, generous funding opportunities and the ‘European identity’ idea were found 
to be the main Europeanisation mechanisms, whereas the subsidiarity principle, 
disapprobation of EU standards, vote-concerns and distrust of the EU encouraged 
domestic actors to act as antagonists. 
 Having explained domestic actors’ positions towards and throughout the process 
of Europeanising the domestic WFLR model in Chapter 6, the thesis carried on the actor-
centred discussion and further questioned their contributions to the process. 
How have domestic actors contributed to the process of Europeanising the 
domestic WFLR policies?     
This thesis has expected domestic impact of the EU to be filtered by the existence of the 
domestic actors. In other words, domestic actors (both governmental and 
nongovernmental) have been expected to shape the process by their contributions to the 
process. Chapter 7 aimed to reveal how the domestic actors acted throughout the process. 
More precisely, it explored the strategies and tactics they have employed as well as the 
barriers they have faced throughout the process. Given that both the strategies and the 
barriers have been influenced by the actors’ socio-political positions within the country, 
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as well as the current socio-political and socio-economic conditions intrinsic to the 
country, the discussion carried out in Chapter 7 was highly context-dependent. 
 The chapter began by differentiating a strategy from a tactic, which is an 
important difference as it highlights the impact of current socio-political conditions on 
the Europeanisation process. Although strategies and tactics work in tandem, this thesis 
accepted strategy as the overall plans designed by domestic actors in order either to 
catalyse or veto the process, whereas tactic referred to smaller plans that domestic actors 
engage with while trying to utilize their strategies. Domestic actors change their tactics 
when they face a problem in order to maintain their strategy.  
 Evidence presented in Chapter 7 suggested that both German and Turkish 
catalysts from the civil society have engaged with two main strategies: lobbying and 
WFLR service providing, whereas governmental catalysts (more in Turkey but also in 
Germany) endeavour to form cross-party alliances in order to de-familialise the 
domestic legislative frameworks in each country. A number of catalyst organisations 
both in Turkey and Germany have executed a wide range of lobbying activity in order 
to convince national governments to Europeanise the domestic WFLR models. 
However, in both countries, the lobbyist organisations have appeared to be facing some 
difficulties especially when trying to reach the lobbying target directly. This difficulty 
fund to be linked to the fact that in both countries, the ruling party – the lobbying target 
– has happened to be an antagonist, who is not in favour of Europeanising the domestic 
model.  
 In order to overcome this aforementioned problem, catalyst organisations have 
developed a number of tactics. These included regular visits and emails to members of 
the mainstream political parties; using different media tools; attending events with 
politicians and trying to have unofficial chats during those events and finally, relying on 
their personal relations. The second strategy of catalyst NGOs both in Turkey and in 
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Germany was to bypass the government and reach the public directly. Instead of trying 
to persuade the national governments to adopt a more de-familialised model, a number 
of both Turkish and German organisations have fully concentrated on raising the public 
awareness of Europeanised WFLR and providing childcare services. By doing this, they 
aim at the implementation of the EU standards at domestic levels even in the absence of 
formal legislation. In either case, the NGOs need collaboration partners in order to share 
the workload and the cost. To this end, they rationally have tried to form various 
partnerships ranging from local governments to international organisations. While they 
have succeeded in collaborating with international organisations and left-leaning local 
governments, the rightist local governments have hesitated to form those partnerships 
on the grounds of lack of shared values and norms. Although failure to form the 
necessary partnerships was the biggest barrier that catalyst organisations faced, other 
barriers stem both from the existence of the antagonists and the socio-political 
conditions of the day, slowing the catalysts down. While they eventually managed to 
overcome the problems originated from the existence of the antagonists, the same cannot 
be said for the barriers emerged from the conditions of the day.   
 All in all, while the nongovernmental catalysts in both countries have engaged 
in a number of grassroots activities; the governmental catalysts have engaged in more 
political-level activities. These included bringing WFLR issues to the table in 
Parliamentary meetings and covering the issues in party programs and elections 
manifestos, as well as establishing working groups within the parties, but most 
importantly, forming cross-party alliances. Despite being part of the political elite, this 
group of catalysts as well, faced salient difficulties while forming these cross-party 
alliances. Since the barriers that slowed the governmental catalysts down emerged from 
the political conditions of the day, unlike nongovernmental catalysts, they could not pass 
them over. 
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 According to the literature on Europeanisation, the existence of catalysts was 
supposed to Europeanise the domestic WFLR model. Yet, neither Turkish nor German 
WFLR models have appeared to be Europeanised, which could be explained through the 
antagonists’ contributions to the process. Since antagonists in both countries happened 
to be members of the ruling parties and NGOs affiliated with the ruling party in Turkish 
case, they did not have to seek as many strategies as the catalysts. Besides, due to the 
nature of the strategies that they have tapped into, they did not need as many 
collaboration partners as catalysts needed. In that sense, the governmental antagonists 
have capitalised on their governmental positions, passed the responsibility to other 
domestic authorities and tried to gain public consent on familialised WFLR policies 
through a relatively more liberal language. Due to their relatively more powerful social 
positions, antagonists faced only two major barriers. While one stemmed from the socio-
political conditions, the other stemmed from heterogeneity within the group. Given the 
catalysts in both countries were the opposition, their efforts could not prevent 
antagonists from translating their ideas into policy; it could only slow them down. 
Therefore, antagonists’ ideology has dominated the content of both Turkish and German 
WFLR policies.    
Why and to what extent the EU WFLR policies have been implemented in 
Germany and Turkey?  
Since the EU has expected the implementation of these policies from both Turkey and 
Germany, the last of four empirical chapters (Chapter 8) concentrated on the daily 
WFLR trends. It sought to reveal whether, why and to what extent Turkish and German 
people have come to reconcile their work and family lives on the basis of de-familialised 
arrangements. The data was obtained from Turkish and German academics as well as 
women’s organisation representatives.  
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 The findings of Chapter 8 suggested a number of families, exhibiting relatively 
more Europeanised reconciliation habits and another number of families, maintaining 
the national reconciliation habits have co-existed in both countries. Instead of 
categorising the domestic actors as catalysts and antagonists, Chapter 8 categorised them 
as thick learners and thin learners. That is because the daily WFLR practices of these 
individuals are an outcome of, rather than a contribution to, the process.  
 According to the literature on societal Europeanisation, domestic societal actors 
would have Europeanised their daily habits if they had come to consider the EU practices 
as the right things to do. Both German and Turkish experiences in terms of societal 
Europeanisation are interesting because neither thick learners’ nor thin learners’ 
practices were directly related to the Europeanisation process itself. Resonating mostly 
with rational choice institutionalism (RCI), economic necessity, children’s self-
development, women’s career aspirations and the changing fatherhood trends have been 
found to be the main mechanisms for relatively more Europeanised WFLR 
arrangements, whereas generous familialised incentives, service related reasons, fear of 
assimilation together with the social pressure, gender pay gap and women’s status needs, 
which resonate both with RCI and sociological institutionalism (SI), have encouraged 
Turkish and German citizens to maintain the domestic model. Relying on the findings 
of Chapter 8, this thesis suggested that rational utility-maximisation calculus played an 
important role in domestic actors’ decisions on how to reconcile their work and family 
lives. Rather than prioritising the social norms and values of the past, they sought their 
best interest.   
 In summary, the analysis carried out in four empirical chapters suggested that 
among the five potential hard Europeanisation patterns, identified by Börzel and Risse 
(2003) and Radaelli (2003), Germany has exhibited ‘absorption’, whereas Turkey’s 
Europeanisation pattern within the WFLR policies has resonated with ‘accommodation’. 
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While both patterns highlight the lack of policy-paradigm change, the level of change in 
absorption is higher than the level of change in accommodation. In other words, 
Germany has transferred more of EU’s policies compared to Turkey. Neither Germany 
nor Turkey, however, have come to be Europeanised in this specific policy area, which 
strongly contradicts the ‘governance by hierarchy’ argument, as it suggests 
Europeanising hard WFLR policies will have an impact on the domestic policy-making 
paradigm. Relying on this lack in terms of policy paradigm change, this research also 
suggested that neither Germany nor Turkey has socialised throughout the process of 
Europeanising their WFLR models. Therefore, they both exhibited a thin learning 
among the two potential soft Europeanisation patterns. This thin learning, at the end, 
highly contradicts the ‘facilitated co-ordination’ argument, as it expects soft-
Europeanisation of WFLR policies to create policy learning at domestic levels. Thus, on 
the contrary to Europeanisation literature, but in line with the main expectation of this 
thesis, the findings indicated that Europeanisation processes in these two countries have 
been filtered by the existence of domestic actors. Due to a number of reasons resonating 
with all three forms of NI, both the catalysts and antagonists have successfully 
contributed to the process. Most strikingly, the analysis of these actors’ contributions to 
the process, together with the barriers they have faced throughout the process, indicated 
that due to their relatively more powerful positions, antagonists have translated their 
views into policy outcomes more effectively than the catalysts. All in all, the relevance 
of Europeanisation to Turkish and German WFLR policies has proved to be very 
interesting as they both resonate and contradict with the literature and provide fruitful 
ground for pushing the boundaries of gender, Europeanisation and NI discussions. 
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9.3. Implications:  
The empirical findings of this research have implications both for theory and policy. 
With respect to theoretical implications, the thesis has provided insights into 
Europeanisation theory and its application to WFLR policies in the Turkish and German 
cases. However, due to the main focus of the thesis and the ways in which the research 
questions were formulated, it does not claim to make contributions to NI theory. As 
already discussed in chapter 2 (see page:34), this thesis approached Europeanisation 
through an NI lens, in order to explain the reasons behind domestic actors’ decisions 
wherein the Europeanisation literature itself remains inadequate. With respect to policy 
implications, it reflects on the repercussions of the EU-induced supranational policies at 
domestic levels and their lived consequences. In addition, the research has also explored 
the interaction between different domestic actors related to WFLR policy as well as their 
strategies for effecting the policy outcome. Finally, as the WFLR policies, by their very 
nature, cannot be examined in isolation from gender discussions, this thesis also adds 
another layer to WFLR literature by analysing their Europeanisation processes with a 
gender lens. 
9.3.1. Theory:  
The theoretical implications of this thesis fall into two major areas. The first refers to 
the theories on bottom-up Europeanisation by examining the causal factors that account 
for the member states’ capacities to influence the EU WFLR policies. The second area 
of consideration relates to the scholarship on top-down Europeanisation by speaking to 
the complexity of the process of transferring EU WFLR model into their legislative 
frameworks, from an actor-centred perspective. In addressing these two issues, this 
thesis combined literature on social policy with European studies.   
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 With respect to bottom-up Europeanisation discussions, this research offered 
insights into the domestic factors that led to one of the most powerful member state’s 
failure to shape the WFLR model at the EU level. Adding new factors, both agentic and 
structural, emergent in the German experience is very important because it might 
broaden the explanation of member states’ contributions to the European social model. 
It is argued in the literature that the financial contribution of member states to the EU 
budget; the number of their MEPs; their membership duration; and their relations with 
other member states matter greatly in terms of uploading the national policy preference 
to the EU (Börzel, 2002). This argument might still stand in other cases or in other policy 
areas. However, it has clearly been falsified in the German experience in this specific 
policy area. Instead, the German experience pointed to the policy consensus among the 
MEPs, the European Parliament Groups and Committees to which these MEPs belong 
and MEPs’ own views towards a supranational WFLR model as key factors in bottom-
up Europeanisation process. These new factors identified in the Germany’s bottom-up 
Europeanisation process can also be applied to other cases, as well as other policy areas. 
Thus, this research expands the range of causal factors that impact member states’ 
bottom-up Europeanisation processes. 
 Moreover, the findings of the interview data have emphasised the importance of 
social norms and values in the bottom-up Europeanisation process. Although acting 
rational and trying to upload the German interest to the EU level would eventually 
minimise the misfit and the concomitant adaptational cost, the German MEPs refused to 
leave their social norms and values aside. Therefore, apart from widening the range of 
causal factors significant for policy uploading process, this research also sheds light onto 
the MEP’s political debates around bottom-up Europeanisation of the German WFLR 
model by bringing NI theory into the discussion. 
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 While literature on top-down Europeanisation demonstrates the Europeanisation 
patterns of member states in the specific policy area, it excludes the candidate states 
even though candidate states are also expected to Europeanise their WFLR models. 
Therefore, this research investigated how the operation of Europeanisation differed 
between a candidate state and a member state. While comparing the top-down 
Europeanisation processes of Turkey and Germany in a policy field where the initial 
misfit with the EU was high, this research has not found any significant difference in 
terms of the ways in which Europeanisation operates. This claim might be further tested 
by comparing another official candidate state (for example, Serbia) with a member state 
which has a familialised WFLR model (such as Greece or Spain). The potential 
verification of the findings is likely to add another layer to Europeanisation discussions. 
 Furthermore, the previous research on top-down Europeanisation approached 
Europeanisation as an outcome rather than a process. This in the end had two serious 
consequences. First, a gap emerged within the literature in terms of how the policy 
transmission happens. In other words, since the existing top-down Europeanisation 
literature did not accept Europeanisation as a mutual process, it explains only the 
Europeanisation pattern and the causes, but not the mechanisms accounting for that 
particular pattern. By accepting top-down Europeanisation as a mutual process, this 
research not only explores the Europeanisation pattern of German and Turkish WFLR 
models, but also traces the mechanisms that led Turkey to exhibit accommodation and 
Germany absorption. Cross-case findings suggest that in Europeanising the domestic 
model, the views of the domestic actors as well as their capacity of action, which stems 
from their positions within the societies, play a significant role. NI theory, or more 
precisely the three forms of NI theory, suggests a way to understand both the reasons 
behind political actors’ views on and their contributions to the process, each of which 
stand as a potential Europeanisation mechanism. In both the Turkish and German 
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experiences, the ways in which domestic actors perceive Europeanisation mostly stem 
from their social norms and values, and thus resonate with SI, whereas when it came to 
taking action, domestic actors brought the rational calculations forward. These findings 
might be highly policy area-specific and context-dependent. But the theoretical 
framework developed by exploring the actors’ perceptions to and actions throughout the 
process of Europeanising the domestic WFLR models from the new institutionalist 
perspective can be applied to other contexts and can point to new mechanisms of 
Europeanisation. 
 The second gap in the existing top-down Europeanisation literature again stems 
from the ways in which Europeanisation was interpreted, and relates to implementation 
of the policies made under the EU influence. The research addressed this gap by 
exploring the daily WFLR practices of Turkish and Germany citizens, again through the 
lens of NI. In other words, this research also questioned how the EU WFLR model has 
come to be socialised by German and Turkish societal actors. The evidence presented 
suggests that it is the rational utility-maximisation calculus that shapes the domestic 
decisions on how to reconcile work and family lives. Europeanisation has not been 
observed to play any role in those decisions. Relying on this finding, this research 
proposes to add another policy learning outcome to thick and thin learning already 
identified within the literature, which would delineate situations where Europeanisation 
happens circuitously.      
9.3.2. Policy process:  
This research sheds light on the complexity of the policy-making process under the EU 
influence by explaining the politics of the Turkish and German WFLR policies through 
NI. Additionally, by involving societal Europeanisation into the discussion, it also 
speaks to policy implementation. This thesis further contributes to discussions on policy 
learning by illustrating the exchange of ideas between domestic actors both nationally 
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and internationally. Last but not least, by exploring the Europeanisation process in each 
country on the basis of familialisation/de-familialisation categorisation, this thesis also 
broadens the gender equality discussions regarding WFLR policy. However, due to the 
theoretical framework developed and the ways in which the research questions were 
formulated, this thesis does not provide any specific policy recommendations.   
 By illustrating the EU’s requirements of Turkey and Germany in terms of WFLR 
policies, together with the policy reforms made in Turkey and Germany, this research 
posits the Europeanisation patterns of Germany and Turkey. The analysis of the policies 
made under the EU influence demonstrates an incomplete and contradictory 
Europeanisation process in each country. Building on the premise that each policy 
outcome is a conscious preference of a certain ideology, this research puts an exceptional 
effort into understanding the views of the domestic actors related to policy-making on 
Europeanisation of WFLR policies.  
 Although opposing views towards Europeanisation simultaneously existed in 
each country, this research found that certain ideologies dominated the policy content. 
For example, progressive women’s organisations, who support a more Europeanised 
WFLR model, co-exist with Christian democratic and Muslim democratic politicians, 
who support the subsidiarity principle in policy-making. Therefore, the dissertation 
traces the process of translating the ideas into policy outcomes. In other words, this 
research analyses domestic actors’ strategies in shaping the policy content. While some 
strategies appear to be country specific due to socio-political conditions of the day and 
the context, some appeared to be general. Nevertheless, the findings of this research 
suggested that regardless of the context and regardless of the aim (either accelerating or 
decelerating the process), the strategies utilised and the barriers faced by the 
governmental actors and nongovernmental actors are highly different from one another 
and the nongovernmental actors mostly need the governmental actors’ collaborations. 
 287 
Relying on this finding, nongovernmental actors aiming to shape the policy content, not 
just in this specific policy field but in general, may redesign their strategies by putting 
more effort into finding ways to network with governmental actors. Findings from the 
Turkish and German experiences have identified a number of ways to do so. For 
example, lobbying activity through Eid visits pursued by Turkish women’s 
organisations might set an example to NGOs in other Muslim countries. Or the failure 
of German opposition parties to form cross-party alliances, whilst the political consensus 
among Turkish opposition parties has succeeded in passing de-familialised laws, might 
highlight the importance of strategic partnerships. 
 Furthermore, another implication that the actors related to WFLR policy-making 
may consider is the significance of international idea exchange. As experienced both in 
the Turkish and the German cases, apart from transferring EU WFLR policies, attending 
international conferences and getting to know better examples had significant impact at 
domestic level in terms advancing the domestic legislation. Therefore, both 
governmental and nongovernmental actors may participate in these kinds of events more 
frequently and may learn the models applied in other countries. Although international 
idea exchange has appeared to be a useful tool for policy learning in Germany and 
Turkey, its validity might further be tested in other cases. The potential justification of 
this finding can point to new mechanisms that would lead to policy learning and would 
combine the actor-centred policy analysis with the policy learning scholarship.  
 Policy that induces change is also expected to alter the daily practices of citizens. 
In other words, a relatively more Europeanised WFLR model is expected to Europeanise 
the WFLR routines of people. However, especially the German, but also the Turkish, 
experiences have challenged this assumption. As the evidence presented in Chapter 8 
demonstrates, a number of families maintain the traditional domestic trends. When 
questioning the causes of this non-Europeanised WFLR arrangements, a number of 
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service related reasons appeared, especially in the German case, where although the law 
gives a statutory kindergarten enrolment right to every single child older than one year 
old, a number of mothers continue to care for their children by themselves. The 
insufficient number of kindergartens and the incompatible working hours of the 
kindergartens, for example, appeared to be the main reasons behind this non-
Europeanised habit. The insufficiency of domestic infrastructure with respect to 
childcare impairs the implementation of the EU induced policies. Similarly, a number 
of parents who identify themselves as secular in the Turkish case also hesitate to send 
their children to a day-care place just because they do not trust the national curricula. 
These problems stemming from the country-specific dynamics raise the question: is the 
EU’s one size fits all approach the right approach to WFLR policy? Therefore, domestic 
actors engaged with WFLR policy-making and WFLR service providing might take this 
finding into account. To this end, this thesis suggests first that up-to-date cross-country 
research explore the demands and needs of parents with child responsibilities. 
 The findings of this thesis also reiterate the complex and tangled nature of WFLR 
policies in terms of gender equality and labour market participation. There has already 
been a lack of consensus on what the WFLR policy should stand for among the feminist 
scholars. While for some feminist scholars, the WFLR policies should serve women’s 
economic independence (Mazur, 2002), for some others they should provide women the 
right to choose between work and care (Hakim, 2000). By exploring not only the 
Europeanisation of policy outcome but also the policy paradigm with respect to WFLR, 
this thesis realises that the meaning attributed to, and the expectations of, WFLR policy 
highly differ from one domestic actor to another. The analysis of EU WFLR policies on 
the basis of familialisation/de-familialisation categorisation indicates that the main aim 
of the EU, when WFLR policy-making, is to provide women’s labour market 
participation. To this end, both the Turkish and German catalysts (partially due to their 
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own socio-political ideologies and partially due to their support for the Europeanisation 
process) also favoured WFLR policy-making for women’s labour market participation, 
whereas the antagonists from both countries (partially due to their relatively more 
conservative stance and partially due to their anti-Europeanisation position) preferred 
WFLR policy-making for women’s motherhood roles. This actor-centred analysis of 
WFLR policy paradigm derives from the German and Turkish cases, yet might be 
generalised to other cases as well. This finding would contribute to feminist discussions 
on WFLR policies by providing insights into the domestic actors’ approaches towards 
WFLR policy-making. 
9.4. Further research:  
This study has explored the process of Europeanising the domestic WFLR model in two 
countries that are at very different levels in terms of social policy development from an 
actor-centred perspective. Relying on the evidence presented in four empirical chapters, 
this thesis indicates that the context and the policy area are crucial in explaining not only 
the Europeanisation process but also the pattern. In this regard, the findings of this 
research open up a number of areas, both empirical and theoretical, for future research. 
 First and foremost, future research can apply the theoretical framework 
developed in this thesis to other contexts or other policy areas, where the EU has the 
competence. Analysing the Europeanisation process of a country from four different 
levels offers a holistic explanation of the policy-making and policy implementation 
process. Relevance of this theoretical framework to other policy areas such as 
immigration policy, one of the most salient issues in recent politics, will bring valuable 
insights to European studies. Even though there is a growing body of research on how 
immigration policies have been changing within the last decade (Faist and Ette, 2007; 
Guiraudon and Lahav, 2013; Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004), the politics of the 
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immigration policies have been well less researched. To this end, further research can 
enrich the literature through the actor-centred theoretical framework developed under 
the scope of this research, which includes both the bottom-up and top-down dimensions 
of Europeanisation. Moreover, the findings of this research have indicated that both 
Germany and Turkey have been prolapsing towards a de-Europeanisation path from a 
Europeanisation path. The future research might analyse the de-Europeanisation 
mechanisms with the actor-centred theoretical framework of this thesis. 
 Second, the data with respect to daily WFLR practices were obtained from the 
academics and from women’s organisation representatives. Hence, it reflected their 
interpretations of German and Turkish citizens’ daily habits. The future research can 
collect data from people who actually have a work and a family life that needs to be 
reconciled. This might identify new factors causing or limiting societal Europeanisation, 
not only for Turkey and Germany, but for any member and candidate state. By doing so, 
future research would extend the literature on societal Europeanisation, which actually 
is the least researched dimension of Europeanisation. 
 Finally, there has been a voluminous body of research on the impact of the EU 
on empowerment of the NGOs especially in candidate states; as well-functioning civil 
society is part of the Copenhagen criteria (Kohler-Koch and Finke, 2007; İçduygu, 2011; 
Ketola, 2013; Kohler-Koch, 2010). Studies have already offered insights on how the 
European integration have enhanced NGOs. However, the impact of de-Europeanisation 
on NGOs has been well less researched. The findings of this research suggest that with 
the decline of the European integration, the functioning of social dialogue has worsened, 
which has led women’s organisations to seek alternative methods for their own existence 
and development. Although this study addressed only women’s organisations lobbying, 
networking and funding strategies, further research can examine how other NGOs such 
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as environmentalists or anti-tobacco lobbyists have been affected by this de-
Europeanised climate, which would push the boundaries of civil society literature. 
 From an empirical perspective, critical junctures such as the war in Syria; the 
approved Constitutional Referendum, which brought the presidential system to Turkey; 
and the rise of the extreme-right in Germany, especially the Alternative for Germany 
(Alternative für Deutschland – AFD) winning twenty percent of the vote, may have the 
potential to constrain WFLR development and assuage the Europeanisation process in 
each country. On the other hand, this current research has identified that the Family 
Minister of Germany has brought forward a number of initiatives, which might 
contribute to the Europeanisation of the German WFLR model, especially the 
Transparency on Pay Act, which passed in May 2017. With the aid of NGOs, these 
initiatives have the potential to reduce gender inequality in German citizens’ daily 
practices of reconciling their work and family lives. Similarly, the potential annulment 
of the state of emergency in Turkey might calm the intense and anxious climate among 
NGOs, which could also be a factor, potentially accelerating the Europeanisation 
process in this specific policy area. Further research might analyse the impacts of these 
developments on the process of Europeanising WFLR arrangements, which adds 
another layer to WFLR policy studies and literature on civil society as well as European 
studies. 
 A second fruitful empirical avenue for further research might be to explore the 
in-country differences. In both Turkey and in Germany, there is considerable difference 
between the eastern and western parts. While the previous research had explained these 
East-West differences through the centre-periphery relations in Turkey (Mardin, 1973; 
Ketola, 2010) and the legacy of the divided years in Germany (Engelhardt et al., 2002; 
Guenter, 2010; Pfau-Effinger and Geissler, 2002), further research might focus on how 
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Appendix 1: Interview guide 
Interview guide for MPs:  
Party: 
o How does your party define gender equality? 
o How does your party define gender equality in terms of employment?  
o How does your party define WFLR? 
o Can you please comment on EU WFLR legislation? 
o Can you please comment on EU’s involvement in this policy sphere?  
o Can you please comment on general female employment trends in your country? 
o Can you please comment on existing WFLR legislation of your country?  
Goals and action taking:  
o Do you have an action plan regarding WFLR?  
If yes:  
a) can you please mention about it? 
b) will you be collaborating with any governmental or non-governmental     
organization while taking action?  
c) can you please comment on your strategies while taking action (party campaign, 
parliamentary question, parliamentary commissions and so on.) 
If no:  
a) Can you please explain the reasons behind? 
Political consensus:   
o Can you please comment on your exchange with other political parties with respect 
to WFLR policy-making?  
o Are you facing any opposition? If yes, can you please mention about it? 
Civil society relations:  
o Can you please comment on the CSOs of your country?  
o Can you please mention about your relationship with the CSOs?  
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Interview guide for advocacy NGOs:  
Organization: 
o How does your organization define gender equality? 
o How does your organization define gender equality in terms of employment?  
o How does your organization define WFLR? 
o Can you please comment on EU WFLR legislation? 
o Can you please comment on EU’s involvement in this policy sphere? (does this 
involvement have any impact on your organization? If yes, how?).  
o Can you please comment on general female employment trends in your country? 
o Can you please comment on existing WFLR legislation of your country?  
o Can you please comment on government’s position on WFLR? 
Goals and action taking:  
o Does your organization’s action plan include WFLR? If yes, can you please mention 
about it?  
o Can you please comment on your lobbying strategy? (how do you identify the 
lobbying target? How do you set the lobbying agenda?  
o Are you facing any problems while taking action? If yes, can you please mention 
about them? 
Networking:  
o Do you collaborate with other organisations in terms of your activities regarding 
WFLR? If yes, can you please mention about it? (how, why, with whom?). If no, can 
you please mention about it? (why?).  
o Do you collaborate with any governmental actors? If yes, can you please mention 
about it? (how, why, with which institutions?) If no, can you please mention about 
it? (why?).  
o Do you have any exchange with any political party other than your lobbying activity? 
Can you please mention about it? (how, why, with which parties?).  
o Do you have any exchange with any EU institutions? If yes, can you please mention 
about it? (how, why, with which institution?). If no, can you please mention about 
it? (why?).  
o Do you have any exchange with any international CSO? If yes, can you please 
mention about it? (how, why, with which institution?). If no, can you please mention 
about it? (why?).  
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Interview guide for Academics and research NGOs: 
o Can you please mention about female employment trends in your country? 
o Can you please mention about key factors behind these trends?  
o Can you please mention about division of paid employment and unpaid domestic 
work between men and women?  
o Can you please mention about key factors behind this division?  
o Can you please mention about current WFLR trends in your country? (care 
arrangements, parental leave take up and working time arrangements?).  
o Can you please mention about key factors behind these WFLR trends? 
Interview guide for EU officials:  
Views on EU work and family life reconciliation policies: 
o Can you please comment on EU work and family life reconciliation policies?  
o Can you please comment on relatively increased EU involvement in terms of 
WFLR policies in member/candidate states?  
o Can you please mention about the informational/technical and financial exchange 
between the EU and the member/candidate states? 
Views on cases:  
o Can you please comment on Germany’s/Turkey’s progress since 2000 in terms of 
WFLR policy making? 






















Research Title: The Politics of Europeanisation Patterns of Work and Family life 
Reconciliation Policy: Germany and Turkey.  
 
My name is Nazli Kazanoglu and I am a PhD student in the School of Social Policy at Ulster 
University. The essential focus of my PhD is gender equality within the work and family life 
reconciliation policies and I am particularly interested in comparing the Europeanisation 
processes of Germany and Turkey in this specific policy area.  
 
While there have been many accounts of the historical and contemporary development of work-
family reconciliation policy both at the EU and national level, the analysis of the transmission 
process of corresponding EU-standards into domestic levels -especially when it comes to 
candidate countries- and internalization of those standards by domestic political and non-
political actors have been less researched, which this study hopes to address.  
 
I would like to invite you to participate in an interview which will last approximately an hour. 
Your interview will be completely anonymous and your name will not appear in any report 
resulting from this research. However, some anonymous quotations may be used only with your 
permission. Moreover, the interview may also be recorded with your permission in order to 
facilitate data collection and subsequent data analysis and no further copies will be made of any 
recordings or interview transcripts. Shortly after the interview, if requested, I will send you a 
copy of the transcript for you to confirm the accuracy of the interview or to clarify any points 
you wish.  
 
Any material collected in the context of this research project will be only used for academic non-
profit purposes and will be treated as confidential. Any information collected during the course 
of the research will be stored securely on password protected devises under the guidance of the 
Data Protection Act (1998). Only the lead researcher (Nazli Kazanoglu) and her supervisors 
(Prof. Ann Marie Gray and Dr. Markus Ketola) will have access to collected information and it 
will be destroyed ten years after the completion of this study. Your participation is completely 
voluntary and you may withdraw from the interview any time without giving a reason.  
 
If you have any further questions or would like more information on the research please contact 
myself Nazli Kazanoglu on 02890 368461 or kazanoglu-n@email.ulster.ac.uk or contact room 
2D02 The Research Graduate Office, University of Ulster, Jordanstown Campus, BT37 0QB, 
Northern Ireland.  
 
Alternatively, you can also contact my supervisors: 
Prof. Dr. Ann Marie Gray: am.gray@ulster.ac.uk  
Dr. Markus Ketola: m.ketola@ulster.ac.uk  
 297 











Title of Study: The Politics of Europeanisation Patterns of Work and Family life Reconciliation 
Policy: Germany and Turkey 
 
 
Researcher: Nazli Kazanoglu 
Supervisors: Prof. Ann Marie Gray and Dr. Markus Ketola 
 
Please read the following information and tick in the space provided to confirm you agree 
with the following statements: 
 
 
1. I agree to take part in the above research project: {_____} 
 
2. I give permission to be audio recorded for analysis purposes only: {_____} 
 
3. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw from the study 
at any time without giving a reason and without my rights being affected: {_____}  
 
4. I understand that my personal details will be kept anonymous: {_____} 
  
5. I understand that data relating to this project may be archived: {_____} 
 
6. I understand that the researchers will hold all information and data collected during the 
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